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# U. S. NAVAL DETACHMENT IN TURKISH WATERS, 1919-1924

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Turkey entered the World War of 1914-1918 on the side of the Central Powers in the fall of 1914, and was the last nation to make peace with the Allies. The defeat of the Turks by the British in Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, and Syria and the surrender of Bulgaria on the western border of Turkey forced her to sign an armistice on board the British battleship Agamemnon at the island of Mudros on October 30, 1918. As soon as the mine fields were cleared away, Allied forces occupied the forts on the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and on November 10 the first British destroyer reached Constantinople. Three days later a large squadron of British, French, Italian, and Greek warships anchored off that place. Thus the Allies came into possession of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, a highway which had been a source of international rivalry and warfare for centuries. Rounding out her spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain now marched into the Mosul oil fields in northern Mesopotamia and, after the collapse of the Russians on the Caucasus frontier, into Baku, taking over the railroad from that place to Batum on the Black Sea. No immediate steps were taken to effect a military occupation of Anatolia, the only portion of the old Ottoman Empire left to the Turks.

The Allies also secured control of Russian ports on the northern shore of the Black Sea at the end of 1918. After fighting unsuccessfully on the side of the Allies, Russia had succumbed to an internal revolution which placed the Bolsheviks in power in November 1917. This government was not recognized by the Allies nor by the United States. They negotiated a separate treaty with the victorious Germans at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 by which

Russia was deprived of Ukrainia in South Russia and the Armenian provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum in the Caucasus. Formerly Turkish, the Armenian provinces were occupied by the Turks but were lost in November 1918 to the British who moved out in the following year. The armistice of November 11, 1918 between the Allies and Germany provided for the withdrawal of German forces from all Black Sea ports. Following the occupation of Constantinople, the Allied fleet crossed the Black Sea and secured control of the Russian ports, which were used as bases of supply for Allied aid to the White Russian armies of Generals Denikin and Wrangel in their efforts to overthrow the Bolsheviks.

The Allies set themselves up in power at Constantinople to enforce the terms of the armistice and to win whatever economic advantages they could from their position. Vice Admiral A. S. Gough-Calthorpe, who as commander of the Allied fleet in the eastern Mediterranean had negotiated the armistice of Mudros, became the British High Commissioner, taking up his residence at the British embassy. Vice Admiral Amet represented the French, and other High Commissioners were appointed by the Italians and Greeks. Together the Allied representatives formed the Allied High Commission, on which the United States had no member. Both the British and the French had assistant High Commissioners. British and French generals commanded the troops garrisoning the fortifications in the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. Constantinople itself was occupied by military forces employed as embassy guards and as a depot for the Bosporus garrisons. The old Turkish government remained in existence under the Sultan, but it took orders from the Allied High Commission, particularly from the British in regard to Constantinople and the Straits. In Asiatic Turkey, however, the voice of the Government had little effect and disorder became rampant. The sanitary administration of Constantinople was taken over by the Allied High Commission

which effected much improvement in conditions prior to its relinquishment of control to the Turkish National Government in November 1922.

After years of war the Near East was in a deplorable situation. Transportation and communication had broken down or practically broken down everywhere. Food and clothing were greatly in need in Turkey, Greece, and in South Russia. Black bread composed partly of sawdust and straw was being sold at exorbitant prices in Constantinople. Off in the interior the peasants had stores of wheat on hand, but they would not sell it because they could not get the clothing and equipment they needed. The armistice did not bring peace to this region, for fighting went on throughout most of the Near East between different factions or races or between the Allied forces and the people they were attempting to subdue. Conditions became worse before they got better. Yet the armistice was not long signed before Americans began trending into the Levant and South Russia.

The United States had no part in the defeat and occupation of Turkey, which was largely a British show, a fact which resulted in the British assuming the upper hand in the Allied occupation of Constantinople. Upon the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany in April 1917, Turkey under German pressure severed diplomatic relations with the United States, but war was not declared between the two countries. The considerable investment of Americans in missionary, educational, philanthropic, and commercial enterprises in Turkey apparently influenced the decision of the United States Government in this connection. The U. S. S. Scorpion, a converted yacht purchased for use during the Spanish War in 1898 which had been the American stationnaire at Constantinople for a number of years, was interned in 1917. On November 9, 1918 the Scorpion was permitted to raise its flag and began to receive military equipment which had been removed by the Turks. A relief crew arrived on board the U. S. S. Nanna

on December 16, and two days later Commander Elmer W. Tod relieved Lieut. Herbert S. Babbitt in command of the Scorpion.

The question of a United States representative at Constantinople was taken up in Washington after the armistice. It was decided not to reestablish diplomatic relations with Turkey immediately, so early in December Mr. Lewis Heck, the former Turkish Secretary of the American Embassy at Constantinople, was ordered to return there as United States Commissioner. The Swedish Legation was to continue to handle our diplomatic affairs. In practice Mr. Heck carried on much business by word of mouth, formal written communications being handled by the Swedish Legation. Agreeing to the desires of the State Department, the Secretary of the Navy directed Admiral William S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, then in London to detail an officer of rank from personnel abroad on duty in Constantinople, where a station ship was to be maintained. Mr. Heck reached the city on the Golden Horn on December 27, 1918 and took up his quarters in the American Embassy. The naval officer selected for the post at Constantinople by Admiral Benson and Admiral William S. Sims, Force Commander of the U. S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, whose headquarters was at London, was Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, a veteran of thirty-six years' service in the Navy. During the war he had served on convoy duty in command of the U. S. S. North Carolina until placed in command of Naval Base 27 at Plymouth, England on October 24, 1918. He later had additional duty as U. S. representative on the Allied Commission in Belgium to enforce naval terms of the armistice with Germany. Pursuant to orders of December 30, 1918, he proceeded to London and received instructions from Admiral Sims. In Paris a few days later he conferred with the American officials assembled there for the peace conference, including Admiral Benson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Herbert Hoover of the Food

Administration, Edward N. Hurley of the U. S. Shipping Board, and President Wilson. He was told to represent the United States Government in looking after American interests and to do what was right. On January 8, 1919 he was assigned to duty as Senior U. S. Naval Officer, Turkey in command of the waters east of longitude 21°, which included all of Greece, except Corfu, and the region to the east. From Paris he travelled via Rome to Taranto, where he boarded the U. S. S. Schley on January 24 for the voyage to Constantinople.

The U. S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters came into existence on January 28 when Rear Admiral Bristol raised his flag on the Scorpion. During the first few days visits of ceremony were exchanged with the High Commissioners of Great Britain and France and the commanding naval officers of those countries and Italy and Greece. Bristol got the impression from Admiral Calthorpe that he considered himself in the position of chief authority in the occupying forces. Relations with the Allied officials and with those of Turkey were thereafter handled by Admiral Bristol as Senior Representative of the United States. The U. S. Commissioner, Mr. Heck, handled the ordinary diplomatic and consular matters. Cordial relations were immediately established between the two representatives, the Admiral being a much older man becoming the senior. Heck departed for the United States in April 1919 and was succeeded as Acting Commissioner by Gabriel Bie Ravndal who had recently resumed the post of Consul General which he held before the breaking of diplomatic relations with Turkey. Admiral Bristol concerned himself with matters pertaining to the armistice, military and naval affairs, relations between the United States and Turkey and with the representatives of all other countries.

The accommodations on board the Scorpion were quite inadequate for business and entertainment purposes so it was necessary to establish headquarters on

shore. On his own authority Admiral Bristol moved into the American Embassy, where the U. S. Commissioner was already located and which also provided office space for Howard Heinz, the representative of the U. S. Food Administration. As communication by cable was limited and expensive, a radio station was set up in the Embassy by means of which continuous and confidential communication was had with the naval vessels operating in the command and with Washington. The naval communication office served all American activities in the area, including relief organizations and business concerns. A newspaper containing intelligence received by radio was distributed in mimeographed form among American organizations and became so much in demand even among foreigners that the edition had to be enlarged.

Other naval activities at Constantinople were housed elsewhere. A naval supply base was established in a leased building on the water front. A dental office was housed in a small frame building constructed for its accommodation by the British naval authorities. The port office was located at first on board the Scorpion and later in a building occupied by other Allied port officers. A station ship, usually the Scorpion, was always kept in the Bosporus moored to the quay and connected by telephone with the Embassy. A tank for fuel oil storage was rented from the Standard Oil Company. Good facilities were available in private shipyards for the repair and overhauling of the vessels in the detachment. The detachment, however, ran an engineering machine shop. A naval dispensary was operated to care for ships' crews on leave in Constantinople. Medical cases which could not be properly cared for on board ship were taken to the American Hospital, where special wards were attended by naval medical officers. Admiral Bristol was largely responsible for the establishment of this hospital.

To assist him in his varied activities, Admiral Bristol build up during his first year in Constantinople a staff of naval officers each of whom had definite duties to perform. He brought with him on the Schley Lieut. Comdr. Ernest V. Stebbins. Other officers who arrived during February and March included Lieut. Comdrs. George M. Tisdale, and Hamilton V. Bryan, Lt. (j. g.) Robert S. Dunn, Lt. William R. Stewart, and Ensigns Samuel J. Pattison, and Charles B. Carroll. But he found it difficult during 1919 to obtain all the help he needed; he worried along knowing that he was not doing the work as well as he should. At the beginning he used the officer material that was on hand; not long after his arrival he appointed the captain of the Scorpion, port officer because it was necessary to have this position filled immediately to handle the ships arriving from the United States with relief cargoes. Early in 1920 he described his staff as follows:

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4. The offices of the Senior U. S. Naval Officer, Turkey are located in the American Embassy. This office contains the following officers and necessary men: Operations Officer; Flag Secretary; Flag Lieutenant; Communications; Intelligence service. Operations of force, policy of ship movements, general fuel situation with future needs are handled by Operations Officer. This same officer is United States representative on the Advisory Committee of the Associated Governments for the Regulation of Trade in Turkey and also assistant to the Senior U. S. Naval Officer, Turkey for Shipping Board and Merchant affairs. He is senior aide on the Staff. The Flag Secretary has charge of all general secretarial work both for Naval and for High Commissioner duties. He has charge of officer personnel and general supervision of the communication clerical record and distribution as well as Navy personnel in all offices at the Embassy.

The Flag Lieutenant has charge of transportation by automobiles, rail, steamer or other means; in charge of all Communication transmission and receiving systems; has charge of government automobiles; general Flag Lieutenant duties.

The Communication Office, as its name implies, has all outgoing and incoming communication work to handle. The Communication Officer with his commissioned and enlisted personnel handles all official work and also all Red Cross, Near East Relief, Food Administration and commercial work. Military occupation of the country has necessitated that messages be given an official stamp to "get through" and commercial work was practically stopped until we began handling it.

The Intelligence Service is self-explanatory. Its principal and most important work is that of watching, reporting and following the political doings of our Allies as well as the various other nations in the Near East. The Russian situation also holds this service owing to the necessity of forever watching the trend of Bolshevism with regard to its effect on the political and the economic conditions of this whole country.

In addition, to handle supplies and provisions, as well as pay accounts, a supply office had to be established ashore. This office maintains provisions, clothing, N.S.A. stores and canteen supplies for the force. All Supply Officer work for ships without such officers is done by this office. For destroyers, subchasers, eagle boats and ships without supply officers, this office maintains a canteen, clothing and small store issue room. Public bills, fuel bills, fresh provision contracts, purchasing of foreign currency and such are handled by this office.

The stationship handles actual ship operations, berthing, keeps the station boats, is radio traffic ship, is in charge of enlisted personnel, handles all ship repairs and docking, furnishes extra help and mechanics when needed and, in general, is practically a tender to the other ships.

The U. S. Naval Port Officer, who is the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. SCORPION, is the U. S. representative at the meetings of the Allied Port Officers--he is present in an advisory capacity and keeps the Senior U. S. Naval Officer, Turkey informed of the policy, orders and desires of the Allied Port Officials to permit our Navy to cooperate with them since we are not a party to the Armistice with Turkey. In connection with the Port Office is an officer known as Naval Transport Officer. This officer has to do with boarding United States merchant ships, arranging their clearance, berthing, aiding them in every possible manner towards expediting loading and unloading in conjunction with agents; following up work of various agents and, in fact, under guidance of Senior U. S. Naval Officer, Turkey he does everything possible to aid American Shipping and American Merchants in obtaining a fair deal in the Near East where graft, profiteering, discrimination and every known hindrance to trade is allowed to flourish unchecked.

> The Staff Medical Officer attends all meetings of the Inter-Allied Sanitary Commission in an advisory capacity and cooperates with this Commission in every way possible. The Dental Surgeon for the force has an office on shore because there is no ship that has a proper place for his work; also, owing to small amount of time spent in this port by destroyers, the Dental Surgeon, with his portable outfit, makes trips on them to carry out dental work on them.
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> ....

An officer on Bristol's staff also supervised a permanent shore patrol, which was maintained in Constantinople to police the liberty men from American warships.

As Senior U. S. Representative in Turkey Admiral Bristol was the head of all the American agents in Constantinople and performed duties which were diplomatic in character. Agreeable working relations were established with Mr. Beck and Mr. Heinz, Admiral Bristol being constantly consulted in regard to their problems. Documents relating to American policy in the Near East were referred to him for his opinion. For a time, until the appointment of a director, Admiral Bristol represented the U. S. Shipping Board in connection with operations of its ships in the district, and afterwards he took up matters for it with the Allied authorities. To successfully combat the competition of the European nations, who had the advantage of being on the Allied High Commission, it was realized that a smoothly running machine was necessary.

The foremost task handled by the American officials in Constantinople in 1919-1920 was the administration of American relief. This had to be undertaken immediately, for naval cargo ships began arriving in February 1919. The American Committee for Relief in the Near East, more commonly known as the Near East Relief, originally organized in 1915 to alleviate the sufferings of the oppressed Armenians and Syrians, began pouring in supplies purchased from contributions taken up in the United States. Its managing director, Major

Davis C. Arnold, was located at Constantinople. An appropriation of $100,000,000 was made by an act of Congress approved February 24, 1919 for the relief of the non-enemy countries of Europe but not excluding the Armenians, Syrians, Greeks, and other Christian and Jewish population of Asia Minor. Under the terms of this act the President appointed Herbert Hoover Director General of the American Relief Administration and authorized the employment of the Food Administration Grain Corporation to purchase, transport, and distribute foodstuffs and supplies to countries requiring relief. The Constantinople office under Heinz controlled activities of the A. R. A. in Turkey, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Caucasus. Hundreds of agents of these organizations began working throughout the Near East and South Russia. The American Red Cross, a branch of which had been established in Turkey in 1911, opened a headquarters for southeastern Europe in Constantinople in January 1920 and engaged in relief activities among Russian refugees in Constantinople, Greece, Bulgaria, and South Russia. Proti, an island of the Prinkipo group, was used by the Red Cross in the operations carried on at Constantinople. Large numbers of American missionaries who returned to the region after the war worked with these agencies, besides carrying on their missions and schools.

The Navy rendered various kinds of assistance to the relief agencies. Admiral Bristol made all necessary arrangements with the Allied authorities. He designated naval officers to serve as port officers at Smyrna, Constantinople, Derindje, and Constanza, Roumania to handle relief cargoes. As far as it was available, transportation was furnished to employees of the agencies to ports visited by naval vessels. The ships also carried mail for all American interests and supplied radio communication. $5,000,000 in gold received from the government of Bulgaria for American flour supplied by the Grain Corporation

was deposited on board destroyers at Constantinople and in the fall of 1919 transported on board the U. S. S. Laub to New York.

The same assistance was given to American business concerns operating in the Near East. The most active of these was apparently the Standard Oil Company of New York, which had an office in Constantinople and branches in Turkey and the Balkan States. Numerous other companies established offices after the reopening of the region to commercial activity. A naval officer represented the United States on the Associated Governments' Advisory Trade Committee, seeking to promote fair competitive practices among businessmen. Gold used to pay for products exported to the United States, particularly tobacco, was transported in naval vessels, the commanders of which under the laws and regulations were entitled to collect a small commission for this service. Transportation was furnished to the employees of commercial companies at the small charge of $1 a day.

The Navy Department received from both the relief agencies and the business concerns many letters of appreciation touching the services rendered by Admiral Bristol, his staff, and his destroyer commanders. The good will that was built up among and by Americans in the Near East was reflected in the attitude of the Turkish government towards the United States, which was usually more favorable than that exhibited towards the European countries.

During the first part of 1919 the naval detachment comprised three converted yachts, the Scorpion, the Noma, and the Nahma, and subchasers nos. 82, 128, 129, and 215. The subchasers were active in the beginning in Grecian waters in connection with relief operations, particularly at Piraeus, the port of Athens. After the arrival of four destroyers in May the operations of the detachment were more extensive. Their arrival was soon followed by the detachment of the

Navy on the Dahna and some of the subchasers.

Concern felt by the Navy Department as to Bristol's status in Constantinople led to an improvement in his position. At the time of his appointment there was doubt as to the advisability of the designation of a flag officer, but Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels overruled Benson on this point. There was also a question as to what the Admiral's relation to the State Department representative, Mr. Heck, would be. The exact capacity of the latter was communicated to him by the State Department on January 21, 1919 in a telegram which directed that he was to have no diplomatic relations with the Turkish government, that he should maintain friendly relations with the Allied representatives and cooperate with them, that his chief mission was to keep the State Department informed about conditions in Turkey, and that Admiral Bristol on his arrival was to take precedence over him. Admiral Benson continued to feel that two representatives were unnecessary and recommended in February that Admiral Bristol be detached. Early in the following month Secretary Daniels, after a consultation with Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk, decided that Bristol should remain in Constantinople. Mr. Heck returned to the United States in April because of ill health and was replaced a month later by an acting commissioner, Mr. G. Bie Ravndal, the consul general.

Further clarification of the situation followed. In dealing with the representatives of the Allies in Constantinople Bristol found that he was placed at a disadvantage because his position as Senior U. S. Representative was not as exalted as that of High Commissioner which was held by them. Through persistence Admiral Bristol succeeded in largely overcoming this hindrance, but in July he finally communicated the difficulty to Admiral Benson and Admiral Henry S. Knapp, who had succeeded Admiral Sims as Force Commander, U. S. Naval

Forces Operating in European Waters, expressing the opinion that if the State Department had done the right thing by him he could have accomplished more. Both of these officers agreed that his position ought to be clarified. It also became apparent in Washington that friction had developed between Bristol and Ravndal because of their ill-defined relations. Benson was in communication with the State Department in August, and on the 12th a commission as High Commissioner signed by the President was issued to Bristol. In communicating this action to the Admiral, Secretary of State Lansing stated that Mr. Ravndal and other consular representatives of the United States would be directed to report to him and place themselves under his direction. As High Commissioner, Bristol was responsible to the State Department and was to receive instructions from it which were to be communicated through the Department in order to keep it properly advised. As Senior U. S. Naval Officer Present, Turkey he continued, under the Force Commander of the U. S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, who was to be the medium of communication between Bristol and the Navy Department and between the American Peace Commission at Paris, to run the naval detachment.

Although he had been performing the duties before, the official bestowal upon Bristol of the rank of High Commissioner enabled him in conjunction with his naval command to function more effectively. Receipt of the commission was followed by an announcement to the effect that it had been received. At this time the connection of the Swedish Legation with American affairs ceased. The appointment concentrated in the Admiral full responsibility for safeguarding all American interests. Since he had control of the warships of the United States in those waters, his knowledge of the political conditions enabled him to employ them to the best advantage and to have them in the right place at

the right time. Through the American consuls at Smyrna, Bagdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, and Samsun, who were designated by the State Department as the delegates of the High Commissioner, and through other Americans - official and unofficial - stationed in or travelling in the region, Admiral Bristol was able to keep well informed of occurrences in the interior - probably better informed than the other foreign representatives who had less extensive means of communication. Americans passing through Constantinople were always welcomed at the Embassy, where the Admiral made himself accessible, although it increased the problems on his hands. Subsequently a delegate was also stationed at Angora (Ankara) which became the new capital of Turkey under the Nationalists.

After his appointment as High Commissioner, Admiral Bristol maintained both a diplomatic and a naval staff in the American Embassy. To the former several secretaries, a commercial attache, and a military attache were attached. A counsellor was later added to this staff. Separate files were kept for the two staffs, so that in case the Admiral should be relieved of his diplomatic post no difficulty would be experienced and the Embassy files could be left intact. In 1920 the consular section of the High Commission was removed from the Embassy, much to the relief of the remainder of the staff which had become crowded.

The investment in Admiral Bristol of a dual responsibility increased his work and caused him to request in the spring of 1920 authority to designate one of the officers operating under his command as chief of staff to handle the details of administering the naval vessels. This request was denied in that year, but on April 15, 1921 Capt. Lyman A. Cotten reported for duty as chief of staff. Somewhat less than a year afterwards he was succeeded by

Capt. Arthur J. Hepburn, who retained the post until it was discontinued in the spring of 1924. The chief of staff took over the duties of planning the use of destroyers and issuing movement orders; inspecting and relieving them; adjusting difficulties into which sailors got which usually caused controversy with foreign representatives and which required an officer of rank to straighten out; and handling correspondence concerning routine matters with the Navy Department.

The settlement with Turkey was taken up by the Allied peace conference at Paris in 1919-1920, but it got nowhere because of events in Turkey, which were partly the result of the action of the conference. Secret agreements made during the war among the Allies provided for the partitioning of the domains of the old Ottoman Empire. During a temporary withdrawal of the Italians from the peace conference the Greeks pressed a claim to Asia Minor, and with the authorization of the Allied Supreme Council they prepared to occupy Smyrna. Forces from British, French, Italian, and Greek warships occupied the harbor forts on May 14; these were later turned over to the Greeks, who occupied the city on the following day. By order of President Wilson, who was a member of the Allied Supreme Council, the United States battleship Arizona, Capt. J. H. Dayton commanding, and the destroyers Dyer, Gregory, Luce, and Manley reached Smyrna on May 11. Rear Admiral Bristol had reached there the day before on the return from a trip to Beirut in the Mehma. The captain and the admiral conferred, and on the 12th, pursuant to orders from Vice Admiral Knapp, Bristol steamed away for Constantinople accompanied by the Luce, the Gregory and the Stribling which had been at Smyrna on special duty. At the time of the occupation of Smyrna the Arizona landed a legation guard of twenty men which remained on shore until May 25.

The Arizona escorted by the Barney and the Hazelwood left Smyrna on June 9 for Constantinople, where it remained only a short time before returning to the United States. Admiral Bristol regarded the Greek occupation as impolitic and unnecessary and reported that American participation, limited though it was, had a damaging effect on our influence with the Turks. Less willingly the Allies finally consented in March 1920 to the Greek occupation of eastern Thrace. The harsh methods employed by the Greeks led to the appointment in August 1919 of an International Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna of which Admiral Bristol was United States member and president, but nothing was done with its report. In dispatches to the United States the Admiral advised against the dismemberment of Turkey as this would create a new Balkan situation; instead he believed the solution of the Near East problem lay in the development of good government for all races, freedom of religion, and universal education. He was friendly to the Nationalists because he believed they would provide these things. The withdrawal of the United States from the peace conference, in which President Wilson had succeeded in getting recognition of the mandate principle, was the signal for the European countries to attempt the execution of their secret agreements. Accordingly French forces replaced the British in Syria and northwest thereof in Cilicia in the fall of 1919. The Treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920 reduced Turkey to the limits of Anatolia.

While the Allies were disposing of the affairs of Turkey at Paris, the Turks were effectuating their own plans. Led by an army officer, Mustapha Kemal, the nationalists held meetings at Erzerum and Sivas in the summer of 1919 and secured control of the Parliament which met at Constantinople in the winter of 1919-1920. The Parliament adopted a national pact declaring for

the independence and sovereignty of Turkey. The answer of the Allies to this was to cause the Sultan to dissolve the Parliament, to occupy Constantinople with military forces on March 15, 1920, and to arrest as many Nationalist leaders as could be found. This opportunity was seized by the Nationalists to set up their own government under Mustapha Kemal at Angora in Anatolia. By early summer Nationalist armies were in the field to drive the Greeks from Smyrna, the French from Cilicia, and the British from Ismid. The national pact and the Treaty of Sevres were quite opposed in terms. The Turks chose war to submission.

A further problem in the Near Eastern situation was the question of Armenia, whose people had been oppressed by the Turks for many years. There was considerable sentiment in the United States for the establishment of an independent Armenia. Admiral Bristol returned from a trip to the Caucasus early in the summer of 1919 strongly convinced that the republics which had been set up there during the war should remain part of Turkey and that from the national point of view there was no such thing as Armenia. An American army officer, Colonel Haskell, was appointed Allied High Commissioner to Armenia that summer. This was an entering wedge, believed the Admiral, for an American mandate over Armenia, which would get the United States involved politically in the situation in the Near East. To keep open communication with Colonel Haskell, a radio traffic ship was stationed at Batum on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The advance of the Bolsheviks forced the evacuation of the personnel of the High Commission and the Near East Relief from Armenia and the Caucasus in May 1920. This was effected by the U. S. S. Pittsburgh, flagship of Vice Admiral Harry S. Knapp, then on a cruise in the Black Sea, and the destroyer Cole. Following an agreement with the Bolsheviks,

the Turks in the fall of 1920 reoccupied Armenia.

On the northern shore of the Black Sea the struggle between the White Russians and the Bolsheviks went on until the end of 1920. After the defeat of the forces under General Denikin at the end of 1919 and his flight to Constantinople, the command was taken over by General Wrangel. Apparently at the suggestion of Admiral Bristol, Rear Admiral Newton A. McCully, U. S. N. and a corps of officers and enlisted men of the U. S. Navy, including Lt. Comdr. H. H. Bunker, were sent into South Russia early in 1920 on a special mission for the State Department for the purpose of keeping the government informed of developments in that region. Transportation was furnished the mission by vessels of Grigorieff's detachment, and a destroyer was stationed on the coast of South Russia to assist it. Mail and radio communication was continuously maintained with Admiral McCully. Lt. Comdr. Hamilton V. Bryan was detached by Admiral Bristol to serve as McCully's agent at Odessa; he was also to keep Bristol informed of happenings. When General Wrangel's defeat threatened in the Crimea in November 1920, the U. S. S. Overton was at Sevastopol. Upon receiving a message from McCully, Admiral Bristol sent the destroyers John D. Edwards, Humphreys, Fox, and Whipple from other places in the Black Sea to the Crimea for possible use in evacuation. These vessels and the St. Louis and the Lenz, which were sent upon receiving news of the continued advance of the Bolsheviks, took part with the American steamships Faraby and Navahoe in the evacuation of all Americans authorized by McCully. From Odessa, Sevastopol, and Novorossiisk were evacuated, besides McCully's party, the American consuls, and their archives; representatives of the American Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A.; YMCA workers; American citizens; and Russian refugees. Large numbers of Russian soldiers and civilian refugees, who could expect no mercy

from the Bolsheviks, were moved out on Russian warships and merchant ships. Following the evacuation, the U. S. Navy under the immediate supervision of Lt. Comdr. Bryan assisted in caring for over 100,000 Russian refugees on board eighty Russian ships in the harbor at Constantinople. By the end of the year many of these pitiable people had been transported to the warmer climate of Bizerte, Tunis, where the warships which were part of the old imperial Russian Navy were laid up for years.

From its base in Constantinople the vessels of the detachment were dispatched throughout the station to cope with the conditions which developed following the armistice and the occupation of Turkey. After June 1919, when the detachment had been increased to a strength which permitted the establishment of regular patrolling, destroyers were distributed on the coasts of Syria and Palestine (Mersina and Beirut), South Russia (Sevastopol), Caucasus (Batum), the north coast of Asia Minor (Samsun), while sub-chasers covered the Gulf of Ismid and the south coast of the Sea of Marmora (Mudania). Another destroyer was maintained at Constanza or Varna on the western coast of the Black Sea as a radio relay ship to communicate with Europe and the United States and with the vessels operating in the Black Sea. These vessels were relieved periodically by the different ships changing stations, a practice which gave the men an opportunity to visit new places and thus kept up their morale. A reinforcement consisting of the destroyers Dupont, Tattnall, Cole, and Biddle reached Constantinople in August 1919. The vessels assigned to the detachment remained with it only a few months when they were ordered to some other station according to the system then followed by the Navy Department. In the summer of 1920 the naval force in the Near East was increased to a total of twelve destroyers. Present in October were the Chattanooga, Scorpion,

nine destroyers, and two sub-chasers, while the St. Louis and three more destroyers were on the way to Constantinople. The St. Louis arrived on October 19 and served with the detachment for almost a year, nearly half of the period under the command of Capt. William D. Leahy. Early in 1921 after the Bolsheviks had successfully liquidated the White Russians from South Russia the Navy Department wanted to reduce the naval force in the Near East, but the State Department did not feel it was the psychological moment for a reduction since conditions there were still confused and the Supreme Council of the Allies was about to meet.

In the fall of 1921 vessels of the detachment resumed visits to Russian Black Sea ports when the American Relief Administration again went to the assistance of starving Russians. A severe drought ruined the crops in the Volga region and in the districts to the east, causing a disastrous famine which finally forced the Soviet to appeal for help from Europe and the United States. According to an agreement of August 20, 1921 between the Soviet government and the American Relief Administration, the distribution of the foodstuffs and other relief supplies was to be handled by the A. R. A., so 200 Americans were placed in charge of districts into which the famine zone was divided. Colonel William N. Haskell was placed at the head of the organization which distributed in all $63,000,000 worth of relief supplies. As in the period immediately following the war, the assistance of vessels of the detachment operating under Admiral Bristol was afforded for transportation, mail, and communication purposes. Because the United States had not recognized the Soviet government, the State Department opined that as a general rule American naval vessels should not appear in Soviet ports, but suggested that in cases of extraordinary emergency relief workers could be transported in

naval vessels. In September the U. S. S. Gilmer carried A. R. A. workers to Novorossisk to investigate facilities there for handling relief supplies, and similar investigations were made at Odessa, Theodosia, and Sevastopol. The subsequent arrival of the first relief cargo was received by the Soviets with cordiality. Relief shipments began late in 1921, reached a peak in July 1922 and gradually declined thereafter. Throughout this period destroyers of the detachment made regular tours of the Black Sea, touching at Varna, Constansa, Odessa, Theodosia, Novorossisk, Batum, Trebizond, and Samsun. In the early part of the year the vessels engaged on this duty included the Childs, Fox, Overton, Sturtevant, and Williamson, and after July the Bulmer, Goff, King, Lawrence, Litchfield, Parrott, and Simpson. In the Caucasus the supplies were distributed by the Near East Relief which was still active in that region. The A. R. A. ceased its operations in September and in consequence the visits by naval vessels were discontinued in November. Not until 1933 did the United States assume relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, following the inauguration of the first Democratic President since the World War.

The Greek occupation of Smyrna resulted in a full scale war between Greece and Turkey in which the former succeeded during 1920-1921 in conquering a considerable part of Anatolia. Failing in their attempt to capture Angora in the summer of 1921, the Greeks were thereafter forced to retreat gradually to the coast. Not long afterwards the French, weary of waging a difficult war and jealous of the British, made a separate peace treaty with the Turks, withdrew from Cilicia and changed the northern border of Syria in favor of Turkey. In August 1922 the Turks undertook an offensive against the Greeks, routed them, drove many into the sea, and captured the rest.

The destroyers serving under Admiral Bristol were kept so occupied during much of 1922 in connection with Russian relief activities that visits could be made only at irregular intervals to Mediterranean ports. Through contacts at Mersina and Beirut and from other sources the Admiral kept informed of the progress of the Greco-Turkish war. American warships were not visiting Greek ports any more since the United States had not recognized the return of King Constantine to the throne of Greece. Destroyer Division 39, comprising the Dahlgren, Edsall, Lawrence, Litchfield, McLeish, Parrott, and Simpson, reached the station at the end of June, permitting the return to the United States in July of the Childs, Fox, McFarland, Overton, Reuben James, Sands, Stertevant, and Williamson.

Apprised of the likelihood of a serious situation developing at Smyrna towards which Greek soldiers and refugees were fleeing, Admiral Bristol ordered the Litchfield and the Simpson to that port early in September 1922 and shortly afterwards the Lawrence with relief workers, supplies, and his chief of staff, Captain Hepburn, on board. Through the Admiral's efforts a disaster relief committee was formed by American relief and benevolent institutions in Constantinople, and a representative with a medical unit was sent to Smyrna. American sailors were landed at Smyrna on September 6 to protect American lives and property. The Turkish army entered the city on the 9th, and through what Bristol regarded as insufficient policing allowed a disastrous fire to begin on September 13. Under the command of Captain Hepburn the evacuation of Americans from the stricken city was undertaken by the naval forces. They were removed to Athens on board the Simpson and a Shipping Board vessel.

There remained the tremendous job of evacuating 250,000 Greek refugees, who during the course of the fire were herded onto the quay by American sailors. These people could not be left there, for their homes had been destroyed by retreating Greek soldiers and the Turks wanted them out. After conferences by Allied naval officers present, initiated by Captain Hepburn, it was decided that the only solution was evacuation. Through negotiations by Captain Hepburn, who as an American naval officer was less unpopular with the Turks than the naval officers of the European powers who were also on hand to remove their nationals, arrangements were made with Turkish authorities for the evacuation of the refugees, and permission was obtained for using Greek vessels which were available at nearby island ports for this purpose. These were operated under the direction of American naval officers, senior of whom after September 16 was Comdr. Halsey Powell of the Edsall. In addition to the destroyers already mentioned, the Edsall, Parrott, and McLeish shared the task of evacuation, guarding American institutions, and maintaining a shore patrol. Their activities extended to other ports of Asia Minor in which refugees were also crowded and continued for weeks. The migration of the Greeks and Armenians from Asia Minor was one of the greatest folk movements in the world's history. The sustenance of several hundred thousand people while crowded in ports awaiting transportation to Greece and thereafter until they could be absorbed into the life of that country presented a relief problem which was participated in by the Near East Relief, the American Relief Administration, the American Red Cross, and the U. S. Navy.

Spurred by their victories, the Turks marched on Constantinople with the object of recovering eastern Thrace from the Greeks. Despite the fact that they were now standing alone, the British brought in large reinforcements and

announced their intention to defend the Straits, which had been declared a neutral zone in the Allied proclamation of neutrality of May 1921. Peaceful methods prevailed, however, and an armistice was signed at Mudania on October 11, 1922, following which Thrace was restored to the Turks as far as the Maritsa River, and a call was issued for a conference to be held at Lausanne to establish peace with Turkey. Refet Pasha, the Turkish general designated to take over Thrace, stopped in Constantinople on the way, remained a month, and took over its government from the Allies. The Sultan was immediately deposed, and a year later Turkey became a republic with Mustapha Kemal as the first president.

After the fall of Smyrna the American naval detachment in Turkish waters was quickly strengthened; Admiral Bristol had some fear that a similar catastrophe might happen at Constantinople, and recommended reinforcements. Destroyer Division 40, consisting of the Bainbridge, Fox, Gilmer, Hatfield, Hopkins, and Kane, and Division 41, consisting of the Barry, Goff, King, McFarland, Overton, and Sturtevant, left Hampton Roads on October 2 and reached Constantinople on the 22nd. Two destroyer tenders, the Bridge and the Dahlgren, followed. With twenty destroyers in the detachment Admiral Bristol was able to keep an adequate reserve at Constantinople and to have regular visits made at the Mediterranean ports of Anatolia, Syria, and Palestine, the Turkish Black Sea ports, and Piraeus, Greece.

At the suggestion of the State Department Admiral Bristol attended the first session of the Lausanne conference from November 26, 1922 to February 4, 1923; his colleagues were Richard W. Child, Ambassador to Italy, and Joseph C. Grew, Minister to Switzerland. Although they were only "observers," they took a prominent part in the proceedings. During the Admiral's absence from

Constantinople, Frederic R. Dolbeare, first secretary of the American Embassy at Berlin, acted as High Commissioner, while Captain Hepburn took command of the naval detachment. Vice Admiral Andrew T. Long, who had become commander of the U. S. Naval Forces, Europe in August, arrived at Constantinople on the Pittsburgh before Bristol's departure and remained stationed at that place until May 1923. All the destroyers then under his command were serving in the Near East. Numerous foreign warships were also moored in the Bosporus, for the situation was still tense. Admiral Long issued orders in December for the evacuation of Americans and American forces from Constantinople in case of an emergency. Together with Captain Hepburn he was consulted by Dolbeare concerning matters effecting American interests.

The Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923 and supplementary conventions at last effected a peace settlement with Turkey. Territorially she fared somewhat better than in the Treaty of Sevres, securing eastern Thrace and a confirmation of the Syrian frontier agreed upon with France in 1921. Mesopotamia (Iraq), Arabia, Syria, and Palestine were recognized as independent of Turkey, while Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, and Cyprus were renounced. An exchange of populations was agreed upon between Greece and Turkey by which the subjects of the one in the other were to be removed. The United States was not a party to this treaty because it had not been at war with Turkey, but after its negotiation it could do nothing except make a treaty on the same terms. Fulfilling instructions from Secretary of State Hughes, who believed it best for our relations with Turkey to be regularized, Joseph C. Grew signed the Turco-American treaty of Lausanne on August 6, 1923.

Throughout most of the negotiations at Lausanne the force of twenty American destroyers was maintained in Turkish waters, although, as the

Chief of Naval Operations pointed out, the maintenance of so many there was a serious strain on the resources of the home fleet. Nevertheless, the discretion of the officer in command of the station and the opinion of the State Department was allowed to govern the size of the force, as in previous years. Admiral Long reported the situation still delicate at the end of November 1922 and likely to become serious if a break should occur in the conference at Lausanne. The conference did break up at the beginning of February, and Admiral Bristol returned to Constantinople, but negotiations were resumed at Lausanne in April, the Admiral not returning. With the approval of the State Department six destroyers including the Bainbridge, Hopkins, Wade, McFarland, Overton, and Sturtevant were sent home in May, and another group of six comprising the Barry, Fox, Gilmer, Goff, Hatfield, and King departed in July. In the former month the Pittsburgh also left to visit other European ports. Remaining thereafter were eight destroyers, the Scorpion, the Bridge, and the Danebola. Since the Turco-American treaty was still being negotiated and since the Allies had not yet evacuated Constantinople, these vessels were maintained on the station for a while longer.

Constantinople was to be restored to Turkey, the Straits were to be demilitarized and opened to all nations, according to the Lausanne conventions. The evacuation of Constantinople began on August 4, 1923, the day following the receipt of the news of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by the Turkish Grand National Assembly at Angora, and was completed without disturbance on October 2 upon the departure of General Harrington, the Allied commander-in-chief, and the last of the Allied troops. Before the completion of the Allied withdrawal, Dr. Adnan Bey, the representative

in Constantinople of the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, indicated to Admiral Bristol that it was expected that the American naval vessels would be sent away. At the end of the Allied occupation only the Scorpion, Denebola, the Litchfield, and Lawrence were at Constantinople, the other destroyers having been sent cruising in the Aegean in order to avoid any embarrassment their presence might have caused. On October 4, two days before the Turks were to enter the city, the last of the vessels were ordered away, the two destroyers being sent to report to the Commander, Naval Forces, Europe.

Thereafter, out of respect for the feelings of the Turks, our naval activities at Constantinople were greatly reduced. Following a recommendation communicated by Admiral Bristol towards the end of October that the use of the naval base at Constantinople be discontinued, a conference occurred between representatives of the Navy Department and the State Department in which it was decided that a detachment of six destroyers, a subchaser, and the Scorpion would be continued in the region as the U. S. Naval Detachment, Eastern Mediterranean, and that the situation would be reviewed in six months. In desiring the continuance of naval vessels in the eastern Mediterranean the State Department was influenced by conditions in Greece, Egypt, and the mandated territories. The U. S. Naval Detachment, Eastern Mediterranean was established as such on November 6. The naval supply base at Constantinople was discontinued, the surplus stores being transported to the United States on the Bridge and the Denebola. The building was retained, however, for storing spare parts belonging to the Scorpion, which was to be retained for the use of the Admiral, for garage purposes, for the Detachment post office, and for office supplies. By the spring of 1924 political conditions in the

Near East had quieted down, and on the recommendation of the detachment commander, the remaining destroyers, consisting of the Bulmer, Edsall, McLeish, McCorrick, Parrott, and Simpson, were transferred to the Commander, Naval Forces, Europe on May 6. Admiral Bristol's naval staff was reduced before long to three aides. Captain Hepburn had recently been detached as the chief of staff, and the assistant chief of staff, Lt. Comdr. Thomas C. Kinkaid, continued only until the summer.

For over three years longer Admiral Bristol remained at Constantinople as U. S. High Commissioner, performing diplomatic duties. Had the treaty with Turkey of 1923 been ratified, he would have been replaced by an ambassador. In December 1923 the Admiral negotiated an agreement with Turkey for the settlement of claims. In 1925 the State Department was willing to part with his services, but President Coolidge requested him to continue, believing that his influence and experience would be helpful to American interests. Later that year he made his only visit to the United States while serving it in Constantinople. Vice Admiral Roger Welles during a visit to that place in 1926 found Admiral Bristol to be popular among both the foreign representatives and the Turkish officials and exercising among the latter an influence second to none. In August 1926 Lt. Comdr. Webb Trammell, who had been an aide to the Admiral for two years, was assigned to his diplomatic staff as naval attache to Turkey, Bulgaria, and Roumania. Under instructions from the State Department Admiral Bristol arranged in February 1927 for the exchange of notes providing for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. At last he was relieved from his post at Constantinople in the following month and allowed to complete his naval career in an appropriate manner. The assignment which he had expected to

endure for only a few months had been lengthened by conditions in the Near East to a period of over eight years. His successor in Turkey was Ambassador Joseph C. Grew.

Bristol's subsequent career in the Navy included two important assignments. From 1927 to 1929 he was commander-in-chief of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet with the rank of admiral and the Pittsburgh as flagship. For the next three years he dealt with higher naval problems as a member and chairman of the General Board. After his retirement in 1932 he engaged in private business in Washington until his death in 1939.

Of Admiral Bristol's services Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, wrote: "The success and achievements of Admiral Bristol in representing American interests in Turkey through a long and difficult period have been signal and it is a pleasure for me to confirm what must already be well known to your Department, namely that the distinguished naval officer has served as a diplomat with equal distinction."

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# U. S. NAVAL PORT OFFICERS IN THE BORDEAUX REGION, 1917-1919

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Office of Records Administration
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# Introduction

The United States Navy established a considerable number of Naval Port Officers in various parts of the world during and immediately after the First World War. With the prospect that this practice may be repeated, it is planned to prepare for this series analyses of the problems faced by those earlier port officers, in the belief that their experience may be of some assistance to those who assume similar responsibilities a quarter century later. While certain problems were common to all port officers, wherever stationed, there were many special situations peculiar to particular ports. Conditions, naturally, would not be identical at Murmansk, Vladivostok, Spalato and Bordeaux. This first port officers study deals with conditions at western French ports handling a constant stream of traffic to and from the United States; it is expected that the series will later present the story of a few other ports where conditions were somewhat different.

U. S. Naval Port Officers in the Bordeaux Region
1917-1919

For the use of the American Expeditionary Force of the United States Army and American naval forces, it was necessary to acquire and develop extensive port facilities in France in 1917. Ports suitable for troop transports, cargo vessels, and naval patrol and escort vessels had to be found, so that the United States could get its men and material to the front and make its might felt in the struggle against Germany. During the preceding years of the war, the British had preempted the French Channel ports and the railroads leading from them to the front—lines also utilized for military operations—so that it was necessary for the United States to use the Bay of Biscay ports on the west coast of France. Besides being more remote from the front, a fact which increased transportation difficulties, most of these ports were not of sufficient depth to admit the largest ships and were poorly supplied with berths and facilities.

Since Bordeaux was the largest commercial port on the Bay of Biscay and third largest in the country, ranking after Le Havre and Marseilles, it was natural for it to become an American base. It was also natural for local interests to seek to attain this desirable end, and they did by instigating a report by a French military commission which recommended the establishment of a station for patrol vessels at Le Verdon, the use of Pauillac for discharging cargoes, troops, and animals, and the construction of new facilities at Bassens. An inspection of the ports on the west coast of France was made upon orders issued shortly after the declaration of war by a joint Franco-American commission. It reported that the early debarkation of American troops should take place at St. Nazaire, but it indicated that La Rochelle and Bordeaux would have to be used. Extensive improvements in the way of docks and railroad facilities were recommended for the last harbor, which should be kept unencumbered pending their completion. There appears to have been an examination of these ports by a joint board of U. S. Army and U. S. Navy officers during this period. In June 1917 a Military Railroad Commission composed of American Army officers made a tour of the French front; they inspected the railroad lines connecting it with the

Bay of Biscay, and the ports of the bay, including those in the Bordeaux region; and they collected data which was used in planning the Army's transportation system in France.

The ancient city of Bordeaux, famous in the United States for the wines named after it that are produced in the neighboring country, is located on a semi-circle of the Garonne River sixty miles from the sea. Although not capable of accommodating the largest ocean liners of that day, the port of Bordeaux possessed considerable shipbuilding, repair, and supply organizations, in addition to being well protected from the weather, secure from naval attack, and remote from the usual zones of submarine activities. Twenty miles below Bordeaux at Bec d'Ambes the Garonne unites with the Dordogne River to form the Gironde River, a wide estuary which one naval officer who served on it likened to the upper half of Delaware Bay. Otherports on the Garonne-Gironde system employed by United States forces included Bassens, four miles below Bordeaux on the east bank of the Garonne, and Pauillac on the west bank of the Gironde twenty-five miles from its mouth, with wharfage for vessels too large to ascend to Bordeaux. At Le Verdon on the southern side near the mouth of the Gironde a great arm of the land provides a sheltered roadstead where vessels could be anchored pending the receipt of movement orders. From Le Verdon a railroad provided a further means of travelling to Bordeaux. Across the embochure from Le Verdon, lay Royan, one of the chief sea bathing resorts of France, which was useful chiefly because of its location as it lacked wharfage with discharge facilities.

Before the entrance of the Americans into Bordeaux, it had been developed as a revictualling base by the French. To increase its capacity for this purpose, new quays and facilities were constructed at Bordeaux, Bassens, Pauillac, and at Blaye on the east bank of the Gironde not far from Pauillac. So crowded were the docks on the river in 1915 that colliers were considerably delayed before getting berths. The total quantity of imports was greatly expanded while the exports were even more greatly reduced. But the advent of the Americans was to effect an even greater change in the economic life of the region.

Fromentine
Sables d'Olonne
Marans
La Pallice
La Rochelle
Rochefort
Tonnay-Charente
BAY
OF
BISCAY
FRANCE
Pointe de la Coubre
Royan
Pointe de Grave
Le Verdon
Talmont
GIRONDE
Pauillac
Blaye
Furt
Bec d'Ambes
Lacanau
St. Loubès
St. Sulpice
Bassens
Bordeaux
Lormont
DORDOGNE
Souge
GARONNE
Gujan-Mestras
Arcachon
N
S
Bayonne
St. Joan de Luz
ROCHEFORT DISTRICT
U.S. NAVY

# PRINCIPAL FRENCH PORTS AND RAILROADS USED BY AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS · HQ SERVICES OF SUPPLY · PRINCIPAL PORTS · SECONDARY PORTS · IMPORTANT TOWNS

MAIN LINES · SECOND LINES · THIRD LINES · OTHER LINES

The importance of the port facilities in France in the American military effort was realized by Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, commander of the Cruiser and Transport Force of the U. S. Navy, who said that "the number of troops that may be landed in France at present depends not upon the success of the anti-submarine campaign, and consequent tonnage available and building, but upon the port facilities provided in France and England for the disembarkation of the troops and supplies that must come from America."

The U. S. Navy Department at the outbreak of the war had no plans for the organization of a port system and little idea of what would be needed in connection therewith. Following the decision of the government to arm merchant vessels, Rear Admiral William S. Sims was ordered towards the end of March 1917 to England to represent the Navy and keep it informed of developments. On June 14, 1917, he was placed in command of our naval vessels abroad as Force Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. Secretary of the Navy Daniels informed Sims on May 8 that the French government had requested and the Navy Department was contemplating the establishment of temporary bases at Bordeaux and Brest. Sims approved--provided the destroyer bases did not suffer. Orders were issued by the Secretary on June 1 to Capt. William B. Fletcher to organize the vessels being fitted out for distant service as the U. S. Patrol Squadrons Operating in European Waters, to proceed to Brest, establish a base there, and begin operations in the waters adjacent to the French coast under the general command of Vice Admiral W. S. Sims. Slightly more than a month later Captain Fletcher reached Brest with his converted yachts, and, after locating his headquarters on shore at Brest, began operating with the French Navy against German submarines. His original complement of eight vessels was augmented by two additional squadrons of converted yachts in August and September, and by a destroyer squadron in October.

At the beginning of June, Comdr. John B. Patton, an officer of considerable experience in naval construction who had recently been recalled from retirement, received orders from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to proceed to Bordeaux, France and take command of the naval base to be established there. He could get no definite

orders in the department as to what his exact duties were to be, but, knowing that he would have to establish the base, he asked for and was assigned an engineer officer, a paymaster, and several yoemen. He was told by the French naval attache in Washington that the Navy Department had agreed to establish two naval bases in France. Arriving in Bordeaux in the Espagne on July 18, he reported by letter to Admiral Sims and to Captain Richard H. Jackson, the Navy Representative in Paris. After seeing them and Captain Fletcher subsequently in Paris, he was still without specific instructions from the American Naval authorities so he proceeded along the lines already worked out by the French, who had planned the development of a coaling and supply station at Pauillac for the use of the naval patrol and escort vessels operating along the coast.

The naval station at Pauillac was located in the neighboring hamlet of Trompeloup, thirty miles from Bordeaux, where a steel and concrete wharf was available for use. Here with the approval and assistance of the French authorities Commander Patton began the development of a base for the use of the American naval vessels which were just then arriving on the coast of France. He acquired land, rented buildings, contracted for coal, and began the construction of another wharf from piling and planks. The transformation of vineyards, industrial plants, and pastures into a naval base comprising storage buildings, housing for personnel, and repair facilities went ahead under the direct supervision of Lieut. Louis L. Bernier, a native of France long a resident of the United States and an experienced ship repair man who had enrolled in the Naval Reserve Force and accompanied Patton to Bordeaux. Admiral Sims, to whose headquarters in London Commander Patton had been reporting his troubles, sought in August to obtain authorization from the Navy Department for the expenditure of $150,000 on the proposed base, but Admiral William S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, responded that it was not the department's policy to commit itself to the establishment of shore bases except for aviation purposes to a greater extent than the military situation absolutely demanded and that it was the intention to supply two repair ships for the use of the small craft operating on the French coast. Sim's rejoinder was that the situation demanded a shore establishment at Pauillac and that furnishing mother ships

would be diverting valuable trans-Atlantic tonnage. In reply Admiral Sims was informed that the U. S. S. Panther and the U. S. S. Bridgeport would be sent to France. This decision forced the discontinuance of the work on the repair shop at Pauillac much to the disappointment of the French, but the preparations for its use as a coaling station went ahead. A former laundry building furnished accommodations for the men to be attached to the station, and ample storerooms.

At Bordeaux in the meantime Commander Patton had been organizing the staff of the American Naval Base. Its organization, as prescribed in a general order of July 31, 1917, comprised several departments. The office of the Commanding Officer or Port Officer, consisting of Commander Patton, a chief yeoman and 3 yeomen, was concerned with the movements of vessels, log books, personnel records, the Bureau of Navigation, and communication. Paymaster F. B. Colby acted as disbursing officer, supply officer, and accounting officer and was concerned with general administration, contracts, requisitions, pay roll, storehouses and supplies, ordnance stores, and commissary department. He was assisted by a chief yeoman and a yeoman. The industrial department was under Lieutenant Bernier and comprised a civil engineer, an electrician, a chief petty officer, and ten men. Surgeon H. Shaw, Assistant Surgeon L. Hays, and four hospital corpsmen composed the medical department, which took care of the sick bay, hospital arrangements, and sanitary inspection. At the end of September, nineteen enlisted men were included in the personnel at Bordeaux; these increased to only twenty-four at the end of 1917.

To look after the interests of American ships which were beginning to arrive in considerable numbers at French ports, Admiral Sims ordered Comdr. Frank P. Baldwin to duty as naval port officer at St. Nazaire and Commander Patton to additional duty in the same capacity at Bordeaux. The latter's orders were issued to him on September 24, 1917 and designated him as naval port officer at Bordeaux, Pauillac, and Bassens. Admiral Sims notified Rear Admiral Fletcher, Commander, U. S. Patrol Squadrons Operating on the French Coast, that these officers were to be under his orders and described their duties as follows:

5. SHIPPING

He should control all U.S. Shipping, permitting no vessel to sail except under his orders, and in regular organized convoys. The term "U.S. Shipping" is to be construed as embracing troop transports, chartered supply vessels carrying army supplies, Naval supply vessels, all vessels under charter to the U.S. Government, and such other U.S. Merchant vessels as may visit the port in question. Some difficulty may be experienced in controlling U.S. vessels which are not under charter by the Government, but by working with the French authorities, it may be possible to withold the clearance of such vessels until they express willingness to cary out orders. All Allied shipping in British waters is now required to travel in convoy, regardless of nationality, and the U.S. Government is shortly to require all vessels to leave home ports in convoy. In order to reduce shipping losses on this side it is necessary to take a firm hand and dispatch our vessels in such a way as to provide the greatest security.

6. TROOP TRANSPORTS AND STORE SHIPS

The Naval Port Officer should be informed by you of the prospective arrival of Troop Transports and Store Ships, and all arrangements made for their escort into port. In the case of vessels of the same classes outward bound they are to be detained in port, or at a safe anchorage in the vicinity of the port, until a convoy can be formed and a suitable escort provided. The Naval Port Officer must keep you informed as to the dates of readiness for sailing of such vessels, and permit none of them to sail except in convoys. This will, probably, result in the delay of some ships, but it will ensure safety, and it seems probable that a regular outward bound convoy from a suitable port may be arranged to sail about once every eight days. In such convoy can be placed any Allied westbound merchant vessels. Your duty with respect to these convoys will be to see that they are provided with suitable escort

and to give instructions as to time of sailing. Ordinarily they should leave the French coast just before dark, so as to pass through the most dangerous areas by night, and be escorted for about forty-eight hours. You would also prescribe the route to be pursued through the danger zone upon information furnished from London or Paris or derived from the local French authorities.

7. The internal organization of the convoy will be the responsibility of the Senior Officer of the convoy, who should provide the necessary instructions for zigzagging, behavior under attack, dispersal, rendezvous, etc. As it is probable that the Naval Port Officer will frequently be consulted on these matters, he should be kept supplied with all the latest information as to tested and approved methods, so that he may give proper advice on request.

8. AIRCRAFT

The Naval Port Officer should, whenever possible, arrange for the co-operation of the French Coastal Air Stations to assist our inward and outward bound convoys. This may be accomplished by your office, but the Port Officer should have full authority to communicate direct with the local French authorities as well.

9. MINESWEEPING

The Naval Port Officer should, by constant communication with you and with the local French authorities keep himself fully informed as to the state of the approach channels, the progress of mine-sweeping operations and the results of such operations, and should keep you similarly informed.

10. COAL AND OTHER SUPPLIES

The Naval Port Officer should keep you informed as to the amount of coal and other supplies on hand and the amounts desired from time to time.

11. INFORMATION

The Naval Port Officer should interview the Captain or Master of every U. S. Man-of-War, Transport, Supply Ship, and other vessels entering his port, for the purpose of bringing out any criticisms they may have to make as to difficulties of entering the ports, lack of pilots, patrols, etc., and any suggestions they may have for improvements. These matters are of urgent importance, particularly in connection with our Troop Transports and Supply Ships. Conditions that may be handled by the local French authorities should be taken up direct with them.

12. CO-ORDINATION

It will be the duty of the Naval Port Officer to keep in constant and close touch with the U.S. Army representatives and the French authorities at the ports to work in close harmony with them and to use every endeavor to avoid friction and clashes of authority.

13. COMMUNICATIONS

The Naval Port Officer will have complete charge of the communication office at his port. He will be given the services of a Communication Officer, whenever such detail is found possible, and will, also, be furnished with a Communication Staff of the necessary size.

14. At St-Nazaire Assistant Paymaster Cunnungham is, at present, detailed as Communication Officer, and he will continue at that capacity until such time as another officer can be sent for that duty. Paymaster Cunningham has certain additional duties in connection with disbursements which he will continue to perform. A separate letter will be written going into the duties of the Communication Officer in more detail.

15. The Communication Officer at each port will, under the instructions of the Port Officer, and with his advice, assistance and co-operation, handle all matters in regard to communications,

make suggestions for improvement and make provision for keeping a secret file of all important messages; also, he will take steps to guard against secret communications falling into the hands of any but Commissioned Officers, or such member of the Communication Force as it may be found necessary, owing to shortage of personnel, to entrust them to.

16. It is particularly necessary that the prospective dates of arrival of Troop convoys and Supply convoys be kept secret, and be communicated to the French authorities and the U.S. Army authorities only in sufficient time to permit them to make the proper preparations for their reception.

17. REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

All reports made by the Naval Port Officer should be made to you direct, the most secret and rapid means of communication being utilized. The Naval Port Officer should, however be authorized to communicate direct with my Staff Representative in Paris and with other Naval Port Officers in cases of urgent necessity. He should, in all cases, immediately furnish you with copies of his communications.

18. ARMED GUARDS

Whenever a vessel carrying a Naval Armed Guard enters a Port Officer's port he is to inspect the Guard, or have it inspected by a competent representative, and should make to you, for further transmission to me, a report covering the following points and any others that may suggest themselves in individual cases:

(a) Vessel - from - to
(b) Master
(c) Officer or P.O. in charge of guard
(d) Number, calibre, and condition of guns
(e) Arrangement and condition of magazines
(f) Personnel
(g) Organization

(h) Co-operation between guard and ship personnel
(i) Food

Especial attention will be paid to the question of uniforms and personal neatness of guards, as the appearance of these men will have a considerable effect on the opinion of a very large number of people as to the general efficiency of our Navy.

19. As the appointment of Naval Port Officers is a new departure, the duties of such Officers cannot be prescribed completely and with exactness. Much must be left to the individual, and, in the discharge of his duties, it will be necessary that he exercise good judgment, tact and discretion, in order to avoid friction with the local authorities, both French and U.S. Army. He must, on the one hand, avoid unwarranted assumptions of authority, and he must, on the other hand, use every endeavor to advance the common cause, which is that of the safe and prompt entry and dispatch of Troop Ships, Supply Ships and other vessels. It is particularly important that between you and the Port Officer there shall be a feeling of mutual confidence, and a constant exchange of information. It is also very important, as has already been stated, that the prospective movements, both outward and inward, of U.S. vessels, be protected by secrecy, by the greatest possible use of the convoy plan, and by the provision of suitable escorts. If these objects are successfully accomplished minor difficulties and failings will have no bearing on the final general result.

On October 19, 1917 Rear Admiral Fletcher communicated to Commander Patton secret instructions as follows:

1. You will be the Port representative at Pauillac, Bordeaux and Bassens, France, of the Commander U.S.Patrol Squadrons Operating on French Coast.

2. You will, as far as is possible, be informed in advance of the arrival of U.S. Shipping Government chartered or private, bound for ports on the Gironde River.

3. You will similarly inform the Squadron Commander as to the dates when such vessels are ready to leave your ports, and as far in advance of departure as possible.

4. If such vessels are bound north or south along the French Coast, they will take advantage of the regularly constituted convoys.

5. You will report the names, speed and size of vessels bound off shore in order that instructions may be issued for them to proceed to such points as may be designated for assembly and escort in convoys.

6. You will arrange as may be necessary for the departure of vessels in Coastal convoys. Information concerning submarines and mines should be obtained by the Masters of vessels at the latest possible moment before leaving your port, from the offices of the French Port Authorities on the Gironde. Port authorities must also be kept informed of the sailings so that such preparations as are desirable and necessary may be assured by mine draggers and local escort, by air as well as by water.

7. Should convoys proceed from sea direct into the Gironde, escorted by American vessels, this office should be informed as far in advance as is possible, of the channels which are safe and can be used, through the Naval Port Officer and the C.D.P.B.

8. Lines of communication from and to you are entirely French. It will be necessary to work with them and through them in order that both French officials and ourselves may be informed of the existing situation. Every endeavor is being made by the Commandant Superieur to perfect the Communication system. All delays in the receipt

or transmission of messages will be reported, so that the cause may be followed up.

9. Report weekly the amount of coal belonging to the Navy received and expended, and the amount remaining on hand. At the end of the month, report the amount received and expended during the month, and the amount remaining on hand.

10. Your attention is invited to paragraph 11 of Enclosure "A", reference (a), and to enclosure "B". These matters will be made the subject of report to the Squadron Commander as soon as possible after receipt of the information. Attention is also invited to paragraphs 12, 13, 17, 18 and 19 of reference (a), Enclosure "A".

11. In connection with the movements of vessels, attention is particularly called to the necessity of absolute secrecy of your codes and coding apparatus, and the secrecy of all despatches concerning the movements of all vessels. All messages received or sent will be entered when decoded, or upon coding, in ink in a record book. Access to this book will be had only by yourself and such persons as are thoroughly reliable. Copies will be limited to these absolutely necessary, marked secret, made only by a reliable person and delivered by such a person, marked "To be opened by addressee only."

12. Every endeavor will be made to work to the common cause of producing efficient service and cheerful and loyal cooperation within our own force, and with the representatives of our sister service, and with those of our Ally, the French.

American ship arrivals were not very numerous at Bordeaux in 1917, for the movement of troops and supplies across the Atlantic did not get well under way until the following year. Moreover the docks then under construction at Pauillac and Bassens were not ready for use until the latter year. In December 1917 there was discharged at Bordeaux 9,800 tons of general cargo, 28,300 tons of coal, and 6,600 tons of lumber.

These quantities were to be multiplied many times in the next year.

The development of the aviation program of the Navy in France resulted in the establishment of several air stations in the Bordeaux region as a part of the system which eventually was completed along the coast for patrol, escort, and reconnaissance purposes. In view of the plan to erect at Pauillac an aviation assembly and repair plant, general storehouses, and barracks for the distribution of enlisted aviation personnel throughout France, Capt. Hutch I. Cone, Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Forces, Foreign Service, recommended to Admiral Sims on November 22, 1917 that the naval base at that place be changed to an aviation center and placed under his command. A naval air station was commissioned at Pauillac on December 1, and on the twenty-second Admiral Sims removed it from the command of the U. S. Naval Base Bordeaux. The assembly and repair plant eventually spread over a considerable acreage of vineyards and occupied the village of Trompeloup near which the air station was located. Here knocked-down aeroplanes received from the United States were assembled, tested, and flown to the operating fields. Other aviation activities in the region included a flying school at Moutchic (Lacanau), and an operating field at Arcachon. A lighter than air station was begun at Gujan-Mestras, but it was not completed before the end of hostilities.

To effect coordination over American naval activities in France, the Navy Department directed Admiral Sims on January 4, 1918 to designate Rear Admiral Henry B. Wilson, who had succeeded Captain Fletcher in command of the U.S. Patrol Squadrons Operating on the French Coast on November 1, 1917, as "Senior U. S. Naval Officer in France," and to direct him to organize his forces according to a general plan comprising six principal fields of activity: (1) naval forces afloat; (2) port organization and administration; (3) aviation; (4) intelligence; (5) communication; and (6) supply and pay. In addition to these matters he was also to take up with French authorities and the U. S. Army any questions that arose, provided they were not of such character that they should be handled by Sims or the department. He was directed in connection with the port organization

and administration to divide the west coast of France into three districts with headquarters at Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux under officers of command rank. Upon receipt of this order Admiral Sims called Wilson, Jackson, and Cone to London for a conference in which an agreement was reached relative to the reorganization of the forces in France. Admiral Sims then drew up some detailed instructions covering the organization of the forces in France, which were sent to Wilson who, as Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in France, was to have charge of all floating naval forces permanently assigned to duty on the channel and Atlantic coasts of France. For the administration of the port organization he was instructed to establish district headquarters at Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort; these places were chosen by Sims instead of those indicated by the Navy Department because they were the French Prefectures Maritimes and the sites of French navy yards. The proximity of the American and French headquarters would facilitate liaison between the naval forces of the two countries. The district organization was considered desirable because it was believed that the direct routing of ships from the United States to ports of destination would be necessary.

The district organization was set up by Admiral Wilson in an order of January 18 addressed to the district commanders. Their mission was to safeguard the passage of American troop and store ships and to cooperate with the French naval forces for the protection of shipping and for the conduct of submarine warfare. The limits of the districts were described; those for the Rochefort District extending from Fromentine on the north to the Spanish border on the south--a 280 mile stretch of coast. The district commanders were charged with the following duties: operations of vessels that might be placed under their command; command, administration, repairing, and supply of vessels assigned to their districts; development and maintenance of adequate naval port facilities; establishment and maintenance of prompt and certain communication; supervision of American shipping and of United States naval personnel on merchant ships. The naval port officers were subject to their orders. Movements of ships were to be reported directly to the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in France. Captain Henry H. Hough was placed in command

of the Brest District, Capt. Thomas P. Magruder the Lorient District, and Capt. Newton A. McCully the Rochefort District.

Captain McCully left Brest in the U. S. S. May on January 20 to assume his command at Rochefort. He did not proceed directly to that place, however, for, pursuant to orders from Admiral Wilson, he visited Lorient, St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Pauillac, and Le Verdon and conferred with officials at those places before arriving at Rochefort at the end of the month. He went ashore there on February 5 to organize and establish the district headquarters. His duties as district commander were in addition to his command of the Squadron 5, Patrol Forces, Atlantic Fleet, which he had been exercising since the previous October. Upon completing his tour, McCully reported that the district comprised the ports of La Pallice, Rochefort, Bordeaux, Arcachon, Bayonne, and St. Jean de Luz, the most important section being that of the Gironde. He recommended that central direction of the work of the district would be best located in the entrance to that river at Royan, but the move was never approved. Other suggestions included the location of a station ship for communications and escort duty and repair ship at Le Verdon, port officers at La Pallice and Bordeaux, and naval base commander and staff at Pauillac.

The district organization remained in use throughout the war. To the original three districts was added in April 1918 a fourth at Cherbourg of which Comdr. David F. Boyd was given command. After his experience with the district organization during the war, Admiral Wilson reported towards its close a strong approbation of the system, which provided the necessary decentralization of administration, particularly of details, required to successfully perform the operations of the Navy connected with the protection of American ships. It was not merely enough, in his opinion, to decentralize matters, for they also had to be placed in charge of officers of considerable rank who could command the respect and attention of French officials and U. S. Army officers. Placing the districts under officers of rank also made it more difficult for the French to obtain control of them. He believed that the character of the work performed by the district commanders

justified the rank of rear admiral and recommended that rank for McCully and Hough.

On the same day that he issued instructions to the district commanders Admiral Wilson issued other directions to naval port officers, which described their mission and duties as follows:

1. Your mission and duties are summarized as follows:

MISSION: To facilitate the berthing, discharging, and prompt sailing of U.S. troop and store ships.

DUTIES: (a) To cooperate fully with the U.S. Army and French authorities with a view to expediting despatching of vessels.

(b) To immediately inform the Commander in France and your District Commander of the arrival of all U.S. vessels at your port. The Force Commander and the Army headquarters will be informed by the Commander in France.

(c) To interview Commanding Officers or Masters of all U.S. ships on arrival as to incidents of voyage and their needs.

(d) Inspect the U.S. Navy armed guard crews and radio men on U.S. vessels other than regular commissioned U.S. Naval vessels.

(e) To assist in the supplying of vessels with fuel and supplies insofar as this can be properly handled by the Navy.

(f) To pay naval members of armed guards on presentation of memorandum rolls or other necessary vouchers, and to furnish them with clothing and small stores.

(g) Investigate offenses committed by U.S. Navy personnel on vessels other than regular commissioned U.S. Navy vessels.

(h) Investigate and take necessary action on Admiralty cases involving U.S. Navy.

(i) Keep Commander in France informed of the readiness of vessels and of the speed of which they are capable through the danger zone.

(j) Transmit sailing orders received from the Commander in France or District Commander.

(k) Indoctrinate Masters as to precautions to be observed within the danger zone and familiarize them with the prescribed convoy doctrine.

(l) As near as possible prior to sailing, furnish convoy and escort commander with the latest information in regard to submarine and mine activities.

(m) Keep Commander in France informed weekly as to the amount of coal belonging to the Navy on hand, the amount expended and received.

The foregoing instructions were taken almost verbatim from Sim's orders to Wilson, being modified slightly to suit the local situation.

Some special instructions were sent by Wilson to Commander Patton at Bordeaux. These stated that the district commander at Rochefort was responsible for reporting U. S. ship movements in La Pallice, La Rochelle, and Rochefort and the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux for those in the ports of Pauillac, Bassens, Bordeaux, and Le Verdon. Unitl direct telegraph and telephone communication was provided between Bordeaux and Le Verdon he was to depend upon the French

commandant at the latter place for reports on ship movements there.

Admiral Wilson was dissatisfied with the retention at Bordeaux of an officer, who had been assigned there for the purpose of establishing a repair base, as a Naval Port Officer and requested his replacement by a younger man with executive ability and lots of steam. London naval headquarters finally arranged with Wilson and Cone for the transfer of Commander Patton to the post of commandant of the Aviation assembly and repair plant at Pauillac. When the change occurred on February 10, 1918, he was succeeded temporarily as Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux by Lieutenant Bernier. On May 28 the position was taken over by Commander Ralph P. Craft, who was detached for the purpose from the U. S. S. Aphrodite on which he had been serving recently as escort commander on the Verdon convoy. In June the port office at Bordeaux embraced the following departments: naval port officer, marine superintendent, assistant naval port officer, patrols and inspections, repair officer, medical officer, coding officer, radio repair station, pay and disbursing office. Shortly afterwards patrols and inspections seem to have been assigned to separate officers. An organization outline for September 21, 1918 lists the members of the staff as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Naval Port Officer | Comdr., U.S.N. |
| Assistant Naval Port Officer | Lieut., U.S.N.R.F. |
| Engineer Officer | Lieut.,(j.g.),U.S.N. |
| Inspections and Docks | " U.S.N.R.F. |
| Correspondence Officer | Ensign " |
| Patrol Officer | " " |
| Communication | " " |
| Radio Repair, Bassens | " " |
| District Medical Inspection | Comdr. (Medical) |
| Medical Officer (2) | Lieut " |
| Pay and Disbursing Officer | " (Pay), U.S.N. |

The enlisted personnel attached to the naval port office included a number of yoemen and seamen of different classes employed as correspondence, communication, mail and pay clerks, messengers, automobile, motor cycle, and truck drivers, repair gang, and in the dispensary run by the medical officer. Until October 1918 these

men were put upon subsistence; they were then barracked in a remodeled chateau about a mile from the port office. As this building did not provide sufficient accommodations, portable barracks were erected in a public park nearby. Suitable equipment was installed in these barracks to keep them in proper sanitary condition. Better discipline was possible through having the men in barracks.

The location at Pauillac of the aviation assembly and repair station and its use as a port of discharge for material destined for the trans-Atlantic radio station being constructed by the U. S. Navy at Croix d'Hins greatly increased the shipping at that place. The escort vessels which convoyed the ships that arrived in the Gironde obtained at Pauillac coal imported from Cardiff, Wales. Water was available there, and fresh provisions could also be procured by ordering from Bordeaux, where liberty parties could visit for amusement in its theatres and cafes. After his transfer to Pauillac, Commander Patton acted as Naval Port Officer there until the arrival of Lieut. Herbert R. A. Borchardt, U. S. N. on March 10, 1918 to perform the duties of that position. He was succeeded in June by Lieut. George F. Keene U.S.N.R.F., who continued to serve until late in the year. When Comdr. Frank T. Evans relieved Patton, who was invalided home because of an attack of neuritis, as commandant of the aviation establishment at Pauillac in July, he removed his office to a more convenient location at Trompeloup, and at the request of the port officer, the communication officer, and the Army Transport Service officer who was stationed there provided them with space in the same building. When Ensign Andrew Robeson, U. S. N. R. F. was ordered to duty as Naval Port Officer at Pauillac towards the end of October, he was placed under the military supervision and control of the commandant of the naval air station, but he was directed to make reports concerning ship movements and the like to the District Commander, Rochefort.

The expansion of shipping on the Gironde River and the system of operations which was developed to handle it resulted in the establishment of other port officers, in part according to Captain McCully's original recommendations. At Bassens, which was operated as part

of the Bordeaux office, a U. S. Naval Dock Officer was stationed to act as liaison between the captains and masters of American ships and the French captain of the port in matters connected with mooring and navigation. A Communication or Liaison Officer was maintained on board the French station ship Marthe Solange at Le Verdon. A Naval Port Officer at Royan was used principally as a signal station to report ships entering and leaving the Gironde. This place was under the command of Lieut. William V. Astor from February to November 1918. An officer in the Naval Reserve Force, Lieutenant Astor had served during most of 1917 on his own yacht the Noma, which he had presented to the Navy, and on the staff of the Naval Port Office at Bordeaux during the early part of the winter.

In addition to the naval port offices on the Gironde, others were established in Rochefort District during the first part of 1918 at Rochefort, La Pallice, St. Jean de Luz, and Sables d'Olonne. These ports were used by cargo vessels; La Pallice and neighboring La Rochelle and Marans being used particularly for discharging coal brought across from Great Britain.

Since the bulk of the American shipping to French ports during World War I was used to man and supply the American Expeditionary Forces, the U. S. Army organized a transportation system in France. The first convoy of troop transports reached St. Nazaire late in June 1917, and that was the scene of the earliest activities of the Army Transport Service. That convoy and all subsequent convoys sailing directly from ports of embarkation in the United States to French ports escorted by cruisers attached to the U. S. Cruiser and Transport Force, which was commanded by Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, U. S. N. To supply and equip the 2,000,000 troops that eventually made up the A. E. F., it was necessary to build up a vast fleet of cargo carriers; most of these became attached to the Naval Overseas Transportation Service, which was established in the Navy Department in January 1918, following an agreement with the War Department and the U. S. Shipping Board by which the Navy was to man vessels entering the war zones. After studying the British and French organizations, General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-chief, American Expeditionary Forces, decided that the

responsibility for the movement of troops and supplies from the hold of the vessel at the port to the end of the railroad journey in the rear of the front lines should be vested in a transportation department, and on July 5, 1917 he established this system. William W. Atterbury, a former vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, appeared in France at the end of August with orders from the Secretary of War appointing him Director General of Transportation, A. E. F. In the following month General Atterbury and a party of American and French officers inspected the ports on the Bay of Biscay and the railroads connecting them with the interior to secure information upon which to determine ways to improve the systems for the use of the U. S. Army. The list of projects drawn up included the extension of facilities at Bassens and Pauillac.

The selection by the Army of ports to be used as ports of disembarkation for troops and discharge of supplies resulted in the establishment at those ports of supply organizations known as Base Sections, superintendents of the Army Transport Service, and naval port offices. Base Sections came to be organized at St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Le Havre, Brest, Marseille, and La Pallice. That at Bordeaux, the second one established, was called Base Section No. 2; it was commanded by Brig. Gen. William S. Scott and later by Brig. Gen. William D. Connor. Here towards the end of October 1917, an Army Transport Service Superintendent's office was opened by a major, who was succeeded by other majors and lieutenant colonels. The Base Section headquarters at Bordeaux was a much larger organization than the Naval Port Office, whose task was a subordinate one of considerable importance as it concerned the maintenance of the life line across the Atlantic.

The activities of the Army in the Gironde region were widespread. At American Bassens the Corps of Engineers constructed between August 1917 and April 1918 a pile dock containing ten berths, which was the largest construction of this type undertaken by the Army in France and which made Bassens its most efficient port. To distinguish it from French (old) Bassens the new port was called American (or New) Bassens.

The assignment of six berths for the Army at French

Bassens aided in the building of the new berths and provided a greater quantity of wharfage at this favorable point on the right bank of the river, affording access to railroads running to the front. A refrigerating plant was put up here by the Quartermaster Corps. Other dock installations were undertaken at nearby Lormont, at St. Loubes and St. Pardon on the Dordogne River, and at Talmont near Royan, but these were not completed before the Armistice. A number of camps were built around Bordeaux, including camps for laborers near Bassens, Genicart Camp and Grange Neuve Camp at Lormont, Camp Le Hunt at Le Courneau, a combined artillery and balloon training camp at Camp de Souge, and cantonments at St. Loubès, St. Sulpice, Gradignan, and Begles. There was a base hospital for troops at Bordeaux, a veterinary hospital at Carbon Blanc, a remount depot at Marignac, and a motor park at Bordeaux. To serve the port of Bordeaux, a great storage depot was begun at St. Sulpice, nine miles from Bassens in March 1918.

In late December 1917 Captain Jackson wrote Admiral Sims from Paris that the Navy would have to face the necessity of sending troop transports to Bordeaux, for the Army was preparing camps there for the reception of soldiers. Since the Navy escorted the troopships, this plan gave it some concern. Captain Jackson believed it would be safer to route the convoy directly to Bordeaux than to shunt transports south from St. Nazaire to Bordeaux as the voyage along the coast would be dangerous. On the last day of the year he notified Sims that General Pershing wanted Bordeaux used to the fullest extent for troopships and that the Army was then ready to receive troops there. Although the troop convoys had not yet become nearly as frequent as they would, difficulty was being experienced in handling those that were arriving at Brest and St. Nazaire, which were the principal ports utilized for the debarking of troops brought to France in American convoys. Hence the Army's desire to use Bordeaux as a port of debarkation. Unwillingly the Navy yielded to Army pressure, for the despatch of troopships to Bordeaux meant the division of a convoy somewhere in the eastern Atlantic Ocean, which not only resulted in weakened escorts but put a severe strain on the Navy's ability to provide escort vessels. The dispersion of the troop transports was

a means of speeding up their return to the United States and so hastening the movement of troops abroad, and this was what was wanted in Washington.

Early in 1918 transports began arriving at Bordeaux, and in March 5,459 troops were landed principally from the Tenadores, Mercury, and Mallory. Smaller numbers were brought in on freighters in that and subsequent months. A somewhat higher number, 6,161, was disembarked in April chiefly from the Powhatan, Martha Washington, and Rochambeau. Some of these transports made repeated trips to Bordeaux. Although these vessels were among the smaller transports, some of them had difficulty in entering and ascending the Gironde. The commanding officer of the Powhatan reported delays in waiting for the high tide to get over the bar at the mouth of the river and at Pauillac in waiting for a berth. As the engines had to be kept running while at anchor at this place in order to shift the ship with changing levels in the river, no opportunity was offered for overhauling work. Transports continued to arrive, however, landing around 11,000 troops in both May and June. From the Tenadores Admiral Wilson received word in July that it had rested in the mud while unloading. Finally the Army, because of the difficulties encountered on the Gironde, adopted the policy in August of sending transports to Bordeaux only when they carried a large amount of cargo in addition to troops and their equipment and of occasionally sending transports there in order to return troops to the United States. A total of 50,000 soldiers was debarked on the Gironde.

The Army Transport Service was represented on the Gironde not only at Bordeaux, where a superintendent had been stationed in October 1917, but also at Pauillac and at Bassens. Troop transports of too deep draft to ascend to Bordeaux were discharged at Pauillac under the direction of Major H. H. Haines, Army Transport Service superintendent. He also boarded transports on the way to Bordeaux to present orders to the officer in charge of the troops. The handling of the transports at Bassens where they were discharged by the Army, was in the hands of a Marine Superintendent, who was a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve Force. The officer who reported for this duty on October 26, 1917 was Henry W. Barstow, a former ship captain in the Clyde-Mallory

Line; he filled the position until June 1918. His duties took him on occasion to Bordeaux, Pauillac, and Blaye. He was provided for this Army service at the request of the general in command of the Line of Communications, the term then used for the Army Services of Supply.

Although the Army and the Navy operated many U. S. Shipping Board vessels, that agency operated some itself. The U. S. Consul acted as the agent for the Shipping Board vessels, but he had only limited supervision. This position was filled throughout the war by George A. Bucklin. The Shipping Board vessels were assigned to French shipbrokers, to whose financial interest it was to delay a ship in port as long as possible. Mr. Bucklin found it necessary to keep constantly on the watch to see that the shipbrokers did not engage in improper practices and to insure rapid discharging, watering, coaling, ballasting, and clearing. He also found that through his intervention the passage of the vessels up the river through the hands of the various French officials could be expedited. His repeated requests that he be allowed to handle the vessels officially and thus prevent delays were denied by the government in Washington because it was necessary to continue peace time practices in order to maintain good relations with the French. Special permission was given the Army to unload powder ships, which were a menace to the installations and supplies at Bassens, but other ships loaded for the account of the French government continued to be consigned to private companies. Some improvement in matters resulted from the adoption of the suggestion made by Bucklin that the masters of the vessels be directed to communicate with the consul's office on their arrival and make it their headquarters while in port.

In a report to the State Department submitted in August 1918 Mr. Bucklin enumerated the causes that delayed vessels in port as follows: awaiting permit and orders to sail; left American registry; repairs and crew trouble; cargo for French government; awaiting berth; slow discharge and bunkering; awaiting convoy. Most delay was caused by the unavailability of berths. Shipping Board vessels were subject to more delay because their cargoes were often for the French and Swiss governments, which made securing berths more difficult.

Stevedores were poor and hard to find.

Despite these difficulties, the consul by collaborating closely with the Army and Navy officers stationed in the locality was able to assist in speeding up the turn around of the ships.

A further source of trouble for the consul was the crews of the Shipping Board ships which were necessarily a conglomeration of nationalities. So many seamen arrived in port without papers that in December 1917, Mr. Bucklin recommended that all Shipping Board vessels be manned by the Navy, a step he considered desirable to avoid trouble and delays to shipping.

Certain services were performed by the consul for the Navy. He took acknowledgments of and administered oaths to naval and military personnel, charging fees only for private business. He assisted in the repatriation of members of naval crews and made advances of money to naval signalmen.

Shipping Board vessels caused more trouble for the Naval Port Officers than either the Naval vessels or the Army transports. Their masters were often not capable men, owing to the decadence of the American merchant marine which had diminished the supply of trained officers, and they were frequently indifferent to the necessity for handling their vessels quickly. To the naval officers who reported upon activities of these vessels, it looked also as if they were not well administered; masters operated many of the ships without adequate instructions. Attempts by naval officers to expedite their handling brought forth exhibitions of ill will.

In October 1918 Admiral Wilson was authorized by Admiral Sims, who had instructions from Washington, to transfer to the N. O. T. S. any Shipping Board vessels on which crew conditions endangered the safety of lives or property. To accomplish this, District Commanders were directed by Admiral Wilson to request the necessary authority from him amd to appoint a board to report on the circumstances of taking over a ship.

Just as the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Army had to

work together in handling American vessels in French ports, it was necessary for both to work with French officials, for in their hands remained largely the control of ship movements, pilotage, berthing, and mooring. The region comprised in the Rochefort District coincided with the 4th Arrondissement or Department de la Gascogne in which the supreme authority was the Prefet Maritime at Rochefort. His organization included four divisions: the Patrol Marine Defense, Communications, and Land Defense. The Patrol Division administered the patrol and convoy system through subordinates at La Pallice, Le Verdon, and St. Jean de Luz and the avi .tion patrols operating from bases along the coast.

At La Rochelle, Bordeaux and Bayonne were commandants du port, who were naval captains whose duties were principally those of information and communication. Commandants des Fronts de Mer were stationed at La Rochelle, Royan, and St. Jean de Luz for purposes of sea defense and information.

Among the French officials stationed at Bordeaux the chief was M. Clavel, whose French title was le Lieut. Colonel du Ingenieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussees Chef d' Exploitation des Ports de Bordeaux et de la Gironde. He controlled American shipping in general but not in detail. Other French officers included a station commandant, a chief of Division of Patrol Ships of Gascogne, which also had a lieutenant attached to the U. S. Navy as a liaison officer, and an Inspector General of Department of Civil Engineering and Assistant Chief of Central Service of Military Operations of Ports. Commander Patton seems to have been supplied immediately with a French liaison officer. A French naval port officer and an administrator of marine were maintained at Pauillac, the latter representing the Navy Commandant at Bordeaux. At Le Verdon a French station ship, the Marthe Solange, served as an operation office for the convoy, and as a coaling, supply, and repair ship. The French Army of which the headquarters of the 18th Army Corps was in Bordeaux was also involved in the control of shipping as was the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce and the Pilots Association.

The existence of war obliged the French to enforce certain requirements of vessels entering the Gironde in

order to safeguard the interests of the nation and to further its war effort. These requirements were enumerated in printed instructions which were presented to the masters of foreign vessels. Upon their arrival at the entrance to the Gironde the vessels were required to seal their wireless apparatus; to fill in an examination form; to hand in all ship's papers; to submit a list of the names of all persons on board; and to restrict persons from going ashore without the necessary permission. These requirements were designed to prevent the communication of information helpful to the enemy; to prevent the entrance of enemy agents and sabateurs; to apprehend suspected persons; and to secure data useful for handling the vessel while on the river. After mooring in the port the master had to furnish another list of the members of the crew with certain information and to restrict their landing without proper authorization. During the stay in harbor the movements of persons attached to the ship were strictly controlled through the issuance of identity cards and permits of circulation; communication with war prisoners was forbidden; only persons with the authorization of the marine authorities were to be allowed on board ship; persons boarding surreptitiously were to be reported, as were members of the crew leaving ships without permission. At sailing time inspectors boarded the ship to examine the identity cards and to obtain their return; the captain was to insure that no suspicious person was on board and to furnish the names of missing members of the crew, and before sailing the ship had to have a "sailing license." These regulations, established according to French laws, decrees, and orders of 1916 and 1917 were enforced by the Navigation Police, whose chief was stationed at Pauillac, where vessels were inspected on their way up the river. At this place a quarantine officer also boarded vessels to conduct a sanitary inspection.

In the ports of France, American troop and store ships were obliged to pay for pilotage, ballast, water, towage, and handling of lines. The French government remitted the sanitary and quay dues, and there were no custom house or passport charges. The pilotage fees were required by French laws and had to be paid whenever pilot service was offered even though it was not accepted. Considerable correspondence was exchanged

with the French government on this matter, the U. S. Navy taking the stand that it should not have to pay and the French insisting that payment had to be made, except in the case of American patrol vessels regularly assigned to the station. Admiral Wilson pointed out to the French the difficulty he would have in certifying to his government bills for pilotage in cases where the pilot's services had been refused. The Chief of Staff of the French Ministry of Marine took up the matter with Captain Jackson at Paris in April 1918 asking that it be referred to the government at Washington. In forwarding the communication from the Chief of Staff, Captain Jackson pointed out that the practice of paying the pilotage bill if required by port regulations even though pilotage had been refused was quite widespread and suggested issuing instructions accordingly. The matter was referred by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy Department who responded on May 11, 1918 by quoting a statement submitted by the State Department in the preceding year to the effect that the doctrine of international law was that all vessels were subject to the revenue and police regulations, including those in regard to pilotage of the territorial waters which such vessels might enter. United States vessels were subject to the rules and regulations of the French ports, and the controlling factor was not the nature of the certification of the pilotage bill but that the port regulations made its payment obligatory. This opinion was accepted as the official policy of the Navy Department, and Admiral Sims published it for the information and guidance of all forces in Europe in his circular letter no. 65 of July 16, 1918.

The great increase in shipping on the Gironde River, the multiplicity of officers of various countries handling it, and the necessity for imposing war time restrictions produced a complicated and confusing situation, which was never entirely free of difficulties and friction throughout the period of the war. For an understanding of this situation, it is necessary to have a picture of the conduct of operations on the river.

Upon their arrival at the mouth of the Gironde River vessels were subjected to a rigid procedure which lasted during their sojourn. Entrance to the river through the protecting submarine nets stretched across

its mouth was under the watchful eyes of the escort vessels which had convoyed the ships to the river and the French patrol ship guarding the passage through the net, which was kept open at all times. Inside the net at Le Verdon was the French station ship Marthe Solange, an old sailing hulk, upon which was stationed the French officer in command of the convoy and the American Naval Communication or Liaison Officer, as he was later called. Information as to the probable date of arrival of vessels was communicated to the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux, who notified the Army authorities when Army cargoes were involved. At Le Verdon roads the vessels were visited by the French Navigation Police and by the American Naval Liaison Officer, the latter to present a copy of the Port Regulations and to receive a filled in form containing information about the ship necessary for its handling. The radio apparatus was sealed and thereafter was unsealed only by the French authorities or by the U. S. naval district radio repair officer. Preparations were to be made for unloading the cargo while the vessels were still at the anchorage inorder that no time would be lost after they reached the docks. Certain restrictions imposed upon the personnel of the ships by the French have been mentioned; others were stipulated by the U. S. Port Regulations. Liberty parties were allowed under no circumstances at Royan or St. Georges, but when vessels were to be at Le Verdon for several days parties were permitted ashore under an officer accompanied by patrol. Data concerning the arrivals and departures of ships was communicated to the Commander U. S. Naval Forces in France to whose staff it was useful in planning and directing the movements of convoys and patrol and escort vessels.

The passage up the Gironde and the Garonne was under the guidance of a series of French pilots each of whom collected a fee. Off the entrance the vessels were boarded by the Royan pilots, who saw them through the net to the anchorage at Le Verdon. The Le Verdon pilot took vessels as far as Pauillac, where inspections were made by the French Navigation Police and the sanitation authorities. Vessels with cargoes for Bassens or Bordeaux were taken to those places by the Pauillac pilot, and the mooring at those places was in the hands of still another pilot. The Bordeaux pilots had to be secured for subsequent changes of mooring at Bordeaux and

Bassens and for entrance into the basin at the former place. On the voyage down stream this procedure was reversed. Dock regulations for the port on the river were issued by the French captains of the ports and came to be incorporated into the U. S. Naval Port Regulations. So many pilots for a mere sixty miles of river were quite unnecessary, and the chief reason for having changes of pilots was to collect more fees. This, however, was not a practice peculiar to French ports.

Vessels were discharged by the service to which their cargoes were assigned. Most of the vessels containing cargo for the U. S. Navy were unloaded at Pauillac, where a Transportation Department developed under the supervision of a naval officer subordinate to the commandant of the Aviation Assembly and Repair Station. Crews of U. S. naval vessels were required to assist in unloading in order to reduce the time spent in port. Work parties were organized to discharge certain holds on their ships, and when these were emptied the men were placed at liberty. The armed guards on board the ships were used as sentrys at the gangways and at the holds from which cargo was being taken. Assistance was given by the Naval Dock Officer at Bassens and the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux through whom orders concerning the movements of vessels were arranged. Daily reports were submitted to them as to the handling of the winches and gear, the consumption of fuel, and the progress of the unloading.

Other services were performed by the Naval Port Officer Bordeaux. He handled all cable and telegraph communication and incoming and outgoing mail. He arranged for the transfer of naval personnel to other bases in France and for the return of personnel to the United States. Fuel, water, ballast and ammunition were arranged for by the Naval Dock Officer at Bassens.

Army cargo transports and troop transports were under the jurisdiction of the Army Transport Service from the time of their arrival at Le Verdon. Their berthing, discharging, watering, fueling, ballasting, and guarding were handled by the representatives of that service stationed at Pauillac, Bassens, and Bordeaux. The revised port organization for base ports such as

that of Bordeaux-Bassens instituted by the Army in May 1918 comprised Administrative, Operations, Troop and Cargo, Terminal Facilities, and Supplies Division, each having a number of officers. The responsibility for handling cargo from the ship's hold to cars, trucks, and warehouses was in the hands of the Chief Stevedore in the Troop and Cargo Division. The discharge of Army transports was facilitated by the practice of having on board an Army Quartermaster who was familiar with the manner in which they had been loaded.

The Medical Officer attached to the Naval Port Office had important duties connected with the health of ships' crew and sanitary conditions on board and ashore. Neither officers or crew members were allowed to leave the ship until the medical inspection had been passed. Members of the crew found to be infected with venereal diseases were confined to the ship; others having contagious diseases were hospitalized. A Naval dispensary was maintained at Bassens for the treatment of persons on the sick list and a dental office at Bordeaux. A report of the sanitary condition of the ship was made to the Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux. Ashes and garbage had to be placed on shore in proper containers—not dumped into the river. A medical officer acted as liaison with the Army for the evacuation of sick and wounded to the United States. Severe cases of sickness or injury were cared for in the Army Base Hospital at Bordeaux.

By the middle of 1918 American naval personnel were a familiar sight on the streets of Bordeaux, and at times there were hundreds of them on liberty. Although the conduct of these men was generally good, instances of disorderliness, rowdiness, and drunkenness in which persons were sometimes injured were sufficiently numerous to require the establishment of a Naval Patrol by order of the District Commander of June 21, 1918. The duty of maintaining order and enforcing liberty regulations devolved upon the patrol, and by arrangement with the French the jurisdiction of the patrol was extended to the personnel of American merchant ships visiting the city. Liberty was allowed between the hours of 8 A. M. and 9:30 P. M., but the patrol was on duty somewhat later in order to pick up stragglers. Persons granted liberty by the commanding officers of ships were

required to carry passes signed by their executive officers. Special passes were granted for attendance at theatres with the warning that violations of the spirit of the pass would result in disciplinary action. Advice as to the danger of infection from associating with prostitutes and the addresses of Army prophylactic stations were supplied; badly diseased red light districts were set up as restricted districts and men caught with disreputable women were punished. Other causes of arrest were disorder, intoxication, refusal to obey orders of patrol, and absent overleave or without leave. The Naval Patrol at Bordeaux consisted of personnel attached to the Naval Port Office. At Pauillac no permanent patrol was formed, and patrols were furnished by the ships landing liberty parties. A Naval Ferry operated between Bassens and Bordeaux was much used by naval personnel going to the latter on liberty. Since it was the largest city in the region, Bordeaux attracted liberty parties from naval activities throughout that part of France.

The Naval Port Officer held court two or three times a week, dispensing what might be called naval justice. If Naval Regulations or the rules for courts and boards held, well and good, if not, he used his ingenuity, like a frontier judge of the United States, and devised penalties to fit the crime or misdemeanor. Private American citizens with grievances against the Navy or the French, and French citizens, as well as Naval personnel brought their troubles to the Naval Port Officer.

In the military port of Bordeaux there were special dangers incident to the war which had to be countered. Deserters from the Allied forces were looking for means of escape, sometimes as stowaways on board ships in the harbor; German prisoners were utilized on the docks in labor gangs; spies sought means of communicating with ships; other agents attempted sabotage on ships and attempted to stir up dissatisfaction among their crews. Consequently guards had to be maintained constantly on ships and docks. American Naval personnel were warned against bands of courtesans engaged in collecting information for the enemy; these were not only of the street walking variety but also the educated, well-dressed type whose particular prey was Naval officers.

In 1918 a counter espionage system was being developed by the U.S. Navy, which involved the assignment of intelligence officers to the headquarters of the French military regions to cooperate with the U.S. Army and French intelligence services. The district intelligence officer for Rochefort District was stationed at Bordeaux, and instructions were issued to the District Commander and the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux to furnish him with information and to assist him in his work. The officer assigned to Bordeaux at the end of February was Lieut. Comdr. William L. Stevenson, U.S.N.R.F. He performed some excellent work in organizing the counter espionage system in the 18th Army Region, in the opinion of his superior, Comdr. W. R. Sayles, the naval attache at Paris, but he did not establish proper relations with the District Commander at Rochefort and got into difficulties with his chief assistant, as a result of which both were disenrolled in June. The chief assistant became particularly unpopular with Commander Sayles because he represented himself as the naval attache in visits to ports south of Bordeaux. Lieut. Frederick C. Havemeyer, U.S.N.R.F. succeeded Stevenson at Bordeaux and remained there until the end of the war.

The material condition of ships was also a concern of the Naval Port Officer. Repairs beyond the capacity of a ship's force were handled by the repair officer, who from the summer of 1918 had available for this kind of work a repair ship, the U. S. S. Panther. There were dry dock and ship yards in Bordeaux, where repairs were also made upon American vessels. The repair officer handled not only the naval vessels based on the coast but also troop ships and cargo vessels whether Navy, Army, or Shipping Board. Repairs were also made by Army establishments. The scarcity of shipping made it imperative to keep all vessels in operation as much of the time as possible. Radio repairs were taken care of by an office at Bassens.

The establishment of adequate communications was of unusual importance to the Naval Port Office at Bordeaux because of the distance of that port from the sea and because of its supervision of other port offices on the river. For months the American naval port office system was dependent upon the French lines of

communication, which had never been planned for the load now put upon them. In the summer of 1918 work was undertaken upon independent telephone and telegraph lines but progressed slowly, owing to the lack of material and to the indifference of the U.S. Army to building purely Naval lines. In July 1918 a submarine cable was laid between Royan and Le Verdon; it worked a few days and then failed because of poor insulation. By the end of 1918 the Navy had constructed a complete telephone circuit from Rochefort via Royan, Le Verdon, Pauillac, Bordeaux, and back to Rochefort. This system included two cables under the Gironde between Royan and Le Verdon. All port officers could also communicate at this time by telegraph with the District Commander. Radio schools were conducted at Bordeaux and Rochefort for coaching operators on ships.

The last service performed by the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux and his subordinates at Bassens and Pauillac for U. S. ships was to get them started on the homeward voyage. A day or two before departure commanding officers called at the Naval Port Office for sailing orders. Ships ready to depart were required to make a search for stowaways, prepare a list of persons carried on board and a list of men left behind. After being cast off from the docks vessels which had been discharged by the Army again came under naval authority. The passage down stream was under the guidance of pilots, and at Le Verdon French officials came aboard for an inspection.

Le Verdon was the assembly point for convoys bound for the United States, which were referred to as the O. V. convoys and which were made up of vessels from the Gironde River ports and other ports on the southwest coast of France. No vessels, except naval warships, were allowed outside of the nets guarding the entrance to the Gironde without naval escort. The O. V. (V. for Verdon) convoy was established towards the end of 1917 by the Commandant Superieur des Divisions de Bretagne at Brest, under a French naval officer on the Marthe Solange. As the French escort was inadequate, several American yachts which had been serving farther north on the coast of France were based at Le Verdon early in 1918. The vessels usually assigned here during 1918 were the Aphrodite, Corsair, May, Nokomis,

Noma, and the Wakiva. Although orders for the convoys were issued by the French, the commander of the senior American escort vessel was given further information by the District Commander at Rochefort, on whose staff the Operations Officer had charge of the escort vessels assigned to the district. The senior escort commander communicated his final and secret instructions in a meeting attended by the ships' officers on the Marthe Solange. The usual procedure was for a group of three American and one French escort vessel to accompany the ships to sea for two or three days when they dispersed on divergent routes onthe open sea, and then the escort returned to the Gironde. For the first 50 miles the escort, whose composition varied according to the number of craft available, was reinforced with gunboats and launches attached to the Gascony patrols.

In the summer of 1918 the number of ships in a convoy ranged from 22 to 36. With more or less regular periods for liberty and repairs, the monotonous escort trips went on and on. In these more southern waters there were few encounters with enemy submarines. Reports of the convoys were sent by the senior American officer to the District Commander. Between February and October 1918 twenty-four O. V. convoys comprising 437 ships were escorted from Le Verdon.

After April 1918 ships sailing from New York to Bay of Biscay ports were convoyed directly in what were called H. B. convoys. These convoys were operated by the British Admiralty, as were all other convoys of cargo ships crossing the Atlantic, until September when the U.S. Navy, having acquired experience in running convoys, took over the operation of the H. B. convoys; the more northern convoys traversing more dangerous routes remained under British control. The laden ships of the H. B. convoys were conducted by American or French cruisers to a rendezvous point off the French coast, where they were met by escort vessels which had brought out an O. V. convoy, and, whenever possible by destroyers from Brest, and taken to Le Verdon for distribution to the ports to which they were destined. This system required careful management and necessitated a constant flow of communication between Admiral Wilson's headquarters at Brest and Captain McCully's headquarters at Rochefort, in addition to communication

with the United States and the British Admiralty at London. Arrangements at first were for convoys every sixteen days, but by September there was a fast store-ship convoy every four days in addition to slow convoys; they comprised an average of ten ships. The Navy Department at this time considered increasing the number of convoys, but Admiral Sims advised an increase in the number of ships on the convoys as the more numerous the convoys the easier it was for the submarines to find them and the more escort vessels needed. Of the total of 255 ships taken to the Bay of Biscay in twenty H. B. convoys 202 were American.

Ships coming to Le Verdon to join the O. V. convoys, ships brought to that place in H. B. convoys for distribution to other ports on the coast, and ships engaged in coastwise traffic were escorted in coastal convoys which operated along the entire coast of the Bay of Biscay. These coastal convoys were run by the French Navy, and the officer stationed on the Marthe Solange at Le Verdon received orders pertaining to them. American naval vessels composed three out of the eight units of escort vessels employed on the coastal convoys.

Pauillac served as a supply base for the American escort vessels. At the completion of each trip to sea, they ran up the river to coal from colliers anchored at that place or from the coal piles at Trompeloup. Here they also obtained other supplies, including water, provisions, clothing, lubricating oil, gasoline, and engineering and electrical stores. Monthly visits were made by one of the yachts to Brest for other supplies not procurable at Pauillac. Because of the difficulty of coaling the yachts there, due to the lack of berths, the District Commander recommended the acquisition of two lighters. To meet the need which would eventually exist for a shore base for the vessels assigned to the district, he suggested, in a report of August 1, 1918 Talmont as the most suitable place because of its superior location. The construction of oil tanks at Furt, which was progressing at this time, would have provided a store from which to supply oil burning destroyers for escort duty--had the war continued longer.

American troop transports were provided with escorts and routed by Admiral Wilson's headquarters at Brest. These were given preferential treatment over the cargo convoys because they carried our manpower and because they were larger and more valuable ships. Convoys of transports routed to the Gironde under the escort of destroyers, which had met them at the rendezvous in the Atlantic, were reinforced at land fall positions by the American escort vessels attached to the Le Verdon station. It was sometimes necessary to weaken the regular Verdon convoys in order to accomplish this. Instead of being returned to the United States in the regular O. V. convoys, the troopships formed special O. V. convoys and were given destroyer escort to a safe distance from the coast, whence they proceeded alone, relying on their speed to evade any chance submarines that might be encountered.

Airplane escort was also provided for the convoys from nearby naval air stations operated by the French and the Americans. Towards the end of the war, after airplane escort had been regularly provided for some time, it succeeded in driving the submarines away from the coast out to sea, where ships were more scattered and difficult prey.

The O. V. convoys and the coastal convoys were largely comprised of American ships. For this reason and because the French did not operate the convoys as efficiently as they might have, Captain McCully recommended that control of the convoys be acquired by the U. S. Navy. He reported that the assignment of positions to ships in the convoy was not done to the best advantage, that the French vessels lacked sufficient signalmen, and that the convoy instructions were frequently unsatisfactory. Should American control be established, he advised that the senior convoy officer should be stationed at Le Verdon in a vessel from which he could arrange the formation of the convoy. To take care of the increased number of vessels which statistics showed would have to be handled, he proposed the assignment of additional escort vessels and stationing auxiliary vessels at Pauillac and Le Verdon. He believed that by means of American control efficiency would be increased and delays reduced. Admiral Sims directed Admiral Wilson on August 16, 1918 to assume

full responsibility for handling the H. B. and O. V. convoys as soon as possible. The H. B. convoys were taken over in the following month, but lack of escort vessels appears to have prevented the adoption of a similar course for the O. V. and the Coastal convoys before the Armistice ended the necessity for convoys.

To develop the Garonne-Gironde system into an efficient port organization, in order to speed up the turn around of vessels as much as possible, it was necessary for the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy to overcome numerous difficulties, some of which were physical in character and others administrative. Mention has been made of the work undertaken by the U.S. Army to increase port and rail facilities; much was accomplished in this direction, but ship traffic on the river was congested after it got into full swing during 1918. The impossibility of constructing sufficient docks quickly enough and the obstacles presented by the river itself which was difficult to enter because of the tide and a bar, difficult to navigate because of sandbars and a narrow channel, and lack of depth, and difficult to anchor or moor in because of the heavy tide, made it the more necessary to accelerate traffic by improving conditions that were not insurmountable.

Among the causes of delay encountered by American vessels in steaming up the Gironde River were the police and sanitation inspections conducted by the French officials at Pauillac. An American Naval officer who investigated shipping conditions on the river in the spring of 1918 reported that these inspections resulted in delays amounting in some cases to 12 to 24 hours or even longer and necessitated in some instances the return of vessels to Le Verdon before they could proceed up the river. The amelioration agreed upon for this condition will be referred to later.

More irksome to the commanding officers of the ships was the necessity for stopping their progress up stream so many times to take on new pilots. Nor was it agreeable to have to pay for pilotage that was not performed, yet the Pilots Association on the river kept track of the movements of ships and sent them bills demanding payment for pilotage. The refusal at first on the part of American Naval authorities to pay for

pilotage when services were not performed irritated the French pilots and caused them to perpetrate deliberate delays in handling ships. Waiting in midstream at Pauillac for several hours or overnight for a pilot and during the whole time keeping the engine running in order to shift the ship with changes in the tide was not calculated to promote good Franco-American relations nor the prosecution of the war. Not until the summer of 1918 was this matter settled, after reference to the Navy Department and securing a legal opinion, by the issuance of instructions which directed the payment of pilots whenever their services were offered.

Once at the docks, delay was again likely to be met because of lack of berths, railroad cars, stevedores, equipment, and harbor craft, and improper stowing of cargo at the ports in the United States. Berths were built, railroad cars, stevedores, and equipment were imported, and tugs and lighters provided, and the turn around was improved. Battalions of negro laborers brought over by the Army for use as stevedores were kept in camps near Bassens. Some difficulty was experienced in converting cotton hands into cargo handlers, but the transmutation was gradually effected. Additional German war prisoners were obtained for this work. In their own country they would have done good work, but in France they did not want to—and wouldn't. Discharging vessels was more an Army problem than a Navy one, and the remedies were largely of military devising. To speed up the unloading of its own vessels, the Navy required their crews to assist the labor available in port. Assistance was also afforded the Navy by officers of the Army Transport Service. Among the forces of the latter organization a competitive system of discharging ships was inaugurated to speed up the work, showing by means of charts the progress made by the various outfits in the "Race to Berlin."

Reports submitted by the District Commander at Rochefort contained suggestions as to means of preventing delays. A permanent Naval Port Detachment was recommended as a method of enabling Naval vessels to be discharged entirely by Naval personnel. More careful stowage of cargo in the United States would make easier unloading in France. Each port should have a marine Superintendent who should be a Naval officer assigned

to the Army for liaison duty between Naval Port Officers and Army Transport Service officers. In the United States there should be an officer familiar with conditions along the French coast. A further way of expediting shipping movements would be the adoption of a demurrage system, which would entail the payment of charges for the detention of ships.

Occasionally it was necessary to supply coal or oil to a vessel in order to enable it to leave the river. This could be done only with great difficulty, for fuel had to be imported. A recommendation by Captain McCully that ships leaving the United States be required to carry enough fuel to make the return voyage was forwarded by Admiral Sims to Washington with an endorsement to the effect that he understood it to be the department's policy to fuel vessels for the round trip. When this was not possible, he stated that it would be necessary for additional fuel to be sent in other vessels. He added that the construction of oil tanks on the west coast of France would make it possible to provide small quantities of oil to vessels that might require it. A practice followed with fuel as with other supplies was to have ships carrying an extra quantity unload some for the use of ships that might be short.

To provide stability, proper immersion to the screw, and manueverability, it was necessary to ballast ships returning to the United States as there were few goods to be exported. Ballast, chiefly iron pyrites, was available at a reasonable price, but it required labor, rolling stock, and animal transport to load it, and these things were difficult to obtain and were needed for unloading cargoes. The Shipping Board and the Army Transport Service during summer months required ships to carry water ballast in their double bottoms, but the Navy apparently did not favor such an inflexible rule, which did not distinguish between oil burners and coal burners, the latter of which had coal to serve as ballast. Free water in the holds was tried but proved more dangerous than no ballast at all. Some vessels successfully used box tanks in the holds, which could be utilized for carrying cargo, and consideration of this method was recommended by Captain McCully. The amount of ballast to be carried by naval vessels was determined in a conference between their masters and

the naval port authorities, a method regarded by Captain McCully as being unsatisfactory because not exact. His proposal was for an inspection of each ship by a technical board in United States ports to decide the amount of ballast to be carried for various conditions and the means of carrying it.

The increase of shipping on the Gironde, the inexperience of many of the officers and crews on the ships, and their unfamiliarity with the region caused collisions, resulting in damages to U.S. Naval vessels and French vessels. Pursuant to U.S. Navy Regulations, such cases were settled according to the French Port Regulations by special boards, which were appointed to determine the responsibility and the amount of the damages. When French vessels were responsible for damage to U.S. Naval vessels, they made prompt payment, but there was no way in which the same treatment could be accorded them when the circumstances were reversed. Pay officers refused to make payment for repairs because they had no appropriation from which it could be paid, nor did the Navy Department have any appropriation available. Some French shipping companies paid large amounts to the United States, but could secure no payments from it for damages caused their ships by U.S. Naval vessels. Such cases, reported Captain McCully, brought the good name of the United States into disrepute. He recommended in May and again in August 1918 that funds be made available for the prompt payment in cash for damages caused by U.S. Naval vessels.

Even when a ship had been discharged and ballasted, further delay sometimes happened. Departure time arrived, and the officers and crews were not on board. The maintenance of discipline among green ships' forces, hard enough at best, was made more difficult by the uncertain and complicated control and administration on the river. When it was not known what to do, the rule was do as you please. Lax discipline was especially bad on Shipping Board ships, whose masters at times interposed trifling reasons for delaying their departure. As a means of promoting discipline, Captain McCully recommended a system of observation and report on the masters of vessels and an improvement of the system used for the commanding officers of U.S. Naval vessels. Of sterner character was his proposal that all cargo

vessels operating in the war zone be taken over and manned by the Navy.

At the convoy station at Le Verdon, vessels assembled for the westward voyage and waited for the escort vessels, if they happened not to be on the spot, which was the case at times because there never were enough vessels for the duty. To facilitate the arrangement of the convoy, Captain McCully attempted to keep an American Naval vessel stationed at Le Verdon, but it was necessary at times to send it away on other duty. Had there been a Naval vessel with a suitable staff stationed at Le Verdon, the time spent here by ships waiting to go up the river or waiting for convoy could have been utilized in exercising and training signalmen and radio men, conducting boat drills, and to inspect the ships to see that regulations were complied with. Captain McCully wanted to station there an officer of the rank of commander with experience in convoy work to make up convoys and issue their instructions. Had the war continued longer this step probably would have been taken, and the convoys placed under American Naval control.

Better results might have been obtained at Bordeaux and at other port offices in the Rochefort District, if additional personnel had been provided. The District Commander pointed out that communicating information about the arrival of ships to all the persons concerned was a complicated matter, requiring more personnel to accomplish properly.

In the latter part of 1918 some processed Port Regulations were issued by the Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux for the instruction and guidance of masters of vessels arriving on the river. The first edition clearly shows the origin of the regulations by appending to it numerous French and American orders regulating traffic on the river. Revisions issued in January and March 1919 were less of a compilation and more of a finished product and embodied further experience. These were undoubtedly of great assistance to ships' officers.

The primary cause for the delays to shipping on the Gironde was the lack of a coordinated system of

control during most of the war. Reaching an agreement was in itself a difficult matter because of the diversified character of the shipping and the multiplicity of the authorities attempting to handle it. The following classes of vessels arrived in the district:

U.S. Naval Transports
U.S. Navy Chartered Transports
U.S. Naval vessels with cargoes for Army, Navy, and French
U.S. cargo vessels for Army, Navy, French, and neutral powers
Allied vessels with cargoes for Army and Navy
Neutral vessels with cargoes for Army and Navy
U.S. Shipping Board vessels with cargoes for Army, Navy, and French
U.S. Shipping Board vessels chartered to French government
U.S. Shipping Board vessels operated by private American parties
U.S. Shipping Board vessels chartered to private French parties
Special vessels in service of U.S. Army, U.S. Navy and Aviation
Private vessels chartered to various parties

Special methods were necessary for handling each class of vessel. For the two first classes procedures were eventually worked out which operated with little difficulty.

The authorities concerned in handling the shipping from the United States were as follows:

U.S. Naval Port Officers
U.S. Military authorities (Army Transport Service)
French Naval authorities
French civil authorities (Ponts et Chaussees)
U.S. Consuls
Consuls of Allied and Neutral Powers
Naval Port Officers of Allied Powers
U.S. Naval Information Service (Office of Naval Intelligence)
Private consignees, ship brokers, etc.

In view of this mixture of military and civil authorities of various countries and French private interests, it is not surprising that it was difficult to reach an agreement for the control of shipping. The French authorities and interests had been running things and naturally wanted to continue doing so. The American authorities were instructed to speed up the turn around of vessels so they were desirous of removing all obstacles to the movements of ships. All parties were influenced by political considerations, by local practices, by international law and custom, and by jealousies of their respective services.

Long before the volume of traffic on the Gironde began to be expanded by the arrival of American cargoes, the need for agreement as to its control was realized. Commander Patton in September 1917 urged upon Admiral Sims the necessity for giving attention to the question of Army and Navy administration and cooperation at Bordeaux and that suitable instructions be sent to him. At the time the U. S. Navy Department set up the district organization in France, it was giving consideration to the matter of reaching an agreement whereby all American ships entering the districts would be subject to the orders of U. S. Naval authorities and asked for the recommendations of Admirals Sims and Wilson on the subject.

After American Naval forces had been operating for several months on the French coast, recommendations began to be received at the headquarters in Brest concerning the handling of shipping. In an endorsement dated March 16, 1918, to a communication from Lieut. Comdr. Ezra G. Allen, of the U.S.S. Wakiva, pertaining to the mission of U.S. Naval Port Officers, Captain McCully advocated the extension of the activities of the port officers to include all American vessels. He believed Shipping Board vessels were capable of twice the work they were performing, if their movements were under a well systematized control. An extension of the port officer system would be necessary to establish this control. In place of absolute control of shipping by the U.S. Navy, which might not be necessary or desirable, he thought that the shipping could be managed efficiently by disseminating information concerning movements of ships through Naval headquarters at Brest,

where a Transportation Officer would be necessary. A representative of this office would be needed in the United States for coordinating purposes. Both of these letters were communicated by Admiral Wilson to District Commanders for their information and guidance. He planned at this time to make Allen the Transporation Officer in charge of the Naval Port Officers.

Experiences subsequently met by troop transports in ascending the Gironde elicited reports from their commanding officers on the need for improved methods of controlling shipping. Upon the arrival of the U. S. A. T. El Oriente at Le Verdon report was made to the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux, Lieutenant Bernier, who sent sailing orders to the captain of the ship, and Lieutenant Commander Barstow, Marine Superintendent, A. T. S. at Bassens, also sent sailing orders to the master of the ship. From the mouth of the river to the docks, four pilots were taken on board, and a visit was made by police authorities to inspect personnel. An Army officer came on board at Pauillac and delivered orders to the captain who turned them over to the senior naval officer. As vessels were being unnecessarily delayed in their passage up the river by this diversity of control, Lieut. Comdr. R. R. Smith of this vessel, recommended the establishment of the office of commandant of the Gironde district under a captain of the U.S. Navy in order to centralize the control of U. S. ships under Naval authority. In the same month, May 1918, the U. S. S. Martha Washington upon reaching Pauillac was directed by the Army representative to proceed to American Bassens with a favorable tide, but the French harbormaster refused to allow it to continue until the next tide which was not until the following morning. Lieutenant Bernier's explanation for this delay was that it was the result of misunderstanding and lack of coordination between the Navy and the Army and conflict of authority between French civil and naval authorities.

The difficulty experienced by the Martha Washington and other Army transports apparently led to an agreement between the Army Transport Service Superintendent and the Naval Port Officer concerning the extent of their authority. It was arranged that information about ships arriving at Le Verdon would be communicated to

the Army at Bordeaux via the Naval Communication Officer at Le Verdon and the Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, and that instructions as to the movements of the ships would be transmitted by the Naval authorities. After the ships received these instructions at Le Verdon, their further handling was under the Army Transport Service. The Navy was not to be involved again until the ships were discharged and cast off from the docks. Thus a definite agreement was attained, which was designed to avoid conflicting or duplicating orders.

After the establishment of the Naval Overseas Transportation Service in the Navy Department in January 1918, to direct the operations of the cargo vessels operated by the Navy, greater interest developed in the department in the turn around of Naval vessels in the ports of France. The Director of the N. O. T. S., Comdr. Charles Belknap, Jr., wrote Admiral Sims concerning this matter, expressing approval of the appointment of port officers, which he indicated correspond to the District Supervisors of the N. O. T. S. in ports of the United States. In April 1918 the Chief of Naval operations, under whom the N. O. T. S. functioned, ordered a party of officers headed by Lieut. Comdr. Daniel Bacon, U. S. N. R. F., a man of considerable experience in merchant shipping, to duty in France as representatives of the N. O. T. S. Admiral Sims was somewhat uncertain what to do with these officers and requested a report with recommendation from Admiral Wilson, who responded on May 9 in a letter in which he referred to the increase of shipping in French ports and to the inadequate facilities for handling it. As these facilities could be obtained only with great difficulty, except through the Naval Port Officers, they had assumed control of American vessels in French ports and of foreign vessels in American service. He continued as follows:

> 4. There appears to be a strong tendency toward separation of the control of vessels of these various classifications. From previous correspondence and from the daily press, it seems to be intended that there shall be in each port separate representatives to control each of these classes of vessels. This will lead to confusion of effort and to considerable delay in the

handling of vessels whose port representatives have not a control of the port facilities. What is required is an organization to insure that each vessel, regardless of classification, shall be boarded at its first anchorage on the coast of France by an English speaking official competent to give the Captain or master full information as to his future movements, and information as to the berthing of the ship, repairing, fueling, hospital and ballasting facilities of the port, pilotage, etc. The organization must keep the vessel under constant scrutiny while in port to insure that no time is unnecessarily lost in discharging the vessel or in dispatching from the port. Charts and hydrographic information must be available. Such an organization can be handled only by the Navy, and there has been established for this purpose a system of Naval Port Officers. For the further development of this system there is now required in the office of the Commander U.S. Naval Forces in France an officer of experience and rank whose function will be to direct and coordinate the activities of the Naval Port Officers and to control in all respects American merchant shipping except in matters of convoy and escort and matters pertaining to merchant seamen which will be handled through the Operations Officer and by the U.S. consuls as at present. In order that this officer may have the necessary power it seems necessary that the Commander U.S. Naval Forces in France be constituted the representative in France for the United States Shipping Board and for the Naval Overseas Transport Service.

Upon the arrival of Lieutenant Commander Bacon in London, Admiral Sims ordered him to Paris for conferences with representatives of the Navy, the Army and the U.S. Shipping Control Committee, and to Brest for consultation with Admiral Wilson, then to return to London. After completing this tour Bacon was assigned to Pauillac with his party of six men to investigate conditions there and to prepare suggestions for managing ships at other ports. The party reached Pauillac on May 16, and on the 23rd Bacon was back in London

again reporting to Admiral Sims. In an endorsement of the following day to Admiral Wilson's report of May 9, Admiral Sims wrote to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:

> The situation in European ports, and particularly the French ports with respect to control of United States shipping is unsatisfactory, and it is thought that the movements of ships could be very much expedited if all vessels were placed under the control of the Navy. The ideal plan to meet wartime requirements would be to have all vessels regularly commissioned Naval vessels, but in the absence of such an arrangement, which is recognized as impracticable at present, the next best thing would be to have all vessels when in port subject to Naval jurisdiction in all matters concerning their movements and discharge.

He referred to the establishment of Naval Port Officers in Europe and to the fact that they lacked authority to deal with any but regularly commissioned Naval vessels. He regarded the creation of the N. O. T. S. as a step in the right direction. He did not endorse Admiral Wilson's suggestion that he be designated as representative of the Shipping Board and the N. O. T. S., but he did recommend that the Navy be given

> authority to control the movements, while in port, of all vessels flying the United States flag or under charter to the United States Government, including vessels in the service of the U.S. Army. With respect to the last named vessels, it seems desirable, under present conditions, that the discharge of cargoes and the landing of troops be under Army authority.

The letters of Admirals Wilson and Sims were referred by the Chief of Naval Operations, who was in accord with their views, to the War Department and were considered by the staff of the A. E. F. in France. General James G. Harboard, head of the Services of Supply, reported to General Pershing that the operation of the transports while in French ports, including their discharge, was so closely related to the work of the terminal facilities, warehousing, railroading, and

dealing with the various supply departments that it should remain under Army control. It was no time to substitute something new for a smoothly working organization. Upon reading the foregoing statement in a letter from Pershing, Admiral Sims wisely concluded that a change from Army to Navy control was inadvisable. By this time closer cooperation had developed between the two services.

Admiral Wilson had also been in touch with the Director of the Army Transport Service concerning the discharging of Naval vessels, which was difficult for the Navy to effect since the Army had control of most of the facilities. The willingness of the Army to unload or assist in unloading Naval vessels whenever practicable apparently made it unnecessary for Admiral Wilson to carry through a plan he had for the establishment of a Naval organization for for discharging vessels.

Lieutenant Commander Bacon returned to Pauillac for duty in connection with the handling of shipping, but remained there only until the middle of June, being detailed then to Brest, whence he returned to the United States in the following month. He became connected thereafter with the administration of N. O. T. S. matters in the Navy Department, giving it the benefit of the knowledge he had acquired of conditions in France. Four members of his party became permanently attached to the station at Pauillac, while the others were soon sent away.

In a letter of May 27, 1918 to Admiral Wilson, Admiral Sims remarked about the shipping problem in France that "It is not in the least our fault. There is evident lack of coordination of these various functions in Washington." There was evidently some truth in this statement, for early in 1919 the Director of the N. O. T. S. and the Shipping Board corresponded concerning the designation of a liaison representative to expedite business between the two agencies.

The situation at Pauillac was improved towards the end of May 1918 as a result of an agreement between the Army and the Navy. In dealing with American officers at that place the French port officers were

uncertain whether to take up matters with the Naval Port Officer, the commandant of the air station, or the Army Transport Service officer. After the French called attention to the Pauillac situation at a meeting in Paris, Brigadier General Atterbury proposed to Admiral Wilson that a trial be made of having the Army officer determine priority for ships berthing there. This was agreed to as a temporary measure by the Navy, which was willing to try anything to better conditions at Pauillac docks. As late as October 1918, however, trouble was still being experienced at Pauillac in the discharge of vessels.

Early in June an agreement was reached with the French as to the whole shipping situation on the Gironde. This seems to have resulted primarily from the efforts of Lieutenant Commander Stevenson, the Intelligence officer who had been assigned to Bordeaux, whose instructions directed him to investigate the causes for the delays to shipping on the Gironde River. He looked into the matter and discussed it with Bernier, Barstow, and Major C. A. Stern, Army Transport Service officer at Bassens, all of whom stated that political conditions had prevented improvement. Believing that something could be accomplished, Stevenson went to Brig. Gen. W. S. Scott, commanding Headquarters Base Section No. 2, Bordeaux, presented the matter to him and discussed the remedies. At a meeting called by General Scott, attended by the French admiral, the Army Transport Service officer, the Marine Superintendent at Bassens, the U. S. Naval Port Officer, and the U. S. Consul, a preliminary arrangement was made to overcome delays to shipping.

Not long after the foregoing arrangement had been effected, Admiral Wilson communicated to the District Commanders in France a letter from the Director General of Transportation, U. S. Army, to General Scott, embodying an arrangement which had been negotiated with the French for increasing the efficiency of U. S. Shipping on the Gironde, providing as follows:

A. Direct American telephone service between the French port offices and the American offices.
B. Sanitary and police inspection of Army and Navy transports at Le Verdon instead of at

Pauillac.

C. Shipping Board vessels with mixed and civilian crews carrying commercial cargoes were to submit to the same regulations as the ships of French and British merchant ships. Such vessels as carried cargo for the French government were to be considered and treated as military vessels.

D. U.S. Transports to be boarded by U.S. Naval Officer at Le Verdon, representing both Army and Navy, to secure information and to give movement and berthing instructions. A direct line of communication was thus established between transports arriving at Le Verdon and the offices at Pauillac, Bordeaux, and Bassens. The Army Transport Service officers were to inform the Naval Port Officer of expected arrivals and the berths to be used, which information the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux was to transmit to the French authorities.

E. French pilots were to take vessels from Le Verdon to their berths at Pauillac, Bordeaux, and Bassens without stopping for change of pilots or for inspections; the pilots to be returned by boat or by train to Le Verdon at the expense of the United States.

F. Transports were to be allowed to move during the night as soon as Colonel Clavel was satisfied that there was sufficient tow-boat power.

G. All pilots were to be under the control of the French Naval authorities.

H. Berthing was to be arranged and decided between officers of the Army Transport Service and the U.S. Naval Service, and berthing orders were to be transmitted to the French port authorities through the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux.

I. Berthing of either Naval or Army transports containing explosives was to be handled by the Army, whose job it was to get the explosives away from docks.

This disposition of matters covered many of the problems that had arisen, but it was unfortunate that it had not

been accomplished earlier because the bulk of the troop transports had already arrived and departed.

The series of agreements which have been described did not settle all of the difficulties on the Gironde. Some of the stipulations of the accord with the French did not go into effect. The Port Regulations issued subsequent thereto indicate, for instance, that the pilotage system continued as before, as do entries in log books of ships that visited Bordeaux, although changes in pilots do not always seem to have been made.

Judging from the following lines in the Port Regulations of January 1919, the Army and the Navy had a difference of opinion concerning sailing orders:

> The Marine Superintendent, Army Transport Service, Bassens, is endeavoring to usurp this proper duty of the Naval Port Officer. That officer has been informed that such orders are not proper.
>
> Commanding Officers of U.S. ships are instructed not to receive "steam" or "sailing orders" from the Army, except in case of emergency. If such an order is delivered to a U.S. ship it will be returned with the following endorsement:
>
> "Returned. By direction of the U.S. Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, you are informed that no steam order or sailing order from your office will be obeyed, except in an emergency case. Such order should originate from U.S. Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, or his representative."

This type of direction would seem to be the kind that should <u>not</u> have been put in the Port Regulations.

A method of getting around the French Navigation Police inspection of personnel attached to U. S. ships that was considered by U. S. Naval authorities is worthy of mention. This proposal was that to avoid the inspection of suspected persons by the French, ships' personnel should be thoroughly examined before leaving the United States, and a certificate issued to the master or commanding officer to satisfy the French. Regular Naval personnel serving on U. S. ships had

means of identification, but this was not always true of civilian crews.

Although the war ended with the armistice of November 11, 1918, the U. S. Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux was continued for almost a year longer. The naval port organization built up during the war was used afterwards in returning soldiers to the United States, handling storeships bringing in supplies for the troops remaining in France; assisting Shipping Board vessels, which began arriving with commercial cargoes, and ships with cargoes of relief food and supplies sent over by the Food Administration and the American Relief Administration. All of these activities made the Naval Port Office at Bordeaux a busier organization than it had been before.

Commander Craft was relieved as Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, on November 23, 1918 by Capt. Frank D. Berrien, who had been engaged in strenuous duty as a destroyer escort commander. No long afterward Captain Berrien was instructed that his authority covered the supervision and control of American shipping in the Gironde River from Bordeaux to the sea, except for the Pauillac air station. Lieutenant Bernier continued to serve as executive officer, being concerned also with the settlement of claims. The personnel on duty in the office in December 1918 totaled 346 men, of whom 102 were comprised in the Naval Patrol.

When Captain McCully was ordered to northern Russia, he was succeeded as District Commander at Rochefort on October 5, 1918 by Comdr. Lamar R. Leahy, who had been attached to the district office since the previous February. The district organization in France was demobilized on November 25, but a Naval Port Officer was continued at Rochefort. The Naval Port Officer at Royan was abolished at this time. That at Pauillac operated under the commandant of the Aviation Assembly and Repair Station from about this time until February 1, 1919 when it was returned to the jurisdiction of the Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux.

The embarkation of troops from France was placed by General Pershing under the Chief Quartermaster, and ports of embarkation were designated at Brest,

St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux. It was planned to make more extensive use of Bordeaux than had been made in bringing troops to France. At the embarkation camps at Bordeaux, known to the soldiers as "The Mill," they were deloused, cleaned, and clothed for the journey home. To facilitate its operations in this region, the Army took over in January 1919 the considerable plant, including barracks, which the Navy had constructed at Pauillac. The homeward movement of troops began at the end of November 1918 and continued for over seven months, more than a quarter of a million troops being embarked. Much quicker turn arounds were made now than when troops had been disembarked. The Cape May remained at Bordeaux only 1 hour and 19 minutes on May 17, 1919 during which time it took on 1928 troops. After the embarkation of the last of the troops in July, the Army still had some occupation for the Navy in connection with the return of Army cargo which could not be disposed of abroad. Over $7,000,000 worth of Army surplus stock at Bordeaux was purchased by the American Relief Administration from the U.S. Liquidation Commission, loaded on board ships for transfer to Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Esthonia, Jugoslavia, Russia, and other parts of France.

The Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, was still being assisted in March 1919 by a U.S. Liaison Officer at Le Verdon stationed on a submarine chaser, a port officer at Pauillac, who was then an officer in the Army, and the U.S. Naval Dock Officer at Bassens. The Pauillac office was demobilized towards the end of that month. In May Rear Admiral Alexander S. Halstead, who had succeeded Admiral Wilson on January 30, visited Bordeaux, where it seemed that demobilization of the Naval Port Office had not proceeded as fast as it might have. Captain Berrien was relieved on June 6, 1919 by Captain Frederick (Julius F.) Hellweg, who after service in European waters, part of the time as commanding officer of the Marietta on the Gironde, had recently been District Supervisor of the N. O. T. S. at Norfolk, Virginia. Captain Hellweg found the port office at Bassens to which it had been removed because the transports berthed there. The office was in a building on the same floor of which was the Army Transport Service office with which it cooperated in handling the transports. By August the port office at Bordeaux was reduced to 5 officers and 25 men. Lieutenant

Bernier remained with the office until the beginning of that month when he was placed on active duty at his own request to take a job with the Shipping Board at Paris. On September 30, 1919 both the Naval Port Office and the Army Transport Service were closed. Captain Hellweg transferred to the base at Brest which was demobilized in the next month, but the Naval Port Office continued at that place until July 1920, being the last one to be disbanded. The furniture which had been used by the Naval Port Office, Bordeaux, was transferred to the office of the recently established port representative of the U.S. Shipping Board.

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Navy Department

Office of Naval Records and Library

No files of the Navy Port Office at Bordeaux exist as such, nor are there files for the port offices at Pauillac, Le Verdon, and Royan, nor for the District Commander's Headquarters at Rochefort, nor for the Headquarters of the Naval Forces in France at Brest. At the time the Naval Port Office was closed at Bassens, several filing cases of records were boxed for shipment to the Navy Department in Washington. The same step was taken, presumably, by the other offices mentioned above since instructions were issued by the Navy Department to this effect. When received in Washington, these records and all other records pertaining to the activities of the Navy in Europe during the war, together with records of the Navy Department, were "archived." The process of "archiving" involved making selections of what were considered the records of permanent value and filing them by subject in a classification devised for the purpose. An enormous chronological file was also set up, consisting to a large extent of duplicate copies but including documents not to be found in the subject file. This is called the "area file," and for area 3, which covers Great Britain and France, it comprises six filing cases of material. An additional file of material selected for a publication that never

appeared was also built up and is still preserved as the "print file." Some fragments of the records of the different headquarters and bases in Europe have remained intact, but the bulk of them were placed in the subject file, in one of the other files, or destroyed. Thus disappeared the files of the Naval Port Office, Bordeaux; the District Commander's Headquarters, Rochefort; the Naval Headquarters, Brest; the Naval Headquarters, London; and the files of all the other bases, port offices, and naval air stations established by the U.S. Navy in Europe during the First World War. The student desiring to investigate a topic connected with the U.S. Navy in that war is therefore obliged to consult a considerable number of widely scattered subjects; to examine amazedly the chronological file only to conclude that for his subject as well as for most others it is impossible to wade through so many filing cases because of the shortness of one's life. In the collections of the Office of Naval Records and Library, folders bearing the following file designations and labels were used:

| | |
|---|---|
| CG | Mercantile Convoys, H. B., from New York |
| CG | Mercantile Convoys, O. V., Verdon, France |
| KD | Vessels, Disposition of, Forces in France |
| KN | Forces in France, Organization, Charts and Orders |
| KN | Organization of Naval Forces |
| KN | Organization, Forces U.S. & Allied |
| KO | U.S. Naval Forces in France, Demobilization |
| KO | Ships' Movements, Foreign Ports |
| P | Bordeaux |
| P | Rochefort, General |
| P | Rochefort, Organization, Plans |
| P | Rochefort, General Reports |
| PA | Pauillac, General |
| PA | Pauillac, Arrival, Position, Character & Departure of Vessels |
| PM | Four Districts off French Coast |
| PM | Rochefort District |
| PO | Bordeaux |
| PO | La Pallice |
| PO | Pauillac |
| PO | Rochefort |
| PO | Royan |

WX-3 U.S. In France, Intelligence, Service, and Publication
ZP Rochefort, France
ZPA Pauillac, France
ZPA Pauillac, France, Transportation Department

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Bureau of Naval Personnel
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Office of the Judge Advocate General
Court of inquiry record, 7591

National Archives, Division of Navy Department Archives

Bureau of Naval Personnel
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Log books of the following U.S. ships: Aphrodite, Beaufort, Corsair, El Capitan, El Occidente, May, Panther, Powhatan, Tenadores, and Marietta
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September 2, 1943 with Capts. Frederick Hellweg and Vaughn K. Coman, last Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux and member of Admiral Wilson's staff, respectively, now attached to the Naval Observatory. The writer wishes to express his thanks to these officers for certain information relating to the period after the war.

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   3A. U. S. Naval Port Regulations, Port of Bordeaux, France (Reproduction of 30 page pamphlet issued 19 March 1919) July 1943.

4. The American Naval Mission in the Adriatic, 1918-1921, by Dr. A. C. Davidonis, September 1943.

Note:

Attention is called to Report No. 3A, which reproduces a 30 page pamphlet, "U. S. Naval Port Regulations, Port of Bordeaux, France", published originally at Bordeaux by the naval port officer. It gives a comprehensive idea of the details of the routine functions of a port officer and might serve as a useful model for similar issues.

Beers, Henry Putney.

Administrative Reference Service Report No. 3A

# U. S. NAVAL PORT REGULATIONS
# PORT OF BORDEAUX, FRANCE
# 19 MARCH 1919

U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS SERIAL RECORD

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Reprinted to accompany Report No. 3
"U. S. Naval Port Officers in the Bordeaux Region,
1917-1919"

Office of Records Administration
Administrative Office
Navy Department
July 1943

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# Port Regulations and Instructions

## Bordeaux (Gironde).

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### ORGANIZATION

---

1. — The U. S. Naval Port Office, Bordeaux, has charge of all movements, in the Gironde River, of U. S. Ships and those whose cargo is consigned to any U. S. organization in Europe.

2. — To assist in the carrying out of the above there has been established the following :

U. S. Liaison Officer on the submarine chaser at Le Verdon.

Port Office at Pauillac. (Represented by Officer of U.S.Army.)

U.S.Naval Dock Officer at Bassens.

3. — The U. S. Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux in organized as follows :

Commanding Officer.
Executive Officer.
Operations and Communications.
Purchasing and Disbursing.
Medical.
Courts and Boards.
Patrol.
Base Repair Officer.

4. — Questions coming under any of the above are referred, through the Executive, to Department concerned.

5. — All U. S. vessels entering the Gironde will immediately anchor near the station ship *Martha-Solange* at Le Verdon to receive the boarding visit of the U. S. Navy Liaison Officer. Under no circumstances will they proceed up the river until ordered to do so by him.

6. — If the tide serves, troop transports will be expedited to their berths, without anchoring if possible, after having communicated with U. S. Naval Liaison Officer at the anchorage.

7. — Immediately upon arrival at Le Verdon a report containing the following information should be prepared for delivery to the Naval boarding officer :

Voyage Form on charter.

U. S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS

U. S. NAVAL PORT OFFICE

BORDEAUX, FRANCE.

Arrived Verdon roads.
Docked at..... AM PM 1919 Berth .....

1. Nature of ship. Nature of cargo.
International call Dead weight Deck cargo.
Home port Operated by U. S. Mail.
Days for home passage Owned by aboard
Name of Master. Consigned to
Number : Officers ..... Crew ..... Guard .....

2. Speed economical ..... Coal or oil per day ... Days can steam .....
Speed in ballast ..... — — — ..... — — .....
Speed loaded ..... — — — ..... — — .....
Port consumption Fuel on board Fuel required
Total bunker capacity Total water carried
Water ballast Permanant ballast
Fresh water required Ballast required here.

3. Built by Year Last docked
Lenght Beam Draft Loaded Light
Deadweight capacity Displacement

4. No. of holds No. of cargo decks No. of ports
Cross registered tonnage Cubic grain capacity
Dimensions of hatches Dimensions of holds

5. Number of officer can carry to U. S.....Number of men . . . .

6. Was ship delayed here Why How long
Was ship delayed en route Where Why How long
Departed for after days in port

7. Engines : Number and type.
Boilers : Number and type.

8. Repairs required in this port.

9. Radio installation. Type Power
Range day Range night Condition
Date inspected here Repairs effected

10. Provisions could spare this Base.
Engineering stores could spare this Base.

11. Sick or casualties

12. Incidents of voyage.

SEND COPIES AS FOLLOWS :

4 to Naval Port Officer Bordeaux.
1 to Marine superintendent, A. T. S., Bassens.
1 to American consul Bordeaux.
1 to Naval Dock Officer Bassens.

*Note* : The above form will be made out in seven copies. Copy will be forwarded to U. S. Consul General, Bordeaux.

8. — If disabling of machinery for over-haul is required, a request to that effect should be signalled to U. S. Navy Liaison Officer on the Le Verdon Roads stating number of days machinery will be disabled. The U. S. Naval Liaison Officer will then request permission from the U. S. Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, by telephone.

9. — On arrival at anchorage booms will be rigged, falls rove off, winches tried out, working parties organized and all preparations made for prompt discharge of cargo.

10. — If weather permits these preparations will be made at sea and while approaching anchorage. Sealed hatches will not be opened except in the presence of Army Quartermaster Hatches not sealed may be opened up, but sentries must be posted over all open hatches until responsibility for them is assumed by consignees.

11. — Commanding Officers and Masters of ships awaiting orders at Le Verdon may use the Telephone on the *Martha* submarine chaser moored there.

12. — No communication with the shore at any port along the river, except where vessel is docked, is permitted; except where vessels required to remain at anchor at Le Verdon for several days may land liberty parties, in charge of an officer, at Le Verdon, accompanied by a patrol consisting of one man for every ten men landed.

12 *a*. — Under no circumstances will liberty be granted to or boats landel at Royan or Saint-Georges.

12 *b*. — The Liaison Officer on submarine chaser at Le Verdon will collect mail from ships at anchor there, as opportunity permits. Such trips are limited due to scarcity of boats available, weather condition, and to fact that ships will get their mail off more quickly by waiting until they arrive Bordeaux, unless there is probability of their remaining at anchor for some time.

## PILOTS

13. — All vessels entering the Gironde should take a Pil

14. — On arrival off entrance a pilot from Royan will take ships to anchorage at Le Verdon. In case weather is unsuitable attempt will be made to have ship met and piloted in by a U. S. Submarine Chaser with a French Pilot aboard.

15. — At Le Verdon a pilot from the *Martha Solange* will take the ship as far as Pauillac.

16. — At Pauillac a Bordeaux pilot will come aboard and take the ship as far as the docks.

Pilotage must be paid whether a Pilot is taken or not.

17. — Off the dock docking pilot will come aboard and dock ship.

18. — On leaving the procedure will be reversed.

19. — All U. S. ships carrying Pay Officers will settle their pilot bills as soon as praticable upon completion of services.

20. — All U. S. ships without paymasters operating for the Army with full or part Army cargos will present bills for pilotage to Marine Superintendent, U. S. Army Transportation Service, Building No. 8, American Bassens, after certifying them to be correct and signed by the Commanding Officer. U. S. ships without paymasters, with cargoes consigned to French Govt. or representatives will have their pilot bills paid by the French Intendance militaire or Transit maritime.

21. — Tonnage registered on pilotage bill to be *net* tonnage.

22. — Following is schedule of pilotage tariffs.

## GENERAL INFORMATION

### Pilotage rules. — Ocean to Bordeaux.

23. — All vessels entering the Gironde must take a pilot. Pilotage is obligatory and must be paid for. Receipt must be signed or paid when presented.

24. — Traveling expenses, mooring, over-time (night) Boats.

25. — Concrete extract from the law of May 6th, 1898, amending the General Pilotage laws of the 4th Maritime District of March 3rd 1858.

26. — Charges for the station at the entrance of the Gironde, Pauillac and Bordeaux.

| 27. Numerical order of Pilotage or Routes | Steamers: Pilotage per decimeter of draft | Steamers: per net ton | Sailing Vessels: Pilotage per decimeter of draft | Sailing Vessels: per net ton |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. From sea to Royan or Verdon (entering) or *vice versa* (going out) | 1.00 | 0.33 | 2.00 | 0.11 (1) |
| 2. From sea to Royan or Verdon (entering) or *vice versa* (going out) | 0.70 | 0.02 | 1.40 | 0.02 (2) |
| 3. From Royan or Verdon to Pauillac and *vice versa*..... | 0.50 | 0.02 | 1.00 | 0.08 |
| 4. From Pauillac to Bordeaux and *vice versa* | 0.70 | 0.025 | 1.40 | 0.00 |

*Note :* The tonnage is not the net tonnage.

Every fraction of decimeter immerged is charged as full decimeter.

Charges are the same if the Pilot has been compelled to anchor or not during the trip.

**28.** — *General Rule* for getting depth of water for entering.

**Bordeaux Harbor.**

To the height of water for the day (High Tide) add 3 metres. 50 centimetres and subtract 30 centimetres.

Example :

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan. 1st 1918, Height of water A M : | 4 met. 65 cent. |
| | 3 met. 50 cent. |
| | 0 met. 30 cent. |
| Draft of ship..... | 7 met. 85 cent. |

*General Rules* for getting maximum depth of water for entering.

---

(1) From Oct. 1st to March 31st.

(2) From April 1st to September 30 th.

**Basen A Float locks.**

To the Height of water of the day, add 1 metre 75 centimetres.

Example :

Jan. 1st 1918, Height of water A M : 4 met. 65 cent.
1 met. 75 cent.
6 met. 40 cent.

*a*) From Bacalan to any point of the harbor above cours du Pavé-des-Chartrons and *vice versa*... 15 frs.
*b*) From Lormont to another point on the port and *vice versa*..... 15 frs.
*c*) Entering or going out of Floating Basin.. 15 frs.
*d*) Shifting inside the Floating Basin..... 10 frs.
*e*) All other moving or shifting..... 10 frs.

*Note* : The mooring of ships, on their arrival at Bordeaux and Bassens should be done by Bordeaux pilots. The mooring of ships is paid on the same scale as movement of ships at Bordeaux. For ships above the medium tonnage it has been proven that on account of the crew having no personal interest in the matter, it was necessary to have the pilots keep watch on the ships at night at the wharf in the river, especially at Queyries and Bassens, during the two or three first tides after the ships arrival, and some times longer. These night watches, during which the pilots adjust lines and slack them or taughten them up as necessary, are paid 10 francs per day and 25 francs per night at Bassens.

29. — Pilotage of a ship from Bordeaux to Bassens and *vice versa* is paid 35 francs (traveling expenses included).

---

Art. 209. — No ship is moved in Bordeaux Harbor without permission from the Port authorities.

Art. 210. — Moving and shifting of ships in Bordeaux, Harbor the floating basin included, are paid according to the following tariff, no matter which nationality.

### Tarif. Syndicate of Pauillac.

| | |
|---|---|
| Night Service..... | 10.00 |
| Day Service..... | 10.00 with orders to shift. |
| Night watch..... | 15.00 berth signed by the |
| Docking at Bassens..... | 10.00 Commandant of the Port. |
| Docking at Pauillac ..... | 15.00 |
| Return Bassens to Pauillac. | 10.00 |
| Return Blaye to Pauillac.. | 10.00 |
| Delivery of orders by power boats : Day each..... | 10.00 |
| Night each..... | 15.00 |

## DOCK REGULATIONS

### Trompeloup-Pauillac.

**30.** — Owing to the fact that a right of way at the docks at Trompeloup exist for certain vessels arriving at that point, the lack of sufficient tug service, and the strength of the current in the narrow channel of the river at this point, ships at the dock at Trompeloup will be prepared to get under way on 24 hours notice unless special permission to the contrary has been given by the U. S. Naval Port Officer at Pauillac.

**31.** — Ships on the outside of the dock are not permitted to have their engines disabled for a greater period than eight hours without the special permission of the U. S. Naval Port Officer at Pauillac.

**32.** — Any vessels moored inside the dock wishing to disable the main engine for a greater period than eight hours will state in writing to the Port Officer the nature, extent and date of completion of the contemplated repairs.

#### Liberty at Pauillac and Trompeloup.

1 Ships lying in stream will not grant liberty except by special permission from Port Officer or his representative who assumes no responsibility for accidents.

2. Liberty parties will be landed and returned by ships own boats; there are no boats available at this station for that purpose.

3. Men on liberty shall wear dress blues and flat hats.

4. Officers and men will be out of cafés at 8.30; men will be off the streets by 9.30.

5. No over night liberty will be allowed enlisted personnel.

6. A patrol in charge of a C. P. O. will be landed, one patrol for every ten men. They will request necessary information as to local Police Regulations from N. P. O. at Pauillac.

## Bassens.

### Orders for the moving of ships berthed at river wharf of Bordeaux harbor.

*(East shore — West shore — Bassens).*

**33.** — Every Commanding Officer of ship when mooring to a berth shall abide by the mooring orders issued by the Officer Harbor Master present when mooring and by the pilot.

**34.** — In case of non compliance the Officer Harbor Master and Pilot will report immediately to Port Captain for necessary sanction, administrative or judiciary.

**35.** — The general rules for mooring ships.

1. (Mooring should be placed on all available bits). If number of or position of mooring post and bits do not permit it, ship should be moored as much as possible according to those orders without jamming the ships bits. Also if there is a reason for not dropping the anchor when mooring the dropping of the anchor may be done later with a floating crane, according to circumstances.

2. Mooring ship head down the river; drop off shore anchor with 30 fathoms of chain at 25 deg. angel with the ships axle. Put out two head lines and two stern lines (Ropes), in no case steel wires. Two forward brest lines and two after brest lines; two spring lines.

3. On shipboard mooring shall be placed on bits and shall be kept clear so as to be slackened if necessary.

4. On shore moorings shall be placed each on individual mooring post as near as possible to the bottom of the post.

5. When possible the mooring of the ship shall be completed by taking on board end of chain made fast to the line of bouys cable as a preventive against the ebb.

6. This chain shall be made fast on board on the off shore quarter so as to pull at an angle of ten to twenty degrees from the stern, without pulling the ship off the dock and tightened up so as to pull less than the stern mooring when grounding.

7. When according to circumstances a ship will have to berth head up river, the off shore anchor shall be dropped when possible and without any inconveniencing for crossing cable with cable of other ships already moored. Stern moorings shall be reinforced by an extra line.

8. In dead water this way of mooring will be sufficient.

9. In live waters that is when the tides co-efficient is equal or superior to ninety, ships shall be remoored head to the flood at the first day tide following her arrival.

10. If there is no cable on the line of buoys or chain fastened to it, an extra short line (which shall be strongest on board) shall be put over the stern. This extra line to be made fast on board all by itself, on a winch barrel if necessary. This line shall not be as right as the other moorings.

11. At ebb tide moorings shall be watched and slackened with the falling of the tide so as to avoid straining them and have the ship parallel with the wharf.

12. After grounding the moorings shall be well tightened up.

13. At the beginning of the flood and especially

during the period of strong tides the floating of ship and remooring when afloat shall be watched particularly. If mooring were slack, they might carry away.

14. Ships berthed in river shall always have sufficient steam so as to be able to run their winches, immediately, at any time. In case of breakdown or impossibility to run winches the Port Officer shall be notified, and according to circumstances and ships berth, Port Officer will order tug boat to stand by for emergency. These tug boat expenses shall be charged to the ship.

15. The Commanding Officer of the ship is responsible for any mooring incident resulting from insufficient watching of the moorings.

16. He shall keep on board sufficient Officers and men to slacken or tighten up moorings at each grounding. He is responsible for all damages caused to his ship, other ships, or port works.

17. When a ship drawing 20 feet or more is moored to a berth where she will ground at low water, the pilot who has moored the ship shall watch the mooring at the first grounding. This watch being ordered or not on the mooring orders.

18. When the mooring pilot is ordered for other duty and when he is the only one available for such a duty, the Syndic des Pilots shall replace him by another pilot designated according to the size of the ship, the experience the Commanding Officer of said ship has of the harbor.

19. In this exceptional case the Syndic des Pilots shall telephone to the Port Officer, justifiing this measure.

20. Grounding watch on ships is ordered by the Port Officer according to the states of the tides and condition under which ships acted during the groundings. When Pilot is relieved, he shall report to the Port Officer on the grounding of the ship. Also on watch kept on board by ships crew.

21. The order for discontinuing these watches will be given according to all these reports.

22. During the entire watch the pilot shall not leave the vessel without being relieved excepting when the Pilot shall have the order to watch two ships close to each other.

23. This order shall be given only under absolute necessity or when a ships watch is drawing to an end, and after approval by the Port Captain.

24. Commanding Officer of the ship shall keep on board at all times sufficient number of men to handle the moorings night and day, every time it is required by the pilot or Harbor Master. When the Pilot is through with his watch the Commanding Officer of the ship shall order watch to be kept up by ships officers.

25. These orders shall be printed in French and English and copy presented by the pilot to every Commanding Officer of ships entering the harbor.

26. After mooring any observation or opinions regarding the position of the ship alongside the dock, obstacles in navigational channels, strength of landing stages, etc., will be takon up without delay with the French Captain of the Port or Harbormaster at Bassens, through the U. S. Naval Dock Officer at Bassens. Bldg. 8 (Tel. No. Bassens 318).

Bordeaux, 20 june 1918.

Le Capitaine de corvette Ollivier,
*Capitaine de port.*

36. — All orders concerning the movements of vessels to and from the dock will be arranged through the U. S. Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux, direct or through the U. S. Naval Dock Officer at Bassens or Pauillac.

37. — The U. S. Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux will be informed of all proposed movements in ample time to give the necessary orders.

38. — No solid matter will be thrown overboard from ships at Bassens.

39. — Tug service is maintained at Bassens by U. S. Army, available in case of necessity, These tugs are fitted with fire fighting apparatus.

40. — Ship's companies will keep thoir winches and gear in order. Making all repairs which are practicable with ship's force. U. S. vessels will receive all possible assistance from U. S. Naval Dock Officer; U. S. Army Transports from Army Dock Superintendant. Power for operation of winches and light where necessary will be furnished by the ship.

41. — On every vessel an officer will be detailed to have charge of each hatch, both while being loaded and discharged. They shall stop all such work as tends to damage ship or gear and report circumstances to the U. S. Naval Dock Officer.

42. — A sentry will be detailed for the gangway and a sentry for each hold from which cargo is being discharged. Such sentries have no authority over the working parties engaged in discharging but will note and report promptly any case of broaching or mishandling of cargo, damage or theft. The sentry shall wear belt, holster and leggins. No arms.

43. — Mimeographed forms as below will be put aboard ship on arrival and will be filled out each morning as of 8.00 A. M., and given to the Officer of the deck.

44. — A messenger from the dock office at Bassens will collect same each morning.

From : U. S. S.

To : U. S. Naval Dock Officer.

| | DATES | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Hours ships winches.... | | | | | |
| In operation..... | | | | | |
| Condition of..... | | | | | |
| Winches..... | | | | | |
| No. Boilers in use..... | | | | | |
| Fuel consumed in last 24 hrs... | | | | | |
| Fuel on hand..... | | | | | |
| Remarks on handling cargo.... | | | | | |

Request of N. D. O.

44 *a*. — The following order of the Inspector General of Bridges and Highways is published for information of all concerned.

« It is forbidden to cast in the water for any reason whatsoever, any floating liquids which are liable to catch fire, one half hour before and one half hour after slack-tide of high or low water ».

### Cable and telegraph.

45. — All cable and telegraph communication will be handled through the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux.

46. — In no case will a U. S. Naval vessel communicate direct with the Navy Department or other stations or vessels in the United States.

### Mail.

47. — Each ship will send a mail orderly to Naval Port Office, Bordeaux, daily. *This is important.*

*Note.* All incoming and outgoing mail to and from ships will be handled through the U. S. N. P. O.

### Fuel, water and ballast.

48. — Fuel and water are arranged for through the U. S. Naval Dock Officer at Bassens. Fuel is very scarce and minimum amount should be requested. Water for drinking and boilers can be taken from the hydrants on the dock.

49. — Fuel oil is obtained at times from oiler, but usually from a redistribution of oil from ships by means of an oil barge.

50. — Written requests for ballast should be submitted in duplicate to U. S. Naval Dock Officer, Bassens, as soon as possible after arrival, stating the total amount required and the distribution, thereof, in the various holds.

### Medical inspection and aid.

51. — No officer or member of the ship's crew, except the Captain, will be permitted to go ashore until the ship has been inspected and passed by Medical Officer.

52. — All cases of sickness will be reported immediately.

53. — The crew will be inspected for venereal and contagious diseases.

54. — All cases of venereal diseases will be confined to the ship while in port. Contagious diseases and other cases of serious illness will be taken off the ship as hospital cases.

55. — It is requested that all persons arriving at ports in France be protected against Typhoid and Paratyphoid fevers. A list of the Officers and men of the ship's company who have not been given prophylaxis will be furnished by the Medical Officer.

56. — A regular sick-call will be held at the Naval Dispensary (located abeam trestle North end French Docks, Bassens) daily at 9.00 a. m. Pharmacist's Mate will bring all patients with health records at that hour each day and report to the Medical Officer.

57. — An inspection of the sanitary conditions of the ship will be made and report rendered to the U. S. Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux. The ship must be cleaned and in good sanitary condition before clearance papers for another port will be assigned.

58. — Ash lighters will be furnished, upon request from the U. S. Naval Dock Officer, Bassens.

59. — Garbage is collected from the docks at 8.30. A. M. daily. It must be placed on the dock in proper containers with covers.

60. — Before sailing it is requested that this office be notified in order that clearance papers may be issued.

61. — Dental service is available at the U. S. Naval Port Office, Bordeaux.

62. — In all cases where men are transferred to the dispensary for treatment they must be accompanied by bag and hammock, medical and enlistment records and pay accounts. If possible men will be returned to their ship before sailing.

63. — A Medical Officer of the Navy in detailed as Liaison Officer with the U. S. Army for the purpose of making proper arrangements for the evacuation of sick and wounded to the United States. This Officer will board all Troop Trans-

ports on their arrival to ascertain the number and class of cases that can be handled by each particular Transport and make such arrangements as may be necessary for increase in Medical personnel and stores.

## Orders.

64. — All Commanding Officers of U. S. Ships will report to the U. S. Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, within twenty-four hours after arrival.

65. — They will also report to the Operations Officer, U. S. Naval Port Officer Bordeaux for sailing orders, a day or two before sailing.

66. — Before sailing a complete list of all persons on board will be forwarded in triplicate to the Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux. In case of any Transports carrying a large number of Army Personnel the list of the Army Personnel is not required by the Port Officer.

67. — Commanding Officers or a representative will call on U. S. Consul in order to give such information as he may desire. Immediately upon arrival at post of embarkation (Pauillac or Bassens) Transport commanders shall send a commissioned officer to consult with U. S. Army Officer in charge of embarkation of troops to make satisfactory arrangements in regard to method of embarking troops.

## Provisions, Supplies and Bills.

68. — Fresh provisions can be obtained on contract of Purchasing and Disbursing Officer at U. S. N. P. O., Bordeaux. Copies of monthly contracts will be supplied each trip on arrival.

69. — Provisions can also be obtained from the U. S. Army Port Steward at Bassens.

70. — Ships not having Paymasters will obtain all bills against them before leaving port, certify them correct and forward them to Paymaster carrying their accounts for payment.

71. — Ships carrying Paymasters shall pay all bills before leaving port.

72. — For pilotage dues, see Pilots.

### No U. S. Treasury checks to be Issued.

73. — French money may be obtained from Purchasing and Disbursing Officer, at U. S. N. O. P. Bordeaux on transfer of funds, S. & A. form 15.

74. — Paymaster at N. P. O. Bordeaux will not exchange money or receive money other than French money.

75. — It is requested that all ships coming here from the U. S. be prepared to transfer to U. S. N. O. P. Bordeaux as many stores; S. E., C. & R., S. & A. and provisions and small stores as possible, for further transfer to ships in need, and for local use. This is done by usual invoicing.

76. — The following letter pertaining to payment of bills, in France, is quoted for the information and guidance of all concerned :

« Oct. 21, 1918.

From : Commander U. S. Naval Forces in France.
To : All Commanding Officers.
Subject : Bills, payment in France.

1. The issue of U. S. Treasury checks in France is forbidden by the Navy Department.

2. No bills in France should be paid with United States currency as the rate of exchange is constantly fluctuating and when bills are paid in United States money at the official Government rate, it results in a loss to the firm or person receiving the money.

3. There are Naval Disbursing Officers in practically every port in France where Navy ships touch. The Supply Officers of such ships who do not have French currency or deposits with the Guaranty Trust Company of New-York, Paris, France, will obtain funds sufficient to cover bills to be paid in France, by transfer of funds, from the Naval Disbursing Officers in France at ports wich they touch.

4. In case a ship touches at a port where there is no Naval Disbursing Officer, the Supply Officer of the ship should obtain the necessary funds from the nearest Disbursing Officer.

5. The rate of exchange for French currency fluctuates each month. This rate is published by the Treasury Department by cable. Supply Officers of ships, immediately upon arrival at French ports, should obtain from the Naval Disbursing Officer a copy of the dispatch giving the rate of exchange for that month.

s/ : H.-B. Wilson. »

77. The following letter, pertaining to purchases in France, is quoted for the information and guidance of all concerned :

« U. S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,

FORCES IN FRANCE,

U. S. S. PROMETHEUS FLAGSHIP.

Brest, France 20 may, 1918.

From : Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in France.

To : All U. S. Naval Forces in France and U. S. Naval Ships touching at French Ports.

Subject : Purchases in France.

1. The following instructions in regard to purchases in France shall be complied with by all U. S. Naval Officers.

2. An order has been issued by the French Government in effect as follows :

*a*) Local emergency purchases may be made in any city or town in France by U. S. Naval Authorities up to *Frs 5.000*.

*b*) In Paris all purchases in excess of *Frs 5.000*, must be approved by the French mission and by agreement, in order to simplify the forwarding of

papers, all request for such purchases are forwarded by the Aid for Material & Supplies U. S. Naval Forces in France, to the French Mission Via the General purchasing Board.

*c*) Outside of Paris, purchases from *Frs 5.000* to *25.000,* may be made with the approval of the local French authorities, no purchasing may be made in excess of Frs 25.000 until the request for the same has been forwarded to Paris and received the approval of the French Mission.

3. The above authority is operative as follows :

*d*) In Paris, a purchase made by any U. S. Naval Officer cannot exceed Frs 5.000 per order without receiving the approval of the French Mission.

*e*) In all other French cities and towns in France, a purchase made by any U. S. Naval Officer, including ships that may arrive, cannot exceed Frs 5.000 per order without the approval of the local French authorities and no single purchase in excess of Frs 25.000, can be made without such requests receiving the approval of the French Mission in Paris.

*f*) There may be several purchases of different materials made each day where each purchase is not in excess of Francs *5.000.*

4. The representative of the French Government state that this regulation is intended to cover only the small emergency purchases that arise from time to time and that it is expected that this regulation will be carried out in good faith, that is, that an order will not be devided in small lots and placed with different firms or any different days in order to obtain material which if bought at one time, would be in excess of the limits imposed, nor is it intended to allow purchases of the same articles to be made weekly or even monthly when it can be avoided.

5. The condition of this authority as granted by the secretary of State for the French Government require

that a monthly report be made of all purchases ranging from Frs 1.000 to Frs *5.000*. At the special request of the U. S. Navy this is on account of the original limits of Frs *1.000* having been increased to Frs *5.000*. In order that this may be done all U. S. Naval Officers who make purchases in France coming under this condition shall forward a report promptly at the end of each month to the Aid for Material & Supplies, U. S. Naval Forces in France, 4, place d'Iéna, Paris, to be combined with reports from others officers and forwarded to the Franco-American sections of the Regional General Staff who will examine them and make comments in regard to any purchases which, by any reason of their re-occurrence or for any other motive, would seem to call for comment. Supply Officers of ships leaving French waters shall forward the reports before sailing. These reports shall be submitted for the month of May and thereafter.

6. The following procedure shall be followed in the case of any purchases which it is desired to make, in excess of Frs 5.000 in Paris, or in excess of Frs 25.000 outside of Paris.

A request prepared by the Supply Officer and approved by the Commanding Officer shall be forwarded to the Aid for Material and Supplies U. S. Naval Forces in France, Paris for transmittion to the French Mission.

These requests shall be numbered serially by each office and shall show :

*g*) The city or town where it is desired to make the purchase.

*h*) The name and address of the contractor.

*i*) The exact material and quantity required.

*j*) The unit and price and total.

*k*) When delivery can be made.

*l*) Whether the articles are on hand or whether they must be manufactured.

*m*) In the case of all articles made of metal, the amount and weight of each metal used in their manu-

facture shall be stated. This is required before the French Mission will act on a request.

S/ : H.-B. Wilson. »

**Liberty — Police regulations — Patrol.**

**78.** — The French Army 18th Region, within which limits fall the City of Bordeaux, is under Martial Law. General Commanding U. S. Army, Base Section No. 2, regulates the deportment of all members of the Army on shore through the U. S. Military Police.

**79.** — A U. S. Naval Patrol has been established in the City of Bordeaux for the purpose of regulating the conduct and deportment of officers and men of the U. S. Navy. The U. S. Army Military Police will not interfere with the Commissioned or Enlisted Personnel of the Navy while on shore by proper authority. In case of disorders involving disturbance of the peace of those which may imperil life or property such disorder will be suppressed by whatever police may be present.

**80.** — Patrols, military or naval will be held strictly responsible for improper or unauthorized arrest or conduct.

**81.** — Commanding Officers of U. S. Naval Ships in Bordeaux may grant liberty in the City of Bordeaux at their discretion from 8 : 00 a. m. to 9 : 30 p. m. No overnight liberty will be granted to enlisted personnel. Liberty and leave for officers may be granted at discretion of Com. Off. Com. Off. going on leave will request permission of N. P. O. Bordeaux. Uniform for all liberty parties : undress blues and *flats hats*.

**82.** — Chief Petty Officers may be granted special liberty with privileges similar to those of officers and will not be required to form part of the liberty party with other enlisted men.

**83.** — Radio operators on board of U. S. vessels will not be granted liberty until after inspection of radio installation has been completed.

**84.** — All men on shore on liberty from ships will be furnished with a pass which will show the following data :

Ship.....
Date.....

(Good for one day only). Pass..... (Good for one day only).
on liberty from.....
to.....
Be off the streets at 9.30 p. m.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER.

. . . . . .

**85.** — The streets of the city of Bordeaux must be cleared at 9 : 30 p. m., but in order to enable men to attend theatres, etc., a special theatre pass may be issued by commanding officers of U. S. Naval Ships similar to the regular liberty pass to be stamped with the date and good for that date only; will bear a statement to the effect that the bearer has special permission to attend a theatre and to return to his ship therefrom when the theatre closes. Such privileges are special and will only be granted to men of known good conduct and sobriety. A violation of the privilege granted by such passes will be considered sufficient provocation for trial by Summary Court-Martial.

**86.** — Bearers of such passes will receive special warning that any violation of the spirit of the pass will result in the recommendation for disciplinary action and that such pass does not entitle the bearer to be on the streets for other purposes.

**87.** — The Y. M. C. A. in the City of Bordeaux will be closed at 10 : 00 p. m., daily, except on special occasions to be decided upon in each case. No enlisted man of the Navy will visit or remain at the Y. M. C. A. after 9 : 30 p. m., unless specially authorized to do so.

**88.** — Commanding Officers are requested to advise the men under their command coming ashore on liberty of the danger of infectious disease so prevalent among the public women of the city, and of the necessity of the proper steps to be taken in case of exposure. Army Prophylactic stations

are maintained at the following places in Bordeaux, and Naval personnel are advised to take advantage of those stations :

**Prophylactic stations in and abour the city of Bordeaux.**

Cours de Gourgue, 4 ;
Rue Dauphine, 24 ;
Casino des Lilas ;
Caserne Nansouty, near Midi Station ;
Medical Supply Depot ;
Base Hospital No 6 ;
Remount Depot No. 2, Mérignac.

**In the immediate vicinity of Bordeaux.**

Beau-Désert ;
Motor Operation Park, near Bastide station ;
Motor Reception Park, near Bassens station ;
Lormont ;
Rest Camp No. 1, Grange Neuve ;
Rest Camp No. 2, Genicart ;
Rest Camp No. 4, Bassens ;
Phoenix Construction Camp ;
Stewart Construction Co. Camp ;
Dispensary at French Docks ;
Refrigeration Plant, Bassens ;
Warehouse No. 7, Sursol ;
Camp of troop L, 6th Cavalry between French docks and Phoenix Camp.

**89.** — The folloving general rules of conduct are specified :

*a*) Strict sobriety will be required of all Naval personnel.

*b*) Cafes and restaurants will be cleared of all commissioned and enlisted personnel by 9 : 00 p. m.

*c*) No person attached to the Naval Service will enter any district, street, house or public place which for any

reason has been restricted by proper authority nor associate with any disreputable person.

*d*) Information of all restricted districts, forbidden houses and public places will be accepted as official when received from members of the military police or naval patrols of Bordeaux who may be on duty by proper authority.

*e*) The streets of the City of Bordeaux will be cleared of all enlisted personnel by 9.30 p. m.

Patrols will immediately arrest men guilty of following offences, making note of the time, place and circumstances :

*a*) Disorder.
*b*) Intoxication.
*c*) Visiting disreputable places.
*d*) Associating whith disreputable persons.
*e*) Refusal to obey orders of Patrol.
*f*) Absent overleave, or without leave.

Naval Patrol will have authority over Naval personnel only.

90. — In case of disorder on shore involving military or naval personnel, the Military Police will have the right to invoke the assistance of Naval Patrol, and the Naval Patrol likewise have the right to call on the Military Police for assistance.

91. — Cases of infraction of Military or Naval discipline, when necessary, will be handled by calling the attention of the Police of the service concerned to the circumstances.

92. — In case of discorder involving disturbance of the peace, or the imperiling of life or property, disorders will be suppressed by whatever police may be present.

93. — The right of Naval Patrol to enter a private dwelling is not recognized. Naval Patrols may, however, enter public places for the purpose of ascertaining the presence there of Naval Personnel during prohibited hours, and will warn such persons to leave. They will not, however, use

any authority over the propietor or persons, or otherwise molesting them.

94. — It will be the general rule for all patrols to bring such men as they may have arrested to patrol headquarters for such disposition as may be ordered.

95. — All enlisted men within the city limits of Bordeaux are subject to orders of the patrol.

96. — Officers in charge of patrols will have the right to station sentries over objectionable places in order to prevent Naval personnel visiting them. Such prohibitions established by U. S. Military or French authorities will be respected by Naval Patrol.

97. — In case of men out of uniform, or failure to salute, patrols will take their names and station and order such men to return to their ship or station immediately.

98. — In case of officers offending, patrols will immediately report the circumstances to the patrol officer, who will take proper action.

99. — Patrols will be held responsible for exceeding their authority or for making unwarranted arrest. Organization of patrols is governed by article 915 U. S. Navy Regulations.

## Transportation to Bassens.

100. — At present the only Navy transportation to Bordeaux is the Naval Ferry. This leaves Berth No. 10, American Docks and Berth No. 1, French docks at Bassens and from the Bordeaux-Ocean landing stage at Bordeaux as per schedule below.

101. — By land a walk of a mile and a half to Lormont where there is a French Ferry and transportation to Bordeaux.

102. — A service with white Reconnaissance car has been established for use of officers, as follows :

Leave Naval Port Office, Bordeaux, 9.15 a. m. and 1.15 p. m.

Leave Naval Dock Office, Bassens, 10.00 a. m. and 2.00 p. m.

Capacity 15 passengers.

## Naval Ferry Schedule.

103. — Ferry for Bassens leaves Bordeaux — foot of Allées des Charles.

| Leave Bordeaux Bordeaux Ocean | | Leave Bassens American Dock |
|---|---|---|
| 7.00 a. m. | Stop at Panther for breakfast | 8.00 a. m. |
| 8.30 a. m. | » » | 9.00 a. m. |
| 11.00 a. m. | Dinner at Panther | 1.30 p. m. |
| 4.00 p. m. | Stop at Panther | 5.00 p. m. |
| 7.30 p. m. | » » » | 8.00 p. m. |
| 9.30 p. m. | » » » | 10.00 p. m. |
| 11.00 p. m. | » » » | 12.00 p. m. |
| | Secure at Bordeaux for night. | |

## Schedule of Ferry Betwen Lormont and Bordeaux.

**104.** — Ferry for Lormont leaves Bordeaux — foot of cours du Chapeau-Rouge.

Beginning at 7.00 a. m., every hour until 11.00 a. m., from Lormont to Bordeaux.

After 11.00 a. m., beginning at 11.30 a. m., every half hour from Lormont and Bordeaux, until 5.30 p. m.

Sundays — beginning at 7.00 a. m., every half hour from Lormont and Bordeaux until 5.30 p. m.

## FIRE REGULATIONS

**105.** — In case of fire, call fire station if phone is in reach. Fire signal to be blown on steam whistle of either steamers or locomotives. Five (5) blasts on the steam whistle will be the signal of fire on the *American Docks*; four (4) blasts will indicate fire at the *French Docks*. The five blasts of four blasts will be followed by short blasts to equal the number of berth in which the fire is located, as follows :

106.

| American Docks. | | | French Docks. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Berth /1 | 5 blasts | 1 short | Berth /1 | 4 blasts | 1 short |
| Berth /2 | 5 blasts | 2 short | Berth /2 | 4 blasts | 2 short |
| Berth /3 | 5 blasts | 3 short | Berth /3 | 4 blasts | 3 short |
| Berth /4 | 5 blasts | 4 short | Berth /4 | 4 blasts | 4 short |
| Berth /5 | 5 blasts | 5 short | Berth /5 | 4 blasts | 5 short |
| Berth /6 | 5 blasts | 6 short | Berth /6 | 4 blasts | 6 short |
| Berth /7 | 5 blasts | 7 short | Berth /7 | 4 blasts | 7 short |
| Berth /8 | 5 blasts | 8 short | Berth /8 | 4 blasts | 8 short |
| Berth /9 | 5 blasts | 9 short | Berth /9 | 4 blasts | 9 short |
| Berth /10 | 5 blasts | 10 short | Berth /10 | 4 blasts | 10 short |

107. — The above signal will be repeated three times. In case a second or general alarm becomes necessary, the above signal will be repeated as necessity requires.

### U. S. Army Tugs.

108. U. S. A. T. Richards. U. S. A. T. 22.
U. S. A. T. Slocum. U. S. A. T. Laboca.
U. S. A. T. Socomy. U. S. A. T. Gypsum Prince.
U. S. A. T. Donivon. U. S. A. T. Richmond.
U. S. A. T. Printer.

109. — These tugs will answer to the fire alarm. At the scene of fire, they will be in command of the Fire Marshal, and in his absence the assistant Fire Marshal.

## REPAIRS

110. — Upon arrival at Bordeaux have list of emergency repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force made up.

111. — Give this list to the representative of the U.S.S.Panther who will come aboard between 8.00 a. m. and noon within twenty-four hours after ships arrival.

112. — A representative will call every day at each vessel to find out if all machinery and work is progressing satisfac-

torily and if there are any further repairs found necessary in the meantime. In case of emergency before or after the daily call of the representative, it is requested that some competent person call up the Base Repair Officer at Bordeaux (Telephone No. Bordeaux 210. Extension 12), or the Assistant Base Repair Officer at Bassens (Telephone No. Bassens 108).

**113.** — There is a Radio Repair Base at Bassens (Telephone No. Bassens 31).

**114.** — All repairs to be done by the US. S. Panther are done upon the approval of any request for repairs by the Base Repair Officer or his assistants.

## Canteen.

**115.** — It is requested that canteen stores be sold only to Navy Personnel and a limited number of Army Officers and that in limited amounts.

## Courts and Boards.

**116.** — All courts-martial will be acted upon by the Naval Port Officer Bordeaux, as Senior Officer Present.

**117.** — In all. serious cases the Boards of Investigation required will be appointed by the U. S. Port Officer, Bordeaux.

## Stragglers.

**118.** — Ships, upon date of sailing, who have men still ashore, will place their bags and hammocks in the office of the U. S. Naval Docks Officer at Bassens, and will transfer them with necessary papers to U. S. Naval Port Office. Upon the reporting in of these men they will be shipped to the United States, to rejoin their ship, via the first available transportation.

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## ADDRESSES

119. — U. S. Naval Port Office, 3 *bis*, cours de Tournon, Tel. 1317, Ext. 210, French 38-90.

### U. S. Army.

Army Transport Service, 15, cours du XXX-Juillet, Tel. 1317.

Provost Marshal, 25, allées de Chartres, Tel. 1317.

Depot Quartermaster, 4, cours de Gourgue, Tel 1317.

Army War.Wharf, Bassens, Tel. 1317.

Base Hospital No. 6 Talence, Major Wasbourn, Tel. 1317.

### Post Office (U. S.).

U. S. Army P. O., 75 *bis*, quai de Paludate, Tel. 2271.

U. S. Navy P. O., 3 *bis*, cours de Tournon, Tel. 1317, Ext. 210, French 38-90).

### Consul (U. S.).

Mr Bucklin, 30, allées de Tourny, 1317, Ext. 3.

### British naval Transport Officer.

31, cours de Verdun, Tel. 1437.

### Captain of the Port.

Commandant Terigi, place de la Bourse, Tel. 1669.

### Postes et Telegraphes.

French Post, Telegraph Service.

Main Office, rue du Palais-Gallien.

Branch Office, place de la Bourse.

## Banks.

Lloyds Bank (France), 23, allées de Chartres, Tel. 189.

Farmers Loan and Trust Co, cours du Chapeau-Rouge, Tel. 4432.

## Y. M. C. A.

Army and Navy, Allées de Tourny and Place de Tourny.

## Multibranch supply Co.

15, rue Michel-Montaigne.

**For other addresses call the U. S. Naval Port Officer.**

84.923. — BORDEAUX, IMPRIMERIE G. DELMAS

6, PLACE SAINT-CHRISTOLY, 6

Administrative Reference Service Report No. 4

# THE AMERICAN NAVAL MISSION IN THE ADRIATIC, 1918-1921

Prepared by

Dr. A. C. Davidonis

Under the Supervision of

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Office of Records Administration
Administrative Office
Navy Department
September 1943

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Note:

The other reports in this series have been prepared under official auspices. This study was prepared privately by Dr. Davidonis of the Department of History, Princeton University, who has consented to its inclusion in the series, while retaining any copyright rights in case of future publication.

Administrative Reference Service Reports

1. Incentives for Civilian Employees of the Navy Department: A Review of the Experience of the First World War, by Dr. Henry P. Beers. (Special Report, not for general distribution), May 1943.

2. U. S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters, 1919-1924, by Dr. Henry P. Beers, June 1943.

3. U. S. Naval Port Officers in the Bordeaux Region, 1917-1919, by Dr. Henry P. Beers, September 1943.

   3A. U. S. Naval Port Regulations, Port of Bordeaux, France (Reproduction of 30 page pamphlet issued 19 March 1919) July 1943.

4. The American Naval Mission in the Adriatic, 1918-1921, by Dr. A. C. Davidonis, September, 1943.

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The little known occupation of central Dalmatia by United States naval forces for a period of thirty-five months is in some ways unique in American experience. Begun in November, 1918, this occupation of more than one hundred miles of Dalmatian coastline did not end until September, 1921. It represents a considerable operation whether the criterion be time or territorial extent, and in addition, it offers an interesting study of unusual political and military complications caused largely by Italian aspirations in the Adriatic.

The most striking feature of the occupation which calls for notice is the fact that the so-called American zone in Dalmatia constituted in reality territory claimed by the sovereign state of Jugoslavia, and the justice of this claim was officially recognized by the United States.[1] Serbia was one of the associated powers during the war and, since it formed the nucleus of the new succession state, Jugoslavia itself attained the same allied status. Hence the United States found itself in the curious position of occupying with naval forces the province of an associated power. Motivation sprang from political grounds. The United States extended naval control over Dalmatia partially to check Italian territorial aggrandizement in that region, and to strengthen

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1. For the sake of brevity the term Jugoslavia will be employed throughout, although it was not until 1929 that the cumbersome title, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was dropped by the Belgrade government.

2. Only after the bitter opposition of Italy was exhausted. The United States, on February 5, 1919, was first among the great powers to recognize Jugoslavia. German recognition came on May 1, 1919; French and British, at the beginning of June. Italy and the other powers recognized Jugoslavia when their representatives signed the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, for Jugoslavia was a signatory to the Treaty.

Jugoslavia's vigorous diplomatic combat against the numerous Italian intrigues and encroachments on Jugoslav soil. Italy, however, was also a friendly country associated with America in the war. Thus the United States occupied the territory of one associated power to thwart the pretensions of a second associated power against the first. The situation was, and still remains unique in American annals.

Although ultimate control in the occupied region was vested in an American admiral, Serb troops garrisoned the zone, and the admiral exerted his influence through the legally constituted local governments both provincial and municipal. A regiment of American infantry which had been detailed to the Italian command in the summer of 1918 participated in the occupation of several points along the eastern Adriatic seaboard under Italian orders immediately following the conclusion of the Austrian armistice. When President Wilson discovered that Italy was employing these troops to further her political aims against Jugoslavia, he ordered the regiment back to the United States. This interesting sidelight, which will be discussed on subsequent pages, probably explains why the Dalmatian occupation remained entirely a naval operation.

It may be remarked here, parenthetically, that the presence of American naval units in the Adriatic engaged in the Dalmatian mission contributed indirectly but none the less materially to the maintenance of Wilson's inflexible policy toward Italy, an attitude that in April, 1919 threatened to disrupt the Peace Conference. The numerous reports sent to Paris by United States navy officers in the Adriatic region while the Peace Conference

was in session described in detail Italian machinations and oppression of the Jugoslav populace. Undoubtedly the President read a substantial proportion of these communications, for many of them to this day bear his marginal and interlinear comments.[3] It cannot reasonably be supposed that such unfavorable observations on Italian activities did not influence a mind already disposed to consider the Italian imperialist program with unconcealed alarm and disapproval. In this limited sense the Dalmatiqn occupation was at once a result of Wilson's effort to circumscribe with justice and severity Italy's expanding ambitions, as well as a contributing factor to his unshaken determination not to yield on this most controversial issue of the peace settlement.

By no means the least interesting phase of this occupation is the curious legal structure that provided a basis for the mission. The American zone fell outside the area to be evacuated by the enemy and occupied by interallied forces under article three of the Austrian armistice. In article four, however, the Allies reserved the right to "occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary...to maintain order"; that is, to take over Austrian territory beyond the armistice line if conditions warranted. Central Dalmatia, which in November 1918 became the American zone, was most emphatically a strategic point, in fact the key strategic position in the Adriatic upon which Italian imperialists cast covetous eyes. Its occupation was undertaken by the United States on the basis of enabling powers granted

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3. Woodrow Wilson Collection, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

in article four, but American authority rapidly expanded far beyond the limits set in that clause, namely, the maintenance of order.

The naval occupation of Dalmatia provides an exceptional illustration of adaptation of form to mission. In the initial stages it was regarded simply as a routine process in the execution of armistice naval terms, nothing more than a rather unusual naval function. As projects of Italian aggrandizement reached the notice of the State Department the American mission acquired political features, the principal objectives of which, as have already been indicated, were to check Italian expansion in the Adriatic at the expense of the then amorphous Jugoslavia, and to support the new state in conformity with Wilson's principle of national self-determination. The form of occupation was adapted to these conditioning factors, and to the mission entrusted to the American admiral. It might be worth noting that this form is unique. For his administration the admiral depended upon Jugoslav provincial and local governments; for his police force he relied on Jugoslav garrisons supplemented by occasional landings of American sailors and a daily shore patrol. This form of government was singularly well adapted to the desired objectives. It served the purpose of assisting Jugoslavia to develop self-government in Dalmatia; it reinforced the international position of Jugoslavia, and all this was accomplished without alienating Italy irreparably.

If, however, the naval occupation of central Dalmatia may be termed unusual, and in some features even unique, it was no more so than the chaotic conditions in the Adriatic which followed

the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire in November, 1918. An examination of these developments and of the Jugoslav movement for national unification is essential to an adequate comprehension of the American occupation and its implications. For this reason stress is laid throughout the chapter on the dynamic political background which vitally, continuously, affected the naval mission in Dalmatia.

## DISSOLUTION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The outlook appeared very gloomy for the central powers by September, 1918. Relentless allied pressure in the west which had begun with the reduction of the Marne salient in June was steadily rolling the German armies back toward the Rhine, and the economic consequences of the naval blockade contributed to the steady deterioration of national morale. In Austria-Hungary war-weariness and the upsurge of discontented subject nationalities made highly dubious the continued existence of the empire.[5] Concessions by the government of Charles VI which were intended to placate the Poles, Czechs, and Jugoslavs had the effect of encouraging their political activities which aimed at nothing short of independence, and hence the destruction of the ancient Hapsburg empire. When in mid-September Franchet d'Esperey's Army of the

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5. The dissolution of Austria-Hungary is simply outlined here. Studies of the problem may be found in E. von Glaise-Horstenau, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, trs. New York, 1930; D. Strong, Austria, October 1918 - March 1919, New York, 1939; P.H. Michel, La Question de l'Adriatique, Paris, 1938; O. Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy, Chicago, 1929.

Orient launched an offensive on the Macedonian front and shortly achieved a break-through, Bulgarian resistance was finally and utterly crushed. Bulgaria capitulated on September 28, and two days later signed an armistice at Salonika on terms which amounted to unconditional surrender. The way now lay open for an allied advance against Austria-Hungary from the southeast.

Austria, however, was in no condition to continue the struggle; the imperial armies were too exhausted, and the friction of nationalities threatened the immediate breakdown of the home front. Her cause was lost. Back in the middle of September, 1918 Austria had displayed her attenuation before the world by addressing a peace note to the United States, but, suspecting chicanery, Wilson rejected it summarily. When in the first days of October Germany in desperation requested an immediate armistice and peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, Austria willingly associated herself with the move. Wilson's reply to Austria, dated October 18, did not reach Vienna until three days later, and its contents doomed the empire. The President, having already recognized the Czech National Council as a de facto belligerent government as well as the justice of Jugoslav national aspirations, was compelled to repudiate clause X of the Fourteen Points[6] and declare that mere autonomy of the subject nationalities was no longer a basis for peace. By its overt encouragement to the Poles,

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6. Point X. "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." C. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House, (New York, 1928), III, 336-37.

Czechs, and Jugoslavs this note virtually dissolved the dual empire, and central authority rapidly disintegrated, its fragments falling into the hands of irregular national councils and committees in the imperial provinces. The armies, too, were infected by the nationalist movements, and no longer could be relied upon as effective instruments of imperial policy.

In this period of crisis when the Hapsburg edifice was crumbling in ruins General Diaz, Italian chief of staff, on October 23 gave the signal which began the carefully prepared general offensive against the Austrian lines. It is an astonishing fact that the Austrian forces, although compelled slowly to withdraw, continued for several days to offer vigorous resistance when a government which could sustain them no longer existed. By October 27 however, Italian and allied troops had crossed the Piave, and smashed the Austrian front. That same day Vienna despatched through a neutral source an answer to Wilson's note of October 18 which agreed to accept the President's conditions without reservation; offered to conclude a separate peace, and sued for an immediate armistice. It was too late. The desperate situation at home and on the front was such that Austria could not afford to indulge in leisurely diplomatic exchanges at a time when an immediate cessation of hostilities was imperative. It became clear that only an armistice on the field could accomplish this.

In Paris, whither he had traveled in great haste from Rome to attend the conferences of the Supreme War Council, Premier Orlando on October 30 announced to Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Colonel House that a commission of Austrian officers bearing the

white flag had crossed the Italian lines and requested terms.[7] At the instance of their political chiefs, allied military and naval advisors quickly drafted armistice clauses which were approved by the Supreme Council the next day, and that same evening they were wired in abbreviated form to General Diaz while a courier hurried to Italy with the complete text in his pouch. At 3 p.m. on November 3, the Austrian commission signed the armistice of Villa Giusti together with a supplement appended by General Pietro Badoglio at the last minute which, among other things, set the time for cessation of hostilities twenty-four hours after the signature.[8] The Austrian high command at Baden was not informed of this supplement, and consequently ordered the imperial armies to lay down their arms immediately after 3 p.m., November 3, in the belief that the armistice would enter into effect at that time. This act was not unjustified because the armistice terms, minus the supplement, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. However, Italian troops continued their advance against the unresisting enemy for twenty-four hours longer, taking some 300,000 prisoners and an enormous booty.[9] While it may be interpreted as

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7. C. Seymour, Intimate Papers, IV, 104.

8. Since the supplement was unauthorized, and because it so obviously favored Italian interests at the expense of her allies, the Supreme Council later repudiated it. See below, p. 23 . Copies of this supplement which threatened a breach among the allies are to be found in the Yale House Collection, and the Naval Records, Navy Department. It has been published in H. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, 6 vols., London, 1920-24, I, 487 ff. Hereafter cited Peace Conference.

9. D. Strong, Austria, October 1918 - March 1919, has partially uncovered the history of this interesting episode. Some mention of it is also made in E. von Glaise-Horstenau, Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

a fitting climax to the singular Italian drive of Vittorio Veneto, it was nevertheless a base and treacherous act which forms yet another stain on Italian arms.

## JUGOSLAV UNIFICATION

While these momentous events culminating in the armistice of Villa Giusti were in progress, the Jugoslavs of the Austro-Hungarian empire directed their energies toward outlining the shape of a new national state. The Jugoslav inhabitants of the Dual Monarchy were distributed among ten different provinces. Under Austria, but possessing varying degrees of home rule, were Carinthia, Styria, Carniola, Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria and Dalmatia. Hungary controlled Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexed in 1909, were under joint Austro-Hungarian administration. Two independent kingdoms, overrun by Austrian troops during the war, were also inhabited by Jugoslavs, namely, Serbia and Montenegro. United by blood, language, and to a certain extent by national tradition these various territories were divided by government, but since the early years of the war the Jugoslavs had conducted an active propaganda aimed at ultimate unification.[10]

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10. Details of the Jugoslav movement for unification lie outside the province of this chapter. Consult R. Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, (New York, 1938), p. 47 ff. for a brief but incisive account. H. Temperley, Peace Conference, IV and V, passim, is still useful, as is E.J. and C.G. Woodhouse, Italy and the Jugoslavs, Boston, 1920. Also see C. Beard and G. Radin, The Balkan Pivot: Jugoslavia, New York, 1929, and J. Buchan (ed.), Jugoslavia, London, 1923.

The movement for national self-determination stemmed from three distinct sources, nor was it completed until these three effected a junction. First of these elements was the Jugoslav National Committee organized in London during the early war months by Dr. Trumbitch, an émigré Dalmatian lawyer,[11] who kept the Jugoslav issue alive and burning with the aid of British subsidies. The second source consisted of the exiled Serbian government, an ally of the great powers, astutely controlled by Mr. Pasitch, its premier and foreign minister. Although Pasitch considered unification in terms of a Greater Serbia he and Trumbitch signed the Pact of Corfu on July 20, 1917, thereby agreeing on the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in a single independent kingdom on a constitutional and democratic basis under the Serb house of Karageorgevitch.[12] The final element in this tripartite movement for unification was the National Council of Zagreb.

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11. Trumbitch was once mayor of Spalato, capital of Dalmatia; was subsequently elected to the Austrian Reichsrat from that province, and eventually became the first foreign minister of Jugoslavia during the years 1919-20.

12. Italy accepted the Corfu agreement in the Pact of Rome signed in April 1918 by Trumbitch and Mr. Torre on behalf of a large Italian parliamentary committee. Orlando approved, perhaps in good faith, but primarily as a war measure to promote allied solidarity. Subsequent Italian intrigues to forestall Jugoslav unity bear out this interpretation. Compare R. Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp. 46-47.

When it appeared that the Dual Monarchy would not survive the war politically intact, Dr. Korosec, Slovene president of the Croatian parliament, invited the political leaders of all Jugoslav parties within the empire to assemble in congress at Zagreb on October 5, 1918, to form a national council. After Wilson in his note of October 18 to Vienna "recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugoslavs for freedom",[13] the national council was encouraged to convene again at Zagreb, and to renounce any connection between the Jugoslav provinces and Austria-Hungary, and to declare their union with the state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as expressed in the Pact of Corfu. Paced by its president, Dr. Korosec, the congress transformed itself into the National Council of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and assumed complete authority over all Jugoslavs within the defunct empire. At the same time it recalled Jugoslav troops from the Italian front in a manifesto which announced the neutrality of Jugoslav territory. Punctilious to the last gasp, Emperor Charles shortly thereafter recognized the new situation, and simultaneously transferred the imperial navy to the National Council. In view of the fact that Italy expected a substantial portion of that fleet as war spoil, her government vehemently denounced this latter act as a perfidious Austrian trick, but actually Charles VI only acquiesced in a fait accompli, since a mutiny in the navy on October 30 had raised the Croat flag to the mastheads. Nevertheless, transfer of the fleet to the National Council of Zagreb caused no

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13. H. Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, 105.

little confusion among the allies when the time arrived to enforce the Austrian naval armistice terms.[14]

By the end of October, 1918, the form of the Jugoslav state had become more distinct. The next obvious step was to bring together the signatories of the Pact of Corfu and the National Council of Zagreb. For this purpose Trumbitch, Pasitch, and Korosec assembled in Geneva together with their aides on November 6, and five days later issued the so-called Pact of Geneva. This document designed the succession state along lines laid down by the Pact of Corfu. It pronounced the National Council of Zagreb the provisional government of Jugoslavia, and announced the formation of a joint ministry to organize affairs pending enactment of a constitution to be drafted by a constituent assembly. Unfortunately Pasitch still nourished the Pan-Serb idea and, apprehensive lest the Jugoslav provinces overshadow Serbia in the new state, treacherously hamstrung the Geneva Pact behind the backs of his colleagues.[15] Common fear of Italy, however, provided the strongest inducement for reconciliation, and after a flurried interval of negotiation the National Council of Zagreb eventually offered Prince Alexander of Serbia the regency over all Jugoslavs. He accepted on December 1, 1918. Then the National Council proclaimed the Kingdom of the

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14. Discussed below, p.18 ff.

15. Minister in Switzerland Stovall to Colonel E. House, November 30, 1918. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919; The Paris Peace Conference, (Washington, D.C., 2 vols., 1942), II, 317-18. Hereafter cited For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference.

Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, that is to say, Jugoslavia, and on December 16, a joint session of the National Council of Zagreb and the Serbian Skupshtina ratified this action. When Montenegro entered the union several days later it completed the unification of the Jugoslavs.[16]

This movement for national self-determination which attracted the pro oundest sympathy and extensive moral support of the United States was not accomplished without intrigue, disorder, and bloodshed, nor did the mere fact of union automatically solve the numerous problems facing the recently established provisional government. There existed the question of future boundaries complicated by the Treaty of London[17] in which document France and Britain had approved Italy's claim to Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria, northern Dalmatia, as well as the Quarnero and Dalmatian islands. These regions constituted Italy's price for entering the war on the allied side, but in all these bartered provinces the vast bulk of the population was Jugoslav. Consequently, territorial issues produced an inevitable clash between Italy and Jugoslavia. To obtain foreign recognition for Jugoslavia proved a formidable task because of adamant Italian opposition. The new state also labored under serious internal problems as well, foremost of which were the establishment of law and order, revictualling of devastated areas, and organization of a permanent constitutional and democratic government. There remained also the delicate questions

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16. French Ambassador to the United States, Jusserand, to Secretary of State Lansing, Paris, January 9, 1919. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 545-46.

17. Signed April 26, 1915.

arising from the application of the armistice terms to those Jugoslav areas which had shortly before belonged to Austria-Hungary.

Now it is highly significant that the United States consistently sustained Jugoslavia in her efforts to find a solution for these grave problems. Such support assumed moral, financial, and diplomatic forms, but as important as any of these was the American occupation of Dalmatia which can correctly be interpreted as direct physical intervention on behalf of Jugoslavia, and a tactful show of force against Italy. Having sketchily surveyed the political background against which the Dalmatian occupation must be viewed, we turn now to events connected with the Austrian armistice which step by step lead to the assumption of American control in Dalmatia.

## ARMISTICE OF VILLA GIUSTI AND ITS ENFORCEMENT

It is a notable fact that the armistice of Villa Giusti, even without the supplement already mentioned, was an overwhelmingly Italian document that provided for Italian rather than inter-allied requirements on the Austro-Hungarian front.[18] The military clauses demanded immediate demobilization of the imperial armies, and the surrender of half their equipment such as machine guns and artillery. Under article three Austria undertook to evacuate all

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18. After the breakdown of the empire, Hungary maintained that the armistice of Villa Giusti did not apply to her. Therefore representatives of General d'Esperey and the Hungarian Government signed at Belgrade, on November 13, 1918, a "military convention regulating the conditions under which the armistice, signed between the allies and Austria-Hungary is to be applied in Hungary." Texts of the armistice of Villa Giusti and of the Belgrade military convention are conveniently printed in H. Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, 499-511.

districts invaded since the beginning of the war, and beyond that to withdraw her troops from specified national territory in the South Tyrol, and from regions about the headwaters and eastern littoral of the Adriatic extending south to Cape Planka, as well as from the numerous islands off the coast. The area to be evacuated traced by this armistice line coincided exactly with the Austrian territory promised to Italy by the allies in the Treaty of London back in April 1915. However, this same clause explicitly stated that "all territories thus evacuated will be occupied by Allied and American troops", and article six entrusted the provisional administration of these territories "to local authorities under Allied and associated armies of occupation".

In the light of what subsequently occurred it is doubtful whether Italy even at this early date intended to permit allied troops to associate with her own in the occupation of these evacuated regions because she regarded them as good as annexed by right of conquest, and by guarantees in the Treaty of London. Article four of the armistice allowed allied armies to "occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order." It was under this mandate that Italy thrust naval and military units beyond the armistice line into coastal areas from Cape Planka to Albania on the heels of departing Austrian troops, and under this same elastic clause that the United States occupied Dalmatia.

The naval conditions of the armistice obligated Austria to surrender to the allies and the United States fifteen submarines, three battleships, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, and twelve

torpedo boats in addition to several smaller vessels. All other naval units were to be concentrated in designated Austro-Hungarian ports, disarmed, decommissioned, and placed under allied surveillance. Blockade conditions specifically remained unaltered by the terms, and article eight granted the allies the right to occupy the great naval base at Pola together with its fortifications, dockyards, and arsenals. These conditions completely prostrated the Austro-Hungarian navy, which at that time stood eighth in the world naval hierarchy.

In the supplement appended at the instance of the Italian high command the stipulations were such that they interpreted the armistice almost entirely in favor of Italy. For instance, ships marked for surrender were required to proceed to the Italian base at Venice, nor can it be ascribed to coincidence that the supplement named vessels which the Italian naval authorities notoriously claimed as reparations for war losses to their fleet. After November 3, it remained for the allies to carry out and enforce the military and naval terms of armistice, an apparently routine operation whose simplicity was shortly belied by numerous difficulties and complications.

On November 5, 1918 the Allied Naval Council in Paris convened "to consider the manner in which the naval terms of the armistice should be carried out."[19] The Council agreed to appoint

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19. Memorandum on the Adriatic, written by Admiral A.P. Niblack. No date but by internal evidence after September 1919. Naval Records, Navy Department, File VA.
The bulk of official naval material emanating from the several branches of the Navy Department and open to investigators is deposited in two places. The first of these is the Office of Naval Records and Library in the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia. Citations from this collection will hereafter read, Naval Records. The other depository of naval material is in the National Archives, Naval Archives Division. Citations from this source will read, Naval Archives. This will keep the distinction clear.

a committee consisting of four naval officers, American, British, French, and Italian, to meet in Venice and take all necessary steps to execute the naval clauses. Two days later Admiral W.S. Sims on the authority of Admiral W.S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, ordered Rear Admiral W.H. Bullard to the Adriatic as naval delegate of the United States to act in concert with British, French, and Italian naval representatives to enforce the armistice. Bullard's mission was strictly defined; he was to collaborate with his colleagues in overseeing the surrender of the forty-two Austrian vessels mentioned in the armistice, but specifically enumerated by the Allied Naval Council only on November 5. These units were to be concentrated at Pola,[20] the remainder of the fleet to be decommissioned in Austrian bases chosen at the discretion of the Committee. It was a naval mission with no political coloration whatever at this time.

As Admiral Bullard sailed from Corfu toward the upper Adriatic he was aware that a grave problem confronted the allies, namely, the disposal of the Austrian fleet. On October 31, before Austria signed the armistice, the Emperor had delivered the imperial navy together with dockyards and arsenals to the National Council of Zagreb. Since the armistice occurred on November 3, Austria was apparently no longer in a position to dispose of the navy, since it constituted Jugoslav property. Would the allies, Italy particularly, recognize the legality of the transfer and waive pertinent clauses

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20. Note that the unauthorized Italian supplement to the armistice obligated the ships therein designated for surrender to return to Venice. The supplement and interallied decisions, as represented by the Allied Naval Council, also conflicted on the matter of specific ships named for surrender.

of the armistice or would the allies treat the fleet as if it were Austrian? This thorny problem set the allied statesmen chasing about in great mental agitation seeking a proper solution.

The first inkling the allied prime ministers and Colonel House received of the transfer came on November 1, at the morning meeting of the Supreme War Council.[21] Here Lloyd George read an intercepted Jugoslav wireless from Pola appraising them of the unforeseen development. Although Premier Orlando stated flatly that the armistice terms as wired to General Diaz the preceding night must stand regardless of who held the fleet, it was later agreed by the Supreme War Council to inform the Jugoslav authorities by wireless to hoist the white flag on the ex-Austrian naval units and proceed to Corfu.[22] What action was to take place there was never determined, since the allies reached no decision on that point, and because the expected vessels never did reach Corfu although the Jugoslavs had acknowledged the allied invitation to sail. The

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21. Aldrovandi Marescotti, Guerra Diplomatica, (Milan, 1937), p.200. It can be proved that the Italian naval command knew of the transfer on October 31, that is, some twenty-four hours earlier. (U.S. naval attache Rome, to Naval Intelligence, November 3, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.). This knowledge did not deter the Italians from forcing the harbor of Pola on the night of October 31 by means of a special torpedo-like apparatus called the Mignatta, and sinking the flagship of the ex-Austrian navy -- the Viribus Unitis -- together with a large transport. The incident is worth noting here because it shows that the action, unanimously hailed as brilliant by all naval historians who touched upon the matter, was neither honorable nor brilliant. It was certainly no feat to force a harbor held by Jugoslavs who had relaxed all vigilance because for them the war was over.

22. Admiral Benson to Sims, November 2, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.

confusion can more readily be appreciated if it is remembered that the Italian supplement to the armistice directed the ships to Venice, but that the allied statesmen decided that the entire navy in Jugoslav possession should proceed to Corfu, and to cap it all, the Allied Naval Council, having no knowledge of the supplement or the ministerial decision, ordered the same units to Pola.

As soon as House learned of the naval transfer he cabled the news to President Wilson and awaited instructions.[23] That same day Wilson replied, advising "the most liberal possible concurrence in [the] transfer of actual armed force to Yugoslav authorities as the best possible proof of our utter good faith towards them."[24] Had the disputed fleet reached Corfu it is possible that the President might have intervened strenuously in favor of the Jugoslavs, but as early as November 3 a series of intercepted messages from Pola reiterated the refrain that the Jugoslavs were "unable to put to sea with the ex-Austrian navy"[25] because adequate personnel was unavailable.

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23. House to Wilson, Paris to Washington, November 1, 1918. Yale House Collection, Sterling Library, Yale University.

24. Wilson to House, Washington to Paris, November 1, 1918. Woodrow Wilson Collection, File VIII, Box 5, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress. A portion of this note is printed in R.S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson; life and letters, (8 vols., N.Y., 1927-39), VIII, 542. The copy of this note in the House Collection is inaccurate due to garbled transmission.

25. U.S. naval attache, Rome, to Office of Naval Intelligence, November 3, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.

The situation remained obscure for several days, and is remarkable for the number of frantic appeals sent by various Jugoslav committees to the allies singly and collectively, principally pleading for the exclusion of Jugoslavia from the Austrian armistice terms.[26] When it became evident that the Jugoslavs were reluctant to deliver their navy at Corfu, and were unable to do so had they wished, and after the French Minister of Marine had already directed his admiral at Corfu to intern under allied supervision all elements of the ex-Austrian navy stationed at Cattaro,[27] the statesmen in Paris on November 10, reached a belated decision. Although Paris remained uncertain as to the actual location of the navy, it was agreed to intern all warships flying the Jugoslav flag in Adriatic ports where allied surveillance could be maintained.[28] The vessels were to be placed to the allied account, and the Peace Conference charged with their ultimate disposal. In reality this meant that Italian opposition to Jugoslav ownership of the navy had triumphed; that all ex-Austrian naval units were demanded for surrender instead of the

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26. For example, Note du Conseil National de Zagreb aux Gouvernments de l'Entente, November 3, 1918, printed in P.H. Michel, La Question de l'Adriatique, (Paris, 1938), p.285. The Otter Cliffs station in Maine picked up a Jugoslav appeal addressed directly to President Wilson. Dated November 3, it requested American aid against Italy. (Woodrow Wilson Collection, File II-A, Box 46.)

27. French Minister of Marine to Admiral Provence, Paris to Corfu, November 8, 1918. Yale House Collection
Cattaro, second largest of the Austrian naval bases, lay about 300 miles south of Pola. At this time Cattaro contained three battleships, nine cruisers, twenty-six torpedo boats, seven submarines, and some thirty auxiliaries. (Bullard to Benson, November 9, 1918. Yale House Collection.)

28. Clemenceau to French Ambassador in Rome, for Orlando; November 10, 1918. Yale House Collection.

several named in the armistice. Obviously such a policy entailed allied acceptance of the Italian position that Jugoslavia, being then an unrecognized state, could legally own no navy, and hence the Austrian transfer was void.

Completely ignorant of the decision reached by his political superiors, Admiral Bullard arrived at the naval base of Pola on November 13, and found that Italian naval and military forces had assumed full control there nine days before. The city together with harbor works and fortifications lay in Italian hands, and from the trucks of the "Jugoslav navy" flew the Italian flag.[29] Naval officers representing France and Britain were already on the scene and, without more ado, Bullard met with them aboard the Italian flagship lying in the roads in a series of conferences under the presidency of the Italian vice-admiral in charge of the occupation. These meetings to organize the enforcement of the naval armistice terms occupied a period of two days.[30] Apparently still unnotified of the decision taken in Paris by their political chiefs to treat the Jugoslav navy as if it were Austrian, the committee of admirals on its own initiative tentatively adopted a similar viewpoint, and brushed aside the protests of the Jugoslav admiral present. The committee agreed that all Jugoslav naval and military personnel in the area should be demobilized by November 20, and that the United States would be given charge of the ex-Austrian battleships Radetzky and

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29. Acting for France, Britain, and the United States, Clemenceau without result protested the Italian usurpation of the ex-Austrian navy anchored at Pola, calling it an "act contrary to the engagements entered into." (Clemenceau to Orlando, November 6, 1918. Yale House Collection).

30. A full, although colored account of the proceedings may be found in a report submitted by Vice Admiral Cagni, commander at Pola, to Admiral Di Revel, Italian chief of naval staff and dated November 15, 1918. (Naval Records, File VA.).

Zrinyi which, together with two torpedo boats, were to be taken to Spalato for internment by American naval crews. Then the discussions foundered on an exceedingly sharp snag; the supplement which Italy had slipped into the armistice. Admiral Cagni attempted to organize the armistice along the lines of the supplement, but his colleagues on the committee, particularly Bullard, refused "to recognize the delegation of power"[31] which that document assumed. Having reached an impasse, Cagni adjourned the conference and the American, British, and French admirals hastened to Venice where another series of meetings opened on November 16, this time under the presidency of the Italian chief of naval staff, Admiral Di Revel.

Here the admirals organized themselves into the Naval Committee for the Adriatic, in accord with the directive issued by the Allied Naval Council in Paris on November 5, and by an act of courtesy elected Di Revel chairman.[32] Discussion at first centered about the supplement, but had to be postponed because no compromise was in sight. The surcharged atmosphere dissipated somewhat when a message from the allied political chiefs in Paris directed the meetings into different channels. This despatch ordered the Committee to make no distinction "between those ships designated in the armistice to be surrendered, and those to be disarmed;"[33] that is, to take over the entire ex-Austrian navy in the name of the allies. It thus required almost a week to bring the Supreme Council's decision

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31. Admiral Cagni to Di Revel, November 15, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.

32. Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic, n.d. Naval Records, File VA.

33. Admiral Benson to Secretary of the Navy Daniels, January 2, 1919. Naval Records, File C-56-20.

of November 10 to fruition.[34] After issuing instructions to their naval subordinates "to disarm immediately and make immobile all the late Austro-Hungarian ships,"[35] the Committee was adjourned by Di Revel to gather ten days later in Rome.

In the ancient Roman capital the admirals convened on November 26, and held conferences for three days.[36] They reached a consensus on a number of important points. First came the settlement of the problem associated with the Italian supplement to the armistice. A directive from the Allied Naval Council in Paris resolved the issue by ordering the supplement annulled, and Orlando so informed Di Revel to the latter's obvious chagrin.[37] This did not mean that the Jugoslavs would regain possession of the fleet, but repudiation of the protocol did limit Italy's exclusive policy toward the hotly contested naval units.

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34. See above, p. 20

35. Admiral Benson to Daniels, January 2, 1919. Naval Records, File C-56-20.

36. On November 25, four Japanese destroyers arrived in the Adriatic to assist in the execution of the armistice terms. Although a Japanese naval officer was present at the Rome meetings he was not given a chair on the Committee and, finding themselves studiously ignored, the Japanese subsequently left. [Memorandum of Adriatic Committee, November 30, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.].

37. Clemenceau had already informed the Italian government that "the allies did not designate [Italian] plenipotentiaries [to sign the armistice] and a protocol which was never communicated to them is nonexistent." [Foreign Minister Pichon to Orlando, undated, but about November 8. Yale House Collection.].

The most significant step taken by the Committee was the division of the eastern Adriatic littoral into four occupation zones under authority derived from articles three and four of the armistice.[38] These provinces were to be held in the name of the allies until the Peace Conference determined their future sovereignty and traced post-war boundaries. Britain received the northernmost area with the city of Fiume; to the south Italy had already established an impregnable position in northern Dalmatia by virtue of the Treaty of London, and the Committee, faced by a fait accompli, confirmed this area as Italy's zone. The American zone of occupation consisted of central Dalmatia together with the numerous islands off its coast. On the north, at Cape Planka, the Italian zone was its boundary; some one hundred miles to the south, at the island of Sipan, the French zone began and extended to the Albanian frontier. Sebenico, Spalato, and Cattaro were the centers respectively of the Italian, American, and French occupation zones. It is worth noting that the Committee acted here on its own initiative, and the determination to divide the eastern Adriatic seaboard into allied zones of occupation came at an important time, because the region was in a chaotic state politically, and disorder there rampant. Allied military authorities had discussed the same problem without reaching a solution; in fact they were still arguing the matter late in December 1918,[39] long after the decision of the naval committee had been ratified by the statesmen in Paris. A zone

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38. The proceedings of the Rome sessions have been pieced together chiefly from three documents: Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic, n.d.; Memorandum of Adriatic Committee, November 30, 1918; Progress Report, Benson to Daniels, January 2, 1919. All are to be found in the Naval Records, the first two File VA; the third, C-56-20.

39. See For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 211-218.

system may not have been the best possible solution, but the Committee acted swiftly in a time of crisis and tightened up the loose situation in the eastern Adriatic in the interests of stability and order. It is significant that the zone assigned to the United States coincided with the area marked out for expansion by Italy. Division of the Dalmatian seacoast into allied zones undoubtedly "prevented a complete Italian control of the coast."[40]

The Adriatic Committee then proceeded to apportion the erstwhile Jugoslav navy among the allies on the basis that the naval units and materiel were enemy property. All vessels in the Italian zone were to be assembled at Pola; those in the French zone at Cattaro, and the American representative agreed that the two battleships and two torpedoboats allotted to the United States should be concentrated at Spalato. The ships, assembled in three different ports, were to remain under surveillance and control of the nation in whose zone of occupation they were located, but the other allies represented on the Committee could station officers aboard if they so desired. All these ex-Austrian men-of-war were to be held in trust for the allies pending final disposal by the Peace Conference.

It should be remarked that the British delegate, Rear Admiral Kiddle, refused a share of the Austrian ships, asserting that "the British Admiralty desires no occupation either of large ships or of groups of small ones."[41] While it is indisputable that the Admiralty was sufficiently busy in the North Sea supervising the

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40. H. Temperley (ed.), Peace Conference, V, 123.

41. Memorandum of Adriatic Committee, Naval Records, File VA.

surrender of the German navy to wish no additional naval obligations elsewhere, evidence exists which seems to indicate that the British and Italians at this time were toying with the idea of a power play which would squeeze France and America out of the Adriatic.[42] The basis of this contemplated diplomatic manoeuver derived from shrewdly calculated national self-interest. It envisaged mutual Italo-British support to exclude the United States and France insofar as possible from naval arrangements in the Adriatic and North Sea. What happened falls outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to state that this informal, uncrystallized understanding between the British and Italian naval ministries helps explain why the Admiralty refused a portion of the ex-Austrian fleet, and why Britain later -- a strangely docile lion indeed -- meekly retreated from her zone at Fiume in the face of Italian aggressiveness.

Before concluding its sittings the Adriatic Committee conferred on the important question of allied administration in areas along the Adriatic littoral evacuated by Austro-Hungarian forces, and where irregular Jugoslav committees already exercised

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42. For example the following: "I am aware...that the Italians were perfectly willing to accept any proposal of the British for a solution of the naval questions in the North Sea, so long as the British continued their policy of complete accord with the Italian views and methods in the Adriatic." (Admiral Benson to Admiral Sims, Paris to London, December 17,1918. Naval Records, File U-UB). Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, had previously informed C.R. Train, U.S. naval attache at Rome of an Italian proposal to the British Admiralty offering unobstructed passage to British warships to the northern Adriatic on the condition that French and American ships be denied transit rights. Benson and the French "took a very positive stand," and so this particular deal fell through. (Benson to Train, Paris to Rome, November 30, 1918. Naval Records, File U-UB.). Also see Sims to Benson, London to Paris, November 15, 1918, (Naval Records, File VD.) for British acquiescence in Italian military occupation beyond the Armistice line.

such civil and military authority as could be exerted under conditions of deplorable disorganization and disorder. The Committee opined that articles four and six[43] of the armistice terms provided a requisite mandate for the establishment of allied naval governments in such territories. Having previously divided the eastern Adriatic coastline into zones of occupation, the distribution of naval governorships proved a simple matter. The naval officer commanding in the zone would also act as its governor, but local Jugoslav authorities would continue their functions subject to his control.

When the Committee disbanded on November 29, the mission of the allied naval representatives in the Adriatic had been defined as follows:

> "...to take charge of all Austro-Hungarian floating material, preserve order, preserve the blockade, and see that the terms of the armistice were carried out, it being understood that the administration of the evacuated territories should be entrusted to the local authorities under the control of the Senior Naval Officer Present [in each zone]...."[44]

Recollecting the limited initial instructions received by Bullard when he embarked for the Adriatic it becomes readily apparent that after the Rome sessions the original mission expanded to embrace political objectives in the sense that naval administration of civil affairs constitutes political activity. However, it should be emphasized that at the end of November, 1918, military and political duties of the allied naval delegates in the Adriatic rested on an

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43. See above, p.15

44. Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic.

interallied plane; that despite some divergence of opinion regarding ends and means among the Committee members they worked as a synchronized unit. The mission in which the United States participated as a full partner was strictly interallied at this point. Not until the following month, and then because of incontrovertible information testifying to Italy's sly and ruthless imperialism in the Adriatic, did the American concept of mission alter. It became in effect two missions; one interallied, the other purely American, designed to check Italy's advance at the expense of Jugoslavia. In a sense the two missions were antithetical, yet ample room existed, as will be seen, for interallied coöperation in political as well as naval affairs, and the vehicle for such important and indispensable coördination throughout remained the Adriatic Committee.[45]

After the Rome sessions terminated on November 29, the allied admirals, with the exception of Di Revel, proceeded to their respective zones to begin the discharge of their duties as naval governors. Admiral Bullard journeyed first to Venice where he was piped aboard the U.S.S. Birmingham;[46] then, on December 2, he took

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45. It is worth recording that American policy in the Adriatic was conducted principally by the navy during November and December 1918. Admiral Bullard was its executor on the spot; his instructions were issued by Admiral Benson who maintained close contact with Colonel House in Paris. In turn, Colonel House kept in touch with the State Department and President Wilson. This arrangement by-passed Thomas N. Page, American Ambassador to Rome. Late in November, 1918, he complained to Secretary of State Robert Lansing that "..no information is sent to me here as to our policy..." (Page to Lansing, Rome to Washington, November 26, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 316.). This irregular situation shortly returned to normal as conditions became more stabilized.

46. Bullard had previously hoisted his flag on the Birmingham at Venice on November 20, 1918. (Admiral Benson's Notebook. Naval Records, File U-UB.).

passage for Spalato, the capital of Dalmatia and the nerve center of the American zone of occupation. Scarcely had Bullard -- and for that matter his fellow delegates on the Adriatic Committee -- assumed charge of civil administration in Dalmatia when a despatch from Paris instructed him to collaborate with his colleagues in investigating allied violations of the armistice. In non-diplomatic language it meant scrutinizing Italian activities, a fact which Bullard shortly perceived. It is, therefore, the tense Adriatic situation, partially fomented and undeniably complicated by ill-considered Italian conduct, that we must next examine, because the results of the investigation determined the final evolution of the American mission in the Adriatic.

## ADRIATIC DEVELOPMENTS, NOVEMBER - DECEMBER, 1918

No sooner had the armistice of Villa Giusti been signed than Italy began forcing naval and military units into the eastern Adriatic in the wake of departing Austrian armies. Italy proposed to entrench herself strongly in former Austrian territories as a safeguard against Jugoslav nationalism, and to fortify her diplomatic position at the peace table. From the Italian viewpoint of sacro egoismo it is comprehensible that fear and jealousy of Jugoslavia should exist. For years Austria had been the hereditary enemy and rival in the Adriatic;[47] was Italy to relax supinely and

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47. A significant commentary on the deep-seated hostility which existed between Italy and Austria is the fact that during all the years they were partners with Germany in the Triple Alliance, Austria consistently refused to permit Italian ships to visit Dalmatian ports. (Admiral Niblack to Chief of Naval Operations, London to Washington, January 31, 1921. Naval Archives, File 29231-10.).

watch a new competing power arise from the imperial collapse which Italian treasure and manpower had helped precipitate? That was far from her intention.[48] Even during the war anti-Jugoslav propaganda had circulated in Italy, and upon the conclusion of hostilities it expanded in volume and intensity under official direction. The Croats were "a brutal people"; the Jugoslavs as a whole were "composed of undesirable elements";[49] and theirs was a "civilization still semi-barbaric"[50] ran the refrain. Goaded on by imperialist dreams, and a fervent, understandable, desire to check a possible new rival, Italy started to infiltrate along the eastern Adriatic littoral waving, under the guise of policeman of the Adriatic, the armistice text as her warrant.

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48. In the Italian Senate, Premier Orlando declared on December 14, 1918, that Italy could not demobilize, but must maintain her naval and military establishments in readiness. He added that the armistice had not diminished, but increased difficulties. (E.J. and C.B. Woodhouse, Italy and the Jugoslavs, Boston, 1920, pp. 171-72.).

49. C.R. Train, U.S. naval attache, Rome to Admiral Benson, November 25, 1918. Naval Records, File U-UB. Train quoted Admiral Di Revel, Italian Chief of Naval Staff.

50. Official Italian statement of Adriatic claims prepared by the Italian Naval Staff, handed to Lansing on January 9, 1919. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, I, 476 ff. As early as 1916 Commander Roncagli, an Italian naval spokesman wrote, "For Italy, in the Adriatic, there can be no half-measures: either dominate or be dominated." (The military problem of the Adriatic, Rome, 1916.). Sonnino's paper, the imperialist Giornale d'Italia took up this theme after the armistice, and denounced the Jugoslavs. (Intelligence Report, December 14, 1918. Naval Records, File C-10-h.).

The chaotic state of affairs in Jugoslavia facilitated Italian designs. Jugoslavia was but a name; none of the great powers seriously entertained repeated requests for early recognition. No strong central Jugoslav authority existed which could unaided offer effective resistance to Italy. The numerous irregular assemblies which mushroomed throughout the provinces as Austrian local government collapsed could not successfully cope even with immediate problems of revictualling, policing, and the like, nor could Serb troops and Jugoslav units of Austria's shattered armies, rationally think of resisting Italy's well-equipped battalions. No real unity existed in November and early December 1918 among the various Jugoslav committees. Instead, factional bickering erupted constantly, and a strong peasant party in Croatia seemed determined to frustrate national unification by insisting upon separate, independent statehood for that province. The terrific ravages of war, the uprooted people seeking employment when none was obtainable, and sustaining themselves with food in many regions procurable only by looting, added to the disorders and confusion produced by divided councils and weak authority. In many instances Jugoslav troops broke discipline and indulged in pillage. Such conditions were perhaps unavoidable under the circumstances, but they invited aggression; Jugoslavia in its formative period seemed likely to yield parts of its national territory to Italy. Jugoslav political leaders, and masses of the articulate population heartily distrusted and disliked Italy, not on traditional grounds of sentiment alone, but because Italy threatened their movement for national self-determination. A contemporary observer commented that their

feeling towards Italy was "uniformly bitter and contemptuous everywhere," and they regarded the Italians "as utterly and entirely commercial in their demands."[51] So upon this nexus of fears, pretensions, and hatreds was predicated the real possibility of a disastrous conflict between imperialism and nationalism in the Adriatic.

Drunk with the victory which appeared so inconceivable after the rout of Caporetto in 1917, Italy following the armistice resented the interference of any third power in Adriatic waters which she regarded as an Italian lake. The naval command early in November, 1918, hastily despatched warships to occupy the strategic ex-Austrian islands lying off the Croatian and Dalmatian coasts, and Italian troops were conveyed there during the course of the same month.[52] Italy displayed an aggressive temper in the southern Adriatic. Ignoring Jugoslav protests Italian authorities rushed naval and military contingents to the important Montenegran ports of Antivari and Dulcigno before the armistice was many days old. Their activities at Cattaro, site of the great Austrian naval base, were so extraordinary as to invite closer attention here, particularly since American forces were involved. Be it noted that Cattaro, Antivari, and Dulcigno[53] were about two hundred miles south of Cape Planka,

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51. Memorandum of an interview between Ambassador T.N. Page and Major Roger Perkins, February 18, 1919. Yale House Collection.

52. Ambassador Nelson Page to Lansing, December 8, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, I, 461.

53. Those cities were eventually assigned to the French when the Adriatic Committee drew zones of occupation in the Rome meetings of November 26-29.

the southernmost limit of the armistice line, and hence legally outside the sphere of Italian occupation except for participation in operations clearly interallied in character. But legality apparently did not weigh too heavily with Italy in the circumstances.

On November 10, 1918, French, British, and Italian warships arrived at Cattaro, and the next day Unit "J", consisting of three American submarine chasers under Lieutenant-Commander Loftin, anchored in the harbor.[54] The French Admiral Caubet, senior officer present, took possession of Cattaro in the name of the allies, but the Italians almost immediately undertook to squeeze out their allies by thrusting large numbers of Italian troops into the area. On November 15, they prepared to land two battalions at Cattaro. The Jugoslavs protested repeatedly that they were in no way hostile to a joint landing of allied forces, but they did object, and would resist if Italy acted alone.[55] The American and French naval commanders requested the Italians not to put troops ashore in view of the expressed misgivings of the inhabitants. This appeal was refused, and in the end the allies were forced to detail some sailors to

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54. A. Thomazi, La Guerre Navale dans l'Adriatique, Paris, 1925, p. 204.

55. Special Agent Dodge, Corfu, to Lansing, (For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 288 ff), records Jugoslav sentiments on allied and Italian occupations in general, with no reference to the Cattaro landings which had not yet occurred. So dynamic and fluid was the situation in the southern Adriatic about the middle of November that Dodge added, "Events are moving on so fast that it seems useless to report them by mail."

disembark with the Italian battalions to give the appearance of an interallied landing and thereby pacify the Jugoslavs. In this way the French, British, and Americans yielded to Italian stubborness, but tactfully avoided what might have developed into a pitched battle between Italians and Jugoslavs.[56] Only five days later Italian transports stood into Cattaro with three thousand additional troops aboard, together with an American battalion.[57] The Italians sent their troops ashore to the unconcealed chagrin of the French, under the specious pretense that the occupation was interallied. The use of American soldiers whom the Jugoslavs trusted was simply an Italian device on this and other occasions to saturate some Jugoslav area with Italian forces in the hope of driving out the allies or at least reducing their influence in that region.

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56. Progress Report, Admiral Benson to Secretary of the Navy Daniels, January 2, 1919. Naval Records, File C-56-20. Special Agent Dodge reported on November 14, that the situation at Cattaro was "critical, as the Italians insist upon landing -- and that [the] Yugo-slavs will probably resist unless [the] other allies or the United States forces also land." (Special Agent Dodge, Corfu, to Lansing, November 14, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 294.).
    Allied representatives went ashore to observe the landing, and personally to reassure the populace that it did not mean an Italian occupation. The colonel in charge of Italian troops was requested, at Admiral Caubet's instance, to march off his units in small groups, and to avoid any demonstration. Instead, the Italians indulged in considerable ceremony and paraded their colors while their band played the Italian national anthem. Allied protests evoked an apology from the Italian Admiral Mola, but that did not erase the impression received by the Jugoslavs. (Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library to A.C.D., August 16, 1943).

57. Progress Report, Benson to Daniels, Paris to Washington, January 2, 1919. Naval Records, File C-56-20.

By what dispensation could Italy order about and employ American troops for the advancement of her own selfish ends? To explain this situation it is necessary to digress a bit. In response to urgent Italian solicitations after the crushing defeat at Caporetto, the War Department detailed the 332nd infantry, 83rd division, with attached medical and supply units to the Italian front in July, 1918.[58] The regiment was placed at the disposal of the Italian high command which could direct its movements through Chief of the American mission to Italy, Major General Charles Treat at Rome, and Colonel Wallace who retained tactical command of the American troops. It was a generous gesture on the part of the United States to place a contingent of its forces under the command of a weaker ally then in desperate straits. Among the principal missions of the regiment were those of elevating Italian morale and depressing that of the enemy by building up the illusion that large American units had arrived in Italy and were preparing to enter the line.[59] This mission was achieved by breaking up the regiment into its

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58. American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 430.

59. As an indication of success, the American naval forces hundreds of miles to the south on the Otranto Barrage had heard vague rumors at this time that as many as five American divisions, that is, about 100,000 men, were on the Italian front. (R. Millholland, The Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage, N.Y., 1936, p. 254).

constituent battalions and marching the men about in exposed positions behind the Piave river front with different articles of uniform and equipment. Thus it appeared to uninformed friend and foe alike that numerous contingents of American infantry, artillery, machine-gunners and the like were stationed immediately to the rear of the Italian forward positions. Of fighting the regiment experienced little, for it contacted the enemy on the day the armistice was signed.[60] Italy continued to command the regiment during the armistice period; it was under this arrangement that she ordered the second battalion to embark for Cattaro and participate in the Italian landing.

No sooner had the Italians established themselves at Cattaro than they proposed to push troops inland across the frontier into Montenegro and occupy Cettigne, the capital of that kingdom. Italy's objective was to support the king of Montenegro who rejected the idea of union with Jugoslavia against the wishes of a substantial portion of his subjects currently under the sway of Jugoslav nationalists. It was just part of the Italian program to hinder Jugoslav unification; to promote the establishment of several small independent states instead of a large nation, and in this manner dominate the Jugoslavs in the future with no danger whatever to Italy's own interests.[61] Serbian

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60. American Armies and Battlefields in Europe, pp. 430-31.

61. Special Agent Dodge, Corfu, to Lansing, November 14, 1918, (For. Rel. Paris Peace Conference, II, 294), unsannily exposed the Italian plans more than a week before they attempted to occupy Cettigne.

forces had garrisoned Cettigne and other strategic points in Montenegro early in November, 1918, and Serb officers as well as Montenegrin civil authorities warned the Italians in the middle of that month that they would resist aggression. Consequently, Italy dared not move and so to precipitate hostilities, for her allies, particularly the French, were observing the situation closely. Instead, the Italians decided to employ American troops then at Cattaro, and everywhere welcomed by Jugoslavs, to effect an occupation of the Montenegrin capital. So on November 23, they ordered two American companies to march towards Cettigne in column with two similar Italian units.[62] En route, some Serb officials approached Major Scanlon, commanding officer of the American companies, and explained the political circumstances surrounding the Italian putsch. Thereupon the major disregarded Italian instructions, and promptly returned his

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62. The American battalion was garrisoned aboard the Italian hospital ship Argentina, it being the vessel which had transported them to Cattaro. Italian orders to the American officer commanding the unit were to report to the senior Italian officer at that port. It so happened that Admiral Mola was senior officer, hence the American battalion came under Italian naval command, and this was certainly a peculiar situation when it is remembered that the American regiment had originally been detailed not to the Italian navy, but to the army. Now it is significant that Mola refused to permit the American soldiers to disembark when they reached Cattaro on November 20, but three days later, taking advantage of the absence of the battalion's commanding officer, the Italian admiral suddenly ordered two companies off the ship to march forward to Cettigne. (Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library to A.C.D., August 16, 1943).

men to Cattaro. The Italian infantry managed to reach the frontier, but discouraged by the gunfire which greeted them, followed the Americans back to their base. Anxious to recoup their lost prestige, the Italians planned further excursions against Cettigne, but were eventually dissuaded by the allied officers at Cattaro. Hence, this particular Italian effort to use American troops as a political weapon failed, but the second battalion was not withdrawn from Cattaro.[63]

Italian aggressiveness at Cattaro, and their obvious attempt to eliminate the allies from that point resulted in a sharp verbal collision between Admiral Di Revel and Admiral Ratye of the French navy at the Rome meetings (November 26-29) of the Adriatic Committee described on previous pages. Charges and counter-charges of bad faith hurtled back and forth, and when it became evident that no agreement was in sight, the Committee referred the matter to the Supreme Council in Paris. After a discussion among the political chiefs, Sonnino found it expedient to order the withdrawal of all Italian forces from

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63. The above account of the Cettigne expedition has been collated principally from two reports which do not entirely agree on the facts. They are: Charge in Serbia, Dodge, to the Acting Secretary of State, Polk, Belgrade to Washington, December 18, 1918, (For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 356-58.), and Ambassador Nelson Page to Lansing, November 29, 1918, Rome to Washington, (ibid, 316-17). In alluding to this incident, H. Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, 202, states that "The facts are exceedingly obscure, and it is doubtful if they are known to any living persons." Passions certainly ran high on the Montenegrin frontier, and it may be that the author is correct.

Cattaro on December 2, 1918.[64] Although the order was later modified to permit some Italian troops to remain, no evidence has been discovered to indicate that they subsequently tried to oust the French from the zone assigned them by the Adriatic Committee.[65]

It was not only at Cattaro that Italians demonstrated their imperialist and uncooperative attitude. When the American submarine chaser No.342 put in at Port Lesina, Lesina island, the Italian port officer instructed the American commander to keep his men aboard ship. The "342" intended to remain only overnight, December 5/6, 1918, but during that night three different Italian officers arrived to hint that the Americans leave immediately.[66] To cap it all the island did not even

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64. Nelson Page to Lansing, Rome to Washington, December 4, 1918, For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 320-21. On the threshhold of his career as a publicist Virginio Gayda expressed extreme Italian anti-French sentiments in "The Adriatic problem and the peace conference," Fortnightly Review, March. 1919, pp. 478-91.

65. Ensign H. W. Blumenthal, Commanding officer of the U.S. chaser No.80 was instructed by Admiral Bullard on December 1, 1918, to assume the duties of Senior U.S. naval officer at Cattaro, (Naval Archives, File 28766-165). His mission was to assist the allied forces in carrying out the naval armistice terms.

66. C.W. Eshom, Commanding Officer U.S.S.C. 342 to Admiral Bullard, December 6, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.
Raymond Millholland offers an inaccurate version of this incident in The Splinter Fleet, pp. 256-57. Millholland was Chief Machinist Mate on the S.C. 225 which for some obscure reason he calls the S.C. IX4 in his book. Although the S.C. 225 was not at Lesina at this time, Millholland confidently places it there with himself aboard on December 5, 1918, and states that upon Italian instructions to leave, the chaser cleared for action. The situation actually was not quite so desperate.

belong to Italy, but Italian warships rode in the harbor, and troops were on duty ashore. Not long after this incident a flotilla of American submarine chasers together with the mother ship U.S.S. Leonidas, all under the command of Captain Nelson, stopped off at the island of Curzola on the afternoon of December 15. The Americans received a great ovation from the inhabitants who paraded the quay with their band, waving Serbian and American flags. This demonstration was entirely friendly, and leave was granted American officers and men to go ashore. Just as the liberty parties landed, ubiquitous Italian troops seized the banners, and, in riot formation dispersed the crowd, composed mostly of women and children, at the point of the bayonet. Wishing to avoid trouble, Captain Nelson ordered his ships to up anchor and proceed elsewhere without delay.[67] In this way Italians broke up a demonstration given in honor of Americans, apparently because such enthusiastic manifestations might quickly spread, and before long assume a political significance which would make it more difficult for Italy to annex desirable regions in Dalmatia. Like Lesina, the island of Curzola was not under permanent Italian sovereignity, but only temporarily and unilaterally occupied by them.. Such incidents, which need not be multiplied here, illustrate the exclusive policy which the Italian naval and military commands undertook to follow, and how discourteous and inconsiderate was their attitude towards the

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67. Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library to A.C.D., August 16, 1943.

ally that in the final analysis had made an Adriatic victory possible.

Aggressive and unscrupulous as were the Italians in the south, their conduct was even more so in the north Adriatic in this early post-armistice period. Italian warships occupied Trieste on November 3,[68] a day before the armistice went into effect. A naval squadron under Admiral Cagni occupied the city and naval base of Pola two days later, and, following a policy of ruthless Italianization, deported, beat, and discriminated against the Slav inhabitants of the province of Istria in a calculated movement which shortly reached the proportions of a reign of terror. It is, however, to Italian activities in Fiume -- concerning which so much ink has been spilt -- that we now turn for an example of Italian conduct and the further embroilment of American troops.

Fiume had been annexed by Hungary in the Ausgleich of 1868, but was assigned to Croatia in the Treaty of London of 1915. Hungary sedulously nursed Italian sentiments in Fiume during the time the city was under its sovereignity to counteract Croat nationalism, and throughout the war a Hungarian garrison was stationed there. Towards the end of October,1918, some Croat troops appeared to disarm the garrison and hoist the Croat

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68. The Italian Navy in the World War, 1915-1918, Appendix, Chart No.2. Published by the Historical Section of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Royal Italian Navy, Rome, 1927.

national flag.[69] On November 4, an Italian naval squadron under Admiral Rainer stood into Fiume harbor[70] seeking to occupy the city but was prevented from doing so by the Croats. A conflict now developed between Italian and Croat, that is to say Jugoslav, elements within the city. The former appealed to Italy for annexation, but the Jugoslavs requested the presence of a British cruiser to act as mediator. Racial feeling ran high on both sides; finally Admiral Rainer ordered marine detachments ashore on the night of November 9, in an effort to dislodge the Croat troops and support the Italians inside the city. The marines were followed by an Italian infantry battalion on November 11, which proceeded to disarm the Croat forces.[71] Four days later a Serb battalion appeared on the scene, and the resulting tension between Italians and Serbs expressed itself in "many incidents of violence."[72] Admiral Rainer demanded the immediate evacuation of Fiume by Jugoslav forces, but his ultimatum was rejected. Negociations followed, and on November 17, the Jugoslav units withdrew to an outlying district upon Rainer's promise not to land additional troops in the city for

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69. J. Buchan (ed.), Yugoslavia, London, 1923, pp. 240-41.

70. The Italian Navy in the World War, 1915-18. Appendix, Chart No. 2.

71. Nelson Page to Lansing, Rome to Washington, November 18, 1918; For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 296-97.

72. Nelson Page to Lansing, Rome to Washington, November 16, 1918; ibid, II, 339-40.

three days.[73] No sooner had the Jugoslavs departed than the Italian general in tha vicinity, Marzano, repudiated Rainer's agreement, and marched considerable numbers of Italian soldiers into Fiume.[74] This dishonorable act naturally increased the bitterness, and created an electric atmosphere. Rioting mounted in the city.[75] In order to calm the excited Jugoslavs, and speciously to grace the occupation with an interallied character the Italian Command ordered the third battalion of the American 332nd regiment to Fiume where it entered on November 19.[76]

In this way did Fiume pass under Italian control, nor did Italy later make any gesture at recalling her troops when the British were assigned Fiume as their occupation zone by the Adriatic Committee late in the month of November. For their part, the British on the spot appeared willing enough to retire from Fiume whatever the attitude of London, and allow the Italians to dominate the city and its environs. Italy employed American troops at Fiume to advance her own political interests just as she did at Cattaro, and at the time of the abortive expedition to Cettigne. When the French government protested

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73. Admiral Bullard to Admiral Benson, Fiume to Paris, December 25, 1918; ibid, II, 339-40.

74. Ibid. Also see J. Buchan (ed.), Jugoslavia, p. 241, and the general account in R. Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 51.

75. For the acute situation in Fiume at this time see For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 296-97, 303, 331-32.

76. Admiral Bullard to Benson, Venice to Paris, undated, ibid, p. 340-41.

against unilateral Italian action in Fiume, Premier Orlando in rebuttal solemnly observed that American contingents had accompanied the Italian troops, hence the operation was a legitimate interallied occupation.[77] It was deception transparently simple that the Italians were endeavoring to put over on the United States and the other allies.

However, the American and French delegates in the Adriatic keenly scrutinized Italian methods and aims, nor did they neglect to report them in detail to their political superiors in Paris and Washington. A despatch sent by Admiral Bullard which was promptly transmitted to President Wilson late in November, 1918, bluntly stated that:

> "Italian authorities have gone much farther than necessary preserving life and property or than demanded by the terms of [the] armistice and Fiume has [the] appearance [of a] permanent Italian occupation. .....It appears [that] American troops are being used to promote rather than curb Italian activities and our army representative probably has not definite instructions. ....Army officials ....are dominated by Italians."[78]

This report to the President precipitated a major crisis in connection with the American regiment, and therefore merits closer examination.

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77. Colonel Edward House to Lansing, Paris to Washington, November 20, 1918, For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 303-04.

78. Admiral Bullard to Benson, Rome to Paris, November 26, 1918. Woodrow Wilson Collection, Peace Conference Material.

On November 18, 1918, Dr. Korosec, president of the Jugoslav National Council of Zagreb appealed to Colonel House for American troops "to occupy strategic points, and points where trouble was feared because of the want of sympathy between Jugoslavs and occupying Italian troops."[79] Less than a week previously Premier Orlando had made an identical request asking for additional American units to reinforce the 332nd regiment. Thus Jugoslavs and Italians alike sought American soldiers, each, of course, for different reasons. Colonel House forwarded Dr. Korosec's appeal to President Wilson on November 18, with the recommendation that it be approved. The next day Wilson cabled his acquiescence stating that the presence of American soldiers in the disputed areas seemed to him "essential to a peaceful settlement."[80] House himself was anxious to see American troops along the Adriatic littoral because he felt they would exercise a moderating and stabilizing influence.[81]

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79. House to Lansing for President Wilson, November 18, 1918; Woodrow Wilson Collection, File IX, Box 4.

80. President Wilson to House, Washington to Paris, November 19, 1918, ibid.

81. Early in November, 1918, House had protested to Orlando the occupation by Italy of Jugoslav territory along the London Treaty line and consented "only upon the explicit promise that this territory should have the same status as the territory to be occupied under the terms of the German armistice." (House to Lansing for President Wilson, Paris to Washington, November 11, 1918, For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 287.). The Italians were one step ahead of the Colonel. They had drafted the armistice terms so that the armistice line coincided with the London Treaty line. Consequently it was legal for them to occupy all such territories within the line, and no protest, however strong, could alter the technical correctness of their legal position. The Jugoslavs simply wasted time in similar protests. (See ibid, p. 291).

Colonel House next approached the French and British governments to inquire whether they would object if American troops engaged in occupation duties in the Adriatic. Foreign minister Pichon enthusiastically approved the mission on November 23,[82] and House cabled the President to that effect the next day, having some twenty-four hours previously informed Wilson of Britain's affirmative reply.[83] Meanwhile Colonel House had invited General Pershing to present his views regarding the transportation of American units to the Adriatic. Although not fully cognizant of the situation Pershing opposed the step, but thought "that the troops already in Italy [the 332nd] might be used for occupying the disputed territory."[84] The Italians, however, did not wait for the completion of House's elaborate diplomatic exercise, but, as already described, had rushed an American battalion to Fiume on November 19, and another to Cattaro the following day. As pointed out in previous pages the Italians did not employ the American soldiers along lines which President

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82. Pichon to House, November 23, 1918. Yale House Collection.

83. House to Lansing for President Wilson, Paris to Washington, November 24, 1918. Woodrow Wilson Collection, File IX, Box 5. In his letter to house, Pichon stated that the French government "can only regard with pleasure the despatch of American troops to the [ex-Austro-Hungarian] territories where they will find French detachments beside them." France was Italy's rival in the Mediterranean, and was eager to take any reasonable step, and some perhaps not so reasonable, to limit Italian power.

84. House to Lansing, for President Wilson, Paris to Washington, December 2, 1918, For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 319.

Wilson or Colonel House would have approved, but used them to further their own particular interests, and the Jugoslavs, in requesting House for American troops, unwittingly played into Italy's hands.

Scarcely had the flurry of diplomatic activity connected with the American regiment subsided when Admiral Bullard's despatch of November 26[85] describing Italy's political use of the troops arrived in Paris. This dropped a bombshell into all previous arrangements. Forthwith communicated to President Wilson the message produced an immediate reaction, for on November 28, Secretary of War Newton Baker ordered General Pershing to recall the American regiment to his command.[86] Knowing the culpability of their activities, the Italians apparently anticipated some such American move, because on the very day (November 26) that Admiral Bullard sent his despatch the Italian government officially requested the United States not to recall the American regiment, and stated that "such a withdrawal would have [a] bad political effect upon [the] Jugoslav situation from [the] Italian standpoint."[87] How true that was the Italians

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85. Quoted above, p. 44

86. The order appears in House to Lansing for President Wilson, Paris to Washington, December 2, 1918. Woodrow Wilson Collection, File IX-A, Box 5.

87. Ambassador Page to Lansing, Rome to Washington, November 26, 1918, For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 314. On November 27, Foreign Minister Sonnino again requested Page to forward to the American government an appeal for the retention of the regiment. Sonnino at this time asked for even more troops. (Ibid. Same to same, November 27, 1918.).

fully realized, but it was the usual double-talk designed to create a favorable impression in American circles while the real motive lay concealed. Unaware of this Italian byplay Pershing obeyed his instructions from Baker, and had in fact directed General Treat to assemble the troops at an Italian port preparatory to their embarkation for the United States when Colonel House intervened. In a cable marked "secret for the President," House on December 2, 1918, advised Wilson to reverse his position and countermand the order recalling the regiment because it "might create an unfortunate impression in Italy".[88] Having assured himself that only the one regiment was involved,[89] the President, after weighing House's recommendation, decided to cancel his directive to the War Department in the interests of interallied unity. So Italy gained the laurels of a minor diplomatic victory, and the American regiment remained on the Adriatic station for the time being.

Although Colonel House had advised the President to reconsider his directive recalling the regiment, he did not underestimate Admiral Bullard's information of November 26, and He remained by no means satisfied with the peculiar situation in the Adriatic. Through Admiral Benson he caused Captain Gherardi, U.S.N., to be sent to Paris from the United States, and contemplated

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88. House to Lansing, secret for the President, Paris to Washington, December 2, 1918. Woodrow Wilson Collection, File IX-A, Box 5.

89. General Payton March, Chief of Staff, to President Wilson, November 30, 1918. Ibid, File II-A, Box 87.

entrusting him with a confidential mission into that agitated sea.[90] Circumstances favored this plan. French naval and diplomatic representatives had throughout the month of November reported on Italian Adriatic activites to their government. When the allied premiers met in London together with their foreign ministers for a series of pre-peace conference discussions on December 2,[91] the French charged the Italians with bad faith in the Adriatic, and enumerated a specific list of accusations. The Italians were compelled to agree to the establishment of a "special commission of four admirals to inquire and make a report to the allied Governments showing clearly what is [the] existing situation [in the Adriatic] and what measures it is necessary to take to safeguard against disagreement or trouble in any territories of [the] Adriatic occupied or to be occupied by Allied forces...."[92] Apprized of this resolution, Colonel House readily concurred in it, since an investigating commission neatly blended into his own plans. During the morning of December 7, he held a conference with Admiral Benson and Captain Gherardi, and here House and Benson charged Gherardi to proceed to the Adriatic, confer with Bullard, survey the situation, and report

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90. House Diary. (Unpublished). Entry for December 7, 1918. Yale House Collection.

91. Colonel House did not attend because of illness.

92. Foreign Secretary Balfour to British Embassy, London to Washington, December 2, 1918. Yale House Collection.

back to Paris in person.[93] Captain Gherardi was not a member of the investigating commission, for Benson appointed Bullard to that post; his mission was to conduct an independent American investigation while the interallied one was in progress.

On December 10, 1918, Gherardi reached Spalato in the American Zone where he met Admiral Bullard, lately returned from the Rome sessions of the Adriatic committee (November 26-29), and just beginning to concern himself with matters of civil administration in Dalmatia. From Gherardi, Bullard receive brief written and oral instuctions sent by Admiral Benson outlining his duties as investigator. By December 10, the allies had named representatives to the investigation commission; Admiral Kiddle for the British, Admiral Retye for the French, and Admiral Mola (substituting for Di Revel) for the Italians. Together with Bullard these delegates composed the already discussed Adriatic Committee, hence, in addition to their previous functions they were now charged with surveying conditions in the Adriatic. The Adriatic Committee, therefore, operated in a dual capacity. Aboard the U.S.S. Birmingham, Bullard and Gherardi on December 11, steamed to the north Adriatic; Bullard to meet with his colleagues, Gherardi to scrutinize developments on his own initiative.

The Adriatic Committee assembled first at Fiume where the tension remained unabated. Bullard and Gherardi arrived there

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93. House Diary. Entry for December 7, 1918. Yale House Collection Wrote House: "Gherardi is one of the most intelligent and trustworthy men I know."

from Venice on the U.S.S. Gregory[94] at sunset, December 14, and after looking over affairs for less than two days, Admiral Bullard was so unfavorably impressed with Italian conduct that in a report to Benson on December 16, he stated that although his instructions were general and contained "no details whatsoever" he believed none were necessary.[95] Bullard realized that his superior had not drafted a detailed directive because it was aimed at Italy, an associated power of the United States, but that he, Bullard, was expected to read between the lines. The Adriatic Committee found Fiume under the military governorship of General Grazioli, and completely dominated by the Italians who employed coercion and resorted to all kinds of propaganda. Food sent from Zagreb to needy Jugoslavs in the Fiume area was requisitioned for Italians, and the schools closed to house Italian troops. Minor street fighting occasionally flared into serious riots. The Italians had barracked the officers of the American battalion in luxurious quarters aboard an Austrian steamer "to keep them under obligation in every way."[96] Ashore, however, the American flag did not fly

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94. The Birmingham remained in Venice to take on coal, and later proceeded to Fiume under Bullard's orders.

95. Admiral Bullard to Benson, Fiume to Paris, December 16, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 332-33.

96. Admiral Bullard to Benson, Fiume to Paris, December 15, 1918. Ibid., 327-31.

above the barracks which garrisoned American soldiers, so Bullard instructed Colonel Wallace to hoist the stars and stripes. Wrote Bullard:

> "Twelve thousand Italian troops, and a battalion of American troops may compose an Inter-allied army, but it looks to me as though it was a real Italian army."[97]

The Adriatic Committee continued its inspection of the Fiume region until the latter part of December, when it removed to Venice where witnesses were called for interrogation. During this time the Italians did what they could to hinder the investigation, but they were unable to forestall the preparation of a report which, strongly influenced by the French and American point of view, condemned Italian activities in Fiume. This document not unreasonably insisted that Fiume, being the British zone of occupation, "must cease to be the object of the continued domination of the Italians," and urged that Italy evacuate her forces except for two battalions, to be reinforced by one battalion each of American, French, British, and Jugoslav troops. Admiral Mola as well as Admiral Di Revel retired from the Committee rather than sign the report, but it was nevertheless forwarded to the Supreme Council in Paris over the signatures of

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97. Admiral Bullard to Benson, Fiume to Paris, December 16, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 332-33. Actually one British and two French battalions were also in the vicinity, but were completely overshadowed by the mass of Italian troops.

the American, French, and British delegates.[98] In Paris, Orlando and Sonnino apparently succeeded in tabling the report, because Italy continued to force troops into Fiume, and in early March, 1919, Clemenceau declared that "he had the worst recollections of a commission of four Admirals sent to Fiume some three months ago," and since the "Italian Admiral had refused to submit to the views of the majority....nothing had been achieved."[99] Italian refusal to act in concert with her allies in effect eliminated the commission of inquiry which in its brief lifetime had proved it would be a source of embarrassment to Italy and her schemes. This may be counted as another minor diplomatic victory for Italy. However, before its complete demise, the investigation commission performed another inspection which will be considered in another connection. It must be emphasized that Italy did not succeed in destroying the effectiveness of the Adriatic Committee which remained the organ of interallied naval coöperation, but only in removing from it the additional function of investigation and report.

Obviously the interallied examination into conditions at Fiume accomplished nothing, but the independent American mission entrusted to Captain Gherardi produced significant results. Immediately upon his return to Paris, Gherardi presented a

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98. Information concerning the contents of the report was obtained from Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic. The chairmanship of the Adriatic Committee fell to the Italian Admiral Rombo after Di Revel's resignation, but Rombo did not sign the condemnatory report.

99. Minutes, Council of Ten, March 7, 1919. Yale House Collection.

statement containing his observations to the American Peace Mission. Later that same day, December 23, General Tasker Bliss despatched the substance of Gherardi's comments to President Wilson.

> "It is the unanimous opinion of the American Peace Mission that....the American troops are being used to further a policy of occupation and penetration.... It seems that the policy governing the use of this regiment has been to ensure the scattering of it so that at no time does it come, as a unit, under the control of its commander.... The result appears to be that the regiment is being employed not for legitimate military purposes but to further political aims." [100]

Bliss recommended that for political reasons it would be inexpedient to withdraw the regiment, but that the President should issue a directive through General Pershing governing its use. President Wilson approved this advice, but no evidence has been found indicating that he ever drafted such a directive. Further reports of Italian intrigue reached the President through diplomatic channels [101] and, in apparent dismay, he wrote on January 9 that the situation "concerns matters unhappily accumulating with which I confess I do not know how to deal." [102] All this testimony served in the end to crystallize Wilson's

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100. General Tasker Bliss to the President, December 23, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 337-38.

101. For example see ibid, II, 344-45.

102. Ibid, II, 345.

attitude inflexibly against Italy, and before long he ordered American troops to withdraw from Fiume.[103] In March, 1919, the entire regiment assembled at Genoa, and its last units embarked for the United States on April 3, 1919.[104]

The recall of the regiment was one result of Captain Gherardi's investigation. It concluded the serious and vexing problem of the political use of American soldiers by Italy to encroach upon Jugoslav territory. This entire episode strongly suggests why the occupation of Dalmatia was undertaken and carried out by American naval forces alone with no assistance from the army.

The reports on Italian Adriatic activities submitted by Admiral Bullard and Captain Gherardi to the American peace negotiators in Paris produced another important result. Due in large measure to that information the American mission in the Adriatic appreciably altered in character. It assumed a definite political color, and an American orientation which at times conflicted with its interallied aspects. During the initial phases of the Fiume inquiry Admiral Benson further defined the policy which Bullard was to follow in the Adriatic.

> "In dealing with questions which arise as a result of [Jugoslav] efforts be guided by the general principles laid

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103. Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic.

104. American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe, p. 431.

> down by the President. It is desired that our good offices be used to maintain order and assist local governments as necessary in adjusting matters local and international as they arise." 105

The "general principles" referred to Wilson's policy of national self-determination, and assistance to local governments meant aid to the Jugoslavs. This directive Benson couched in general terms because it was directed against Italy, a power friendly to the United States. Bullard, therefore, was to pursue an American program in addition to the interallied mission. It involved support to Jugoslavia against Italian attempts to prevent national unification, and consequently the United States acted not as a mediator since that presupposes neutrality on an issue, but as a Jugoslav partisan. Further confirmation of Italy's imperialist policy by Bullard and Gherardi, as already noted, reinforced the American attitude, and it is a significant fact that whereas Italian troops overran the British occupation zone and were present in the French, Admiral Bullard and his successors prevented, by a show of force when necessary, the landing of a single Italian soldier in the American zone of occupation. A statement made by President Wilson to Orlando and Sonnino on April 19, 1919, in the presence of Clemenceau and Lloyd George reaffirmed the position of the United States. Said Wilson, "If Italy had possessions in the

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105. Admiral Benson to Bullard, Paris to Fiume, December 16, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.

Eastern Adriatic it would be a threat to world peace."[106] American policy, one of its instruments being the naval mission in the Adriatic, sought frankly to exclude Italy from that region in the interests of international stability.

Admiral Bullard had not long returned to Spalato from his duties of investigation at Fiume when he was relieved by Rear Admiral A.P. Niblack as commander of the United States Naval Detachment in the Adriatic and delegate on the Adriatic Committee. This occurred on January 22, 1919. Niblack's stay on the Adriatic station was of short duration; Rear Admiral Philip Andrews succeeded him on March 26, 1919, and retained the command until April 28, 1921, at which time the Adriatic Detachment was discontinued. Although Admiral Niblack performed commendably during his brief tour of duty at Spalato, and Bullard accomplished the arduous preliminary tasks that laid the foundations of the American mission in the Adriatic, it is with Admiral Andrews' name that the Dalmatian occupation is most intimately associated. For twenty-five months he pushed forward the American objectives with a steady display of acumen, imagination, and idealism ---- all necessary ingredients in the compound of successful mission. However, before considering the work of the American naval delegates in the exercise of control in Dalmatia it is essential first to pause for a brief description of Dalmatia and the American Zone.

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106. Alrovandi Marescotti, Guerra Diplomatica, see pp. 221-39.

DALMATIA

Geologic processes have produced some curious phenomena, and Dalmatia furnishes us an interesting example.[107] The province consists of a narrow coastal strip some 240 miles long and only thirty-five miles across at its broadest point (near Spalato), then it narrows southward to about one mile at Cattaro. Excluding the fringe of numerous islands its area is 4,956 square miles, more than a third of which lay within the American zone. Dalmatia is uniformly hilly, and in some places the elevation rises sufficiently to justify employment of the adjective mountainous. It is no exaggeration to state that the rugged, barren, Karst limestone terrain completely dominates the region. On the north, Dalmatia is bounded by the Velebit range which stretches from the coast fifty miles in a southeasterly direction to merge with the Dinaric Alps. The latter chain extends about 180 miles in the same general direction to form the contiguous eastern frontier between Bosnia and Dalmatia and then joins the rocky highlands on the shore a few miles south of Cattaro. So the general shape of Dalmatia is roughly triangular; its apex lying in the south, and the irregular base situated on the north, with the mountains to the east and the Adriatic on the west being its elongated sides. The interior is Karst upland country, broken and denuded, although a number of small fertile valleys slash the mountains at right angles. Along the sea

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[107] The following geographic description of Dalmatia has been obtained from T. Jackson, Dalmatia, the Quarnero, and Istria, (3 vols., Oxford, 1887), which still remains a monumental and standard work. Supplementary material was taken from O.H. Ball, Dalmatia, London, 1932; J. Buchan (ed.), Yugoslavia, London, 1923, and H.D. Harrison, The Soul of Yugoslavia, London, 1941.

runs a coastal plain of varying width, but at some points, notably at Cattaro, the hills march right to the surf where they constitute inaccessible cliffs of considerable height.

In some remote geologic age the land mass in the eastern Adriatic sank; this phenomenon created the present thousand or more islands large and small which guard the approaches to the indented shore. These islands, being submerged crests now altered by erosion, share the same geographic features of the mainland with the exception that, whereas the latter is barren and its soil poor, they and the coastal plain are fertile and agriculturally productive. The province is drained by a number of unnavigable streams which rise in the Dinaric Alps and swiftly flow by circuitous routes westward to the sea. In the American zone the largest of such rivers was the Cetina which debouches near Spalato. In summer and winter the climate is characterized by extremes of heat and cold, although the mean temperature is about sixty degrees. The dry, frigid Bora sweeps in from the sea sometimes with sufficient velocity to derail trains. Summer is the season of the prevailing arid Sirocco accompanied by unsupportable heat which frequently causes droughts, although generally the average annual rainfall of twenty-eight inches is adequate. It is a strange land, varying from near-arctic to semi-tropical, from sterile limestone hills to luxuriant valleys.

If dependent upon its own resources Dalmatia could not support a large population. According to the Austrian census of 1910, 635,000 inhabitants lived in the province, but Jugoslav

figures for 1921 indicate an increase of fifteen thousand.[108] Of the total, 274,000 resided in the Italian occupation zone in Dalmatia; about two thirds of the remainder were domiciled in the American, and the rest in the French zone. Italians formed a small minority in Dalmatia; thirty thousand according to Italian estimates, and only eighteen thousand if Jugoslav statistics are valid. Both claims are tendencious, but whichever correct, it is a fact that although the Italian elements concentrated in the coastal cities they formed a racial majority only at Zara which was situated in the Italian zone. It is instructive to note that only fourteen thousand Italians were contained in that portion of Dalmatia assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London, and which region became her zone of occupation in November, 1918, yet Italy shamelessly abused ethnographic arguments to forward her annexionist program.

The overwhelming majority of the people, over ninety-five per cent, derived from Jugoslav stock, but that does not imply they were of similar nationality, because a heterogeneous condition existed. Represented in Dalmatia were Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes, and hardy Lika mountaineers who resemble the Montenegrins and come from the Lika Mountains which surround Spalato. In northern Dalmatia, the Italian zone, Croats predominated; in the American zone

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108 Statistics and information on the Dalmatian population has been obtained from the sources cited in note . In addition to those works the following were used. G.W. Prothero, (ed.), The Jugoslav Movement, No. 14 of Handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign Office, London, 1920. No. 11 of this series, Dalmatia contains more detailed material. C.A. Beard and G. Radin, The Balkan Pivot: Jugoslavia, New York, 1929, treats population from an economic standpoint. The Jugoslav viewpoint and statistics are found in the memorandum of claims presented to the peace conference on February 18, 1919. (Yale House Collection).

the mixture was very great, but chiefly Serbs and Croats. Towards the south, in the French zone, the proportion of Serbs and Bosnians increased. The language commonly used in the province was Serbo-Croat, and past generations had adapted it to various dialects. Religious differences were important; Croats and Slovenes professed the Roman Catholic faith; the Serbs and Lika mountaineers adhered to the Orthodox Greek, and the Bosnians were Moslems. Of the entire Dalmatian population, eighty-three per cent was Roman Catholic, sixteen per cent Orthodox, and the remainder Moslem. Denominational belief accounted for preference as to alphabets which were constantly a source of minor disagreement; the Catholic elements used the Latin, whereas Orthodox followers employed the Cyrillic alphabet. In spite of all these differences a conscious feeling of unity obtained, inspired by similarities of spoken tongue and common historical tradition.

Dalmatia was backward not only because Austria had expended little effort on its development, but also, and perhaps primarily, because the region suffered from a paucity of natural resources which could be readily transformed into foodstuffs and consumers goods without sizable capital expenditure.[109] The soil being poor in quality, eighty-three per cent of the population engaged in agriculture to procure a living, yet considerable annual imports of grain were required to provide nourishment for all. Remnants of feudal landlordism survived which subjected tenants to the corvée and other disagreeable duties, but it was on the wane in 1918,

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[109] Most useful for economic aspects are A. Mousset, Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates, et Slovenes, Paris, 1921; Beard and Radin, The Balkan Pivot: Jugoslavia, and J. Buchan (ed.), Jugoslavia.

and small proprietorship correspondingly on the increase. Dalmatians were, therefore, predominantly rural dwellers; eighty to ninety per cent living in towns of less than ten thousand, and only about seventeen per cent of the total population was engaged in occupations other than agricultural. No more than twelve per cent of the land in the interior was arable, hence most of the crops were gwown on the coastal plain and on the islands offshore. Apart from garden vegetables, Dalmatia produced grapes and olives, wine and oil being the two principal exports. Grains and semi-tropical fruits grown for local consumption, figs particularly, exhaust the list. Paradoxically enough, thirty per cent of the province was classed as forest, yet the region processed no timber because it was mostly scrub of thicket attempting without success to surmount the obstacles of an ungenerous soil and the ubiquitous goat. Similarly, statistics describe forty-five per cent of the Dalmatian mainland as pasture, but other than large herds of sheep producing inferior wool, and numerous goats yielding little milk, the cattle and pig industry was negligible.

Manufacturing and the factory system had achieved small progress in Dalmatia; most industries were in the domestic stage, and whatever staples could not be processed locally were necessarily imported. Spalato was the chief seaport of the province, and the seat of such rudimentary industry as existed. Important as shipping was to the community in the carrying trade and fisheries, for the Dalmatians were outstanding seamen and had for years supplied the Austro-Hungarian navy with its best personnel, it had not developed commensurate with native talent because Austria had placed

restrictions on Dalmatian commerce in order to encourage that industry at Trieste. However, Spalato could boast of harbor works, cement, candle, and tanning factories, and a packing house processing native sardines and olive oil for export. A few miles northeast of Spalato at Drnich and Sinj lay extensive marble quarries containing an excellent stone which was hewed, finished roughly, and transported to Spalato by narrow gauge railway for shipment abroad. These quarries employed a considerable amount of labor.

Lack of capital, Austrian lethargy, and the forbidding topography of Dalmatia prevented an extension of communication facilities which would have stimulated industry. The common beast of burden was not an engine, but a donkey which could successfully negotiate the tortuous, twisting mountain trails. Even on the coastal plain paved roads were unusual, and they uniformly yielded to primitive dirt surfaces in the interior. The entire province contained only some 160 miles of railroad track. From Spalato a line ran to Sinj; another northwest to Sebenico (in the Italian zone) with a spur to Knin. A projected track from Knin to Zagreb, and from Sinj to Sarajevo which if completed would have probably transformed Spalato into an important port remained in the blue-print stage in harmony with Austria's policy of divide and rule. To service an entire province of almost five thousand square miles Austria had maintained only about 217 post offices in Dalmatia and approximately 153 telegraph stations. The census of 1910 listed 458 public elementary schools with an enrollment of 58,600 pupils. Institutions of higher learning were limited to five <u>gymnasia</u> and

three realschulen. Although school attendance was compulsory between the ages of six and thirteen, the authorities never enforced the ruling strictly; consequently almost three fourths of the population was illiterate. However, a cultivated, literary and professional society congregated in the coastal towns. Perhaps the region could not have supported more amenities, because Dalmatia and its inhabitants were not affluent; pre-war tax receipts and the annual budget averaged about one million dollars.

The province, however, offered certain attractive resources out of character with its actual poverty, and it is partly because of this edonomic potential that Italy claimed northern Dalmatia and displayed such avidity to annex as much more of its territory as she could. In Dalmatia lay enormous bauxite beds, and abundant water power in the falls of the rivers Krka and Cetina waited to be harnessed. That combination conjured up images of humming plants turning out aluminum. Fertilizers and chemicals could also be manufactured, as indeed they later were, by utilizing hydro-electric power. In addition to valuable Dalmatian asphalt and rock salt deposits, the region near Sebenico produced coal, a fact of which the Italian government was not unaware.[110] More important than Dalmatian resources were the iron, copper, and coal fields of Bosnia which lay to the east beyond the Dinaric Alps. Should Italy have acquired Dalmatia, especially the ports of Sebenico and Spalato, located as they were on excellent harbor sites and constituting the centers of railways which ran eastward, Italian

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[110] Ambassador Page to House, Rome to Paris, June 11, 1919. Yale House Collection.

capital could have easily extended the railroads and exploited Bosnian minerals for the benefit of the Italian industrial machine. With economic prizes of such magnitude at stake it is not surprising that Orlando should have remarked to Clemenceau and Lloyd George, "For the Italians, the Jugoslavs are what the boches are for you."[111]

It has been intimated on previous pages how strategic was the position which Dalmatia occupied with reference to the naval control of the Adriatic. Her coastline, more deeply indented than any in Mediterranean waters with the exception of Greece, forms a series of excellent natural harbors. The islands are a protective barrier providing shelter from the waves and winds. If fortified astutely these harbors and islands would become virtually impregnable, and could readily accommodate sizable fleets which could steam out, attack the Italian coast at will, and withdraw to safety at the approach of presumably superior Italian squadrons. Because the east coast of Italy contains no adequate harbor between Brindisi and Venice, hostile naval units based on Dalmatian ports, even if inferior, could inflict considerable damage on Italian shipping and installations. Were Dalmatia under Italian sovereignty, however, absolute maritime control of the Adriatic would pass to Italy. Dalmatia, therefore, was the key to naval power in the Adriatic, and on this ground Italian naval and political delegates at Paris strenuously urged the allies to countenance Italian annexation.[112]

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[111] Aldrovandi Marescotti, Guerra diplomatica, p. 252. Meeting of the Big Four, President Wilson being absent, April 21, 1919.

[112] Orlando advanced this argument at a meeting of the Big Four in Paris on April 19, 1919. Aldrovandi Marescotti, Guerra diplomatica, pp. 221-39. Also see the account of a conversation between the publicist Mr. Maffii and Admiral Di Revel in Maffeo Maffii, La vittoria in Adriatico, Rome, 1919, pp. 171-78.

Spalato, an ancient and thriving city of more than 32,000 inhabitants, was the administrative capital of Dalmatia as well as its industrial and shipping center. Centuries ago the emperor Diocletian had constructed there a magnificent palace in which he luxuriated until 313, and the intelligent, cultivated citizens of Spalato pointed to that traditional imperial link with pride, but no less than to its tangible remnants -- the palace ruins -- which constituted an integral part of the city. For years the people of Spalato and its environs had been active politically. Under Austrian rule they, like all other Dalmatians, enjoyed manhood suffrage, and were well represented in the eleven delegates which Dalmatia returned to the Imperial Diet. Before the World War, the locally elected provincial Diet sat regularly at Spalato with power to act on local matters, or to bring up business in the Imperial Diet through the Dalmatian delegates. Spalato, in common with other Dalmatian towns, elected a municipal council and mayor, but in 1912, local sympathies having been vociferously expressed in favor of the Balkan allies, Austria suppressed the Dalmatian press and the municipal liberties of Sebenico and Spalato. Early in the course of the World War the Austrian government dissolved the councils of all cities in Dalmatia, but when the Imperial débacle occurred in the fall of 1918 the inhabitants were not without previous political preparation.

This experience in self-government, although limited in character, proved conspicuously helpful when the Dalmatians undertook to erect a provisional revolutionary government in October, 1918.

Late that month local leaders met at Spalato and constituted themselves into a provincial revolutionary committee, and having acknowledged the supreme authority of the National Council at Zagreb, arrogated to the committee all civil and military functions in Dalmatia. In other cities the leading citizens assembled to form municipal councils to preserve order and carry on the government which had ground to a standstill with the hasty departure of Austrian civil and military officials. For a time all was chaos and confusion. The revolutionary technique closely paralleled that in the thirteen American colonies when British power broke down in 1776. By January, 1919, however, the situation had been regularized. A governor acceptable to Belgrade and the revolutionary junta of Spalato had replaced the original committee; under him served a board acting in an advisory capacity. Provincial elections had returned members to the Diet in Spalato which since 1912 had not been in session. The governor and Diet constituted the executive and legislative branches of the provincial government. In the cities, elections had replaced the self-appointed revolutionary committees with freely chosen municipal officers and councilmen who looked to the governor and Diet for leadership. All these political arrangements were provisional, because the Peace Conference had not ruled on the status of Dalmatia which remained occupied by the Americans, Italians, and French.[113]

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[113] The provisional government of Dalmatia was abolished by the Jugoslav constitution of June 28, 1921. By the Treaty of Rapallo, previously signed, Dalmatia had been assigned to Jugoslavia.

The provisional government of Dalmatia was civilian but necessarily employed police powers very extensively because of unsettled local conditions. Belgrade detailed a general to the province who was responsible for military affairs under the governor, and who commanded the Jugoslav garrisons there.[11] Consequently, the governor could call upon several kinds of police forces in the event of disorder in Dalmatia. To supplement the regular civilian police, who numbered sixty-five in Spalato alone, he had jurisdiction over the militia, a national guard that had been constituted during the revolutionary days of October and November. Composed of armed citizens it at first did not prove entirely reliable, having participated in looting on occasion during the transitional period to independent government, but by the beginning of 1919 it formed a creditable police auxiliary.

To handle more serious disturbances and to prevent Italian encroachment, Jugoslav regulars were garrisoned in the larger cities and towns. In general the more sizable seaboard cities such as Spalato, Trau and Almissia quartered a battalion each, whereas inland towns like Sinj contained smaller units about the strength of an American company. All these forces fell under the command of the Serbian general whose headquarters and staff were located in Spalato. It should be kept clear that the foregoing in connection

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[11] Jugoslav troops, that is to say those units which had fought in the Austro-Hungarian armies against the allies, were merged on November 24, 1918, with the Serbian army. However, since the Jugoslav national union was effected in the middle of December, 1918, it is correct to term Serb troops as Jugoslav after that date.

[12] Admiral P. Andrews to Benson, Spalato to Paris, March 30, 1919. Naval Records, File VA.

with Jugoslav regulars refers to the American zone; in the Italian zone Jugoslav forces were consistently excluded because of incompatibility detailed elsewhere, although they did occasionally barrack in some small interior village if sufficiently far removed from Italian influence. The French zone contained a few Italian troops, but the overwhelming majority was French and Jugoslav.

Formally and officially the American naval governor had no police authority ashore which was deposited in Jugoslav hands by the directive which enjoined the occupying powers to work through local governments. In practice, however, the naval governor exercised an extensive influence, and it is no exaggeration that ultimate police functions in the American zone were determined by the admiral under article four of the Armistice which permitted occupation "to maintain order." The American admiral controlled not the administration of the Jugoslav civil police, militia, and regulars, but did command policy. There has been found no recorded instance where the Jugoslav officials directing policing activities in the zone failed to take cognizance of the admiral's suggestions or orders. In addition to policy control over Jugoslav police units, the naval governor landed American sailors whenever existing conditions indicated the advisability of such action. Thus, by direct and indirect methods it was American police supervision that maintained order in the zone during the period of occupation.

Such, then, was the government, physical aspect, population, and economic condition of Dalmatia when its central area from Cape Planka on the north to Slano Island on the south, a distance of more than one hundred miles, passed to American naval control in November, 1918. We must now consider the nature of American

administration, and the problems encountered by the naval governor in the execution of the naval and political phases of his mission.

## AMERICAN NAVAL CONTROL IN DALMATIA

The focal point of American authority in Dalmatia centered in Spalato where close relations were maintained with the provisional provincial government, and from the city radiated lines of American influence permeating the entire zone of occupation. For the first three weeks of November, 1918, it appeared highly doubtful that United States naval forces would occupy Spalato and the strategic areas in its neighborhood because Italy displayed so strong a disposition to extend her control there. Approached by the Italian naval command, the British naval attache to Rome agreed early in the month that Italy should occupy Spalato.[11] Although not an interallied understanding, British acquiescence provided Italy with a useful wedge in forcing open the central Dalmatian region. Had Italy dared face the consequences of unilateral action Spalato might well have been included in her zone as subsequently delimited at the Rome sessions of the Adriatic Committee. Despite unimpeachable evidence of riot and disorder in Spalato which could be made the pretext of a landing, the naval command realized that Italian occupation would cause an uprising of the countryside. Hence,

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[11] Admiral W.S. Sims to Benson, London to Paris, November 15, 1918. Naval Records, File VD.

Admiral Di Revel formally requested a joint interallied occupation on November 14, 1918,[117] but it seems that American naval forces arrived at Spalato first.

This was in connection with the transfer of the Austrian battleships Radetzky and Zrinyi together with torpedo boats numbers 12 and 52 to the custody of the United States navy for surveillance until the Peace Conference decided on their disposal. In obedience to Admiral Bullard's orders, Lieutenant Commander E. E. Hazlett, in charge of two hundred men, proceeded to Spalato on November 18, to take over the battleships.[118] When Hazlett arrived, American submarine chasers of the Otranto barrage were berthed in Spalato harbor not far from the Austrian warships which had been towed from their base at Pola with Jugoslav personnel aboard in compliance with Bullard's instructions. Hazlett manned the battleships and torpedo boats with the skeleton crew at his disposal, paid off the Yugoslav sailors, and, giving a receipt in the name of the United States, hoisted the American colors on November 20.[119] After

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[117] Ambassador Page to Lansing, Rome to Washington, November 14, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 293.

[118] Admiral Sims to Benson, London to Paris, November 18, 1918. Naval Records, File VD. The name is given as Lieutenant Commander E. E. Spafford in a Progress Report by Admiral Benson to Secretary of the Navy Daniels dated January 2, 1919. (Naval Records, File C-56-20.).

[119] Progress Report, Benson to Daniels, January 2, 1919. Naval Records, File C-56-20. For details see Naval Archives, File 28785-208:5 and 6. It should be remembered that central Dalmatia, together with Spalato, did not come under American jurisdiction as a zone of occupation until the Rome sessions of the Adriatic Committee, November 26-29, 1918.

adjustment of minor details Bullard could report on December 13, that "all the conditions of the armistice...as far as regards the participation of the United States are now complete."

The strictly naval features of the American Adriatic mission, therefore, were early on the way to completion with a minimum of difficulty. There remained only the duty of keeping watch over the ex-Austrian warships until they were allocated by an agency instituted by the Peace Conference. But the elements are treacherous and the Bora fierce in Dalmatia. During a storm in 1920 the torpedo boats dragged anchor and pounded rock until they sank in shallow water, but the battleships rode safely. Subsequently all valuable material and machinery from the grounded vessels were stowed aboard the Zrinyi and Radetzky; the hulls remained, gaunt, broken, when American forces withdrew from Spalato in 1921.

Surveillance of the warships entailed the presence of American naval units at Spalato, and establishment of at least minimum base facilities, for Austria had not constructed naval works there. No purpose would be accomplished by enumerating the various American naval vessels, cruisers, destroyers, and diminutive submarine chasers which were on station at various times in Spalato harbor.

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Admiral Bullard to Benson, Venice to Paris, December 13, 1918. Naval Records, File VA.

Admiral Andrews to Admiral L. Resio, R.I.N., August 25, 1920. Naval Archives, File 28785-208:3.

Such information is obtainable in the Logbook of the U.S.S. Olympia, and that of the U.S.S. Birmingham.

Suffice it to state that the concentration was not great from 1919 to 1921, between six and a dozen ships at any given moment were under command of the American admiral in Dalmatia. During the last two months of 1918, however, the number was considerably larger because units in the Adriatic which had been engaged in operations against Austria had not yet sailed for the United States. One ship, the U.S.S. Olympia, deserves special mention. She carried Dewey's flag at Manila Bay; from her deck Captain H.S. Knapp issued the "Proclamation of Occupation" on November 29, 1916, which established naval government in the Dominican Republic, and as Admiral Andrews' flagship she constituted the backbone of American naval power and influence along the Dalmatian seaboard. The Olympia first appeared off Spalato on February 21, 1919, and except for infrequent movements to other ports, remained there until April 26, 1921. Hence, she is closely associated with American control in the zone of occupation.

The physical facilities of the temporary American naval base at Spalato were indeed meager. Occupying one floor of the Catalinic apartment house was the United States naval port office which supervised water borne traffic at Spalato, and through which were cleared passports into and out of the zone. A wooden warehouse, an ice plant, an oil depot, a branch of the Y.M.C.A., and a recreation center in the Archaeological Museum virtually complete the list.[1] Stationed in Castelli Bay the Zrinyi and Radetzky were

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[1] Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library, to A.C.D., March 22, 1943.

used as storeships until November 1920, when destroyers transferred the stores to a modern warehouse in Sucurac, near Spalato. Fresh food, especially meat, vegetables, and fruit were purchased in Spalato and Sucurac; mess stewards went ashore daily to shop for vegetables and fruit in the local markets, but Italian dealers in Venice and Pola supplied commodities unobtainable in Dalmatia. Similarly, because necessary installations were unavailable, routine repairs to American ships were made at the Italian naval base in Venice, or in a privately owned dockyard at Pola.

Until the spring of 1919 communication between Spalato and Paris was very difficult. Telegraph lines linked Fiume to Paris via Venice, but no wire connected Fiume to Spalato. The Fiume telegraph was so overloaded and unreliable during the immediate post-armistice phase that it sometimes required as much as five days for a despatch to go through to Paris.[12] Consequently, Admiral Bullard improvised a system to insure transmission and receipt of information. At Spalato he stationed a destroyer which transmitted by radio to another American destroyer lying off Fiume. When received, the message proceeded by telegraph from Fiume to Venice and thence to Paris. To guarantee receipt of the despatch, Bullard directed the destroyer at Fiume to radio the identical message to a similar American ship anchored at Venice, and then relay it to Paris on the Venice telegraph. Duplication in sending was desirable owing to the congested state of the Fiume line, but wireless did not prove altogether satisfactory either because the air was jammed

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[12] Admiral Bullard to Benson, Fiume to Paris, December 15, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 330.

by the numerous ships in the Adriatic at that time, and it caused poor reception. Apart from the fact that radio despatches came through garbled if at all, Bullard could not afford to employ destroyers as station ships, since he required them to carry official mail. So dynamic was the Adriatic situation that Admiral Benson on December 17, instructed Bullard to write daily reports, and each week a courier would arrive to collect them for delivery to Paris.[125] This arrangement offered the dual advantages of secrecy and reliability when they were urgently required. As conditions approached normal in the late winter of 1918-19 the Fiume telegraph carried less traffic, but that only partially solved the problem. Therefore, Admiral Niblack undertook the construction of a direct line from Spalato to Fiume which was completed under Admiral Andrews in May, 1919, and afforded easy wire connection to Paris. Manned by American naval operators the telegraph remained in use until United States forces withdrew from Dalmatia in 1921 at which time it was transferred to the Jugoslavs.

The naval phase of the American mission was not its arduous feature, but that part of the directive instructing Bullard to "assist local governments"[126] gave rise to numerous delicate problems which did not abate during the entire stay in Dalmatia. Such problems resulted from the tense political relations between Italians and Jugoslavs; the American admiral's orders placed him in the difficult position of aiding one without alienating the other,

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[125] Admiral Benson to Bullard, December 30, 1918. Naval Records, File U-UB.

[126] See above, pp. 55-56.

an apparently self-contradictory task. No sooner had Italian warships put into Spalato harbor on December 12, 1918,[57] than friction developed. Within a few days a serious riot had taken place between American submarine chaser personnel and Italian crews which originated when an Italian sailor abused a native girl.[58] On December 23, after the American chasers had left for Corfu, a clash occurred at Spalato between the crew of the Italian destroyer Carabiniere and the local inhabitants. Only intervention by Serbian officers and prominent Jugoslav citizens prevented further disorder.[59] Rioting of this nature was so frequent that in late February 1919, the Adriatic Committee in its dual capacity of investigating commission (as explained previously) and interallied instrument of naval cooperation proceeded to Spalato in order to examine the situation and propose remedial measures. Before considering its deliberations we must first inquire most closely into the nature of these disorders.

Although located in the American zone allied warships could visit Spalato and other ports in central Dalmatia, because under the armistice terms the occupation was interallied. This did not alter the fact that the American admiral remained solely

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[57] The Italian Navy in the World War, 1915-1918, Appendix, Chart No. 2.

[58] R. Millholland, The Splinter Fleet, pp. 257-59.

[59] Admiral Bullard to Benson, Fiume to Paris, December 23, 1918. Yale House Collection. Also printed in For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 338.

in control there with the responsibility of a naval governor,[130] but he acted in an interallied capacity and not exclusively as an agent executing an American mission. Under this arrangement Italian warships put into Spalato regularly, and on occasion French and British naval vessels did likewise, but Italy jealously, yet tactfully, denied the same privilege to her allies as far as the Italian zone in Dalmatia was concerned except for a chance British destroyer arriving at long intervals.[131] The American admiral did, however, prevent any landing of Italian military forces in his zone. It was well known to the State Department, as this chapter has previously emphasized, that the Italian government intended to extend its sovereignty over all Dalmatian territory possible, and furthermore that Italy made no attempt to conceal its aid to the artificially stimulated national movement among the relatively few Italian partisans in that province.[132] The Italian government had even drafted plans outlining the administration

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[130] No record was found of any public proclamation issued to the Dalmatians by the three American Admirals successively on station at Spalato announcing a naval government. No technicality would have prevented such a manifesto. Admiral Millo, in charge of the Italian zone, from the first regularly styled himself "Governor of Dalmatia and the Dalmatian and Currolan islands." Dalmatia of course referred to the northern part of that province which constituted the Italian zone. (Naval Archives, File 6471-230:6).

[131] Admiral Andrews to Benson, Spalato to Paris, May 18, 1919. Naval Records, File U-UB.

[132] Ambassador Page to Lansing, Rome to Washington, November 14, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, I, 455. Also see ibid., p. 442. For a description of feeling in Italy on the Dalmatian question consult R.S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 3 vols., London, 1923, I, 89.

of Dalmatia to be put into effect after annexation. Whenever, therefore, Italian naval officers and men on liberty from ships moored in Spalato harbor set foot on shore, their behavior was truculent. Commenting on this state of affairs Admiral Andrews wrote:

> "The officers and men of the Italian ships, from the first days of the armistice came as victors, with that air and bearing, and their arrogant bearing has not decreased.... They have not avoided incidents....Their instructions have apparently been to keep alive and active the Italian spirit of the Italian minority here. Their purpose here has evidently been political, and for propaganda purposes, and everybody knows it. The Italian element here has not been martyred or abused. They have been an active minority, generally eager for incidents to be martyrs for, and always bold by reason of the backing given them by Italian men-of-war being here."

Andrews estimated that no more than three thousand Italians lived in his zone, most of them in Spalato, and it was this element which, with the moral and sometimes physical support of Italian naval personnel, participated in riots with Jugoslavs. That is not to say that the Jugoslavs were blameless, for in some instances they inflicted personal and property damage on the Italian residents. Had the Italian government withdrawn its ships from Spalato, or even had the naval command simply restricted liberty parties ashore as Admiral Andrews frequently and futilely suggested to the Italian authorities, all unpleasant incidents would have promptly ceased.[34] As matters were -- and remained -- the American

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[33] Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, July 30, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-230:7.

[34] Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, July 26, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-230:6. Also see Admiral Andrews to Benson, Spalato to Paris, March 30, 1919. Naval Records, File VA.

naval governor was constantly plagued by popular eruptions requiring close police supervision.

On February 24, 1919, the French, British, and Italian members of the Adriatic Committee proceeded to Spalato to meet with Admiral Niblack aboard the Olympia and confer on disturbed conditions in the American zone. A Jugoslav commission headed by a Serb colonel had called on the admiral earlier that day to acquaint him with latest developments ashore, but departed before the allied admirals arrived. That evening another riot broke out in Spalato, so the captain of the Olympia and Lieutenant Commander R.S. Field together with a few men left the ship to investigate while an armed landing force aboard stood by ready for action. After two hours rockets were seen fired from ashore, a prearranged signal indicating that the disturbances had subsided. The native police, reinforced morally by the presence of American authority, had quelled the riot. When the Adriatic Committee sat in its first formal session aboard the Olympia the next morning the cumulative troubles in the zone, emphasized by the events of the preceding evening, contributed to a quick decision. Four interallied patrols were to circulate day and night through the city, each patrol to be composed of one officer, one chief petty officer, twelve enlisted men, one local policeman, and one Serb soldier. Each allied nation represented on the Committee would contribute an officer, a chief

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Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic.

U.S.S. Olympia, Logbook, February 24, 1919.

petty officer and three men to every patrol, its officer to hold the command. The organization of these police units were entrusted to Admiral Niblack who detailed Lieutenant Commander Field as chief officer of all patrols.[137] No evidence has been found of extensive rioting in Spalato while the patrol system continued, hence it may be concluded that the interallied police under control of the American naval governor proved effective.

Before the Adriatic Committee dispersed an incident occurred which focuses many aspects of the type of authority exercised by the American naval governor. General Milosh Wassith, commanding officer of all Jugoslav garrisons in the American zone, sent an urgent letter to Admiral Niblack on February 26, 1919.[138] In it he reported that six thousand Italian troops had arrived at the village of Muc during the previous night, and that a similar number equipped with artillery was expected within the next twenty-four hours. At Muc the Italians boasted that they would march in two columns upon Spalato and Sinj, both cities in the American zone. Wassith requested Admiral Niblack to authenticate the news and prevent the Italian advance. The next day Niblack communicated this information to Admiral Rombo, chairman of the Adriatic Committee, with the statement that:

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137 U.S.S. Olympia, Logbook, February 25, 1919. Also Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library, addressed to A.C.D., March 22, 1943. Field quartered the patrol on the U.S.S. Israel.

138 All factual material on this incident was obtained from Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic.

> "Such a movement of troops at this time cannot but have grave results in my endeavors to maintain order in the American Zone, now seriously disturbed at Spalato and Trau. I request that you immediately inform me whether this information is to your knowledge, correct or incorrect, and what assurances you can give me as to its import. I cannot but view this movement of troops at this time in any other light than unfortunate."

Admiral Niblack threatened to bring the matter up before the session of the Adriatic Committee scheduled for February 28, and on that warning note closed the letter, copies of which he despatched to the British and French delegates.

Rombo returned an immediate reply categorically denying all allegations of Italian troop movements. Receiving this disclaimer with some doubts of its veracity, Admiral Niblack sent word throughout the affected areas of his zone announcing that "there will be no Italian occupation...the population may rest quiet." At Trau, a city of some 25,000 inhabitants, the local officials placarded public places to that effect. Much exercised over this blow to Italian prestige, Rombo wrote to Niblack asking whether he had distributed such information, and simultaneously lodged a formal protest. Admiral Niblack composed a scorching rejoinder in which he stated:

> "My answer is, yes. I did not give any directions to the Local Government as to how to use this information, and...if it was posted, I am very glad...because it served the purpose for which I intended the information... namely, to allay the fear, excitement, and dread in this community [American zone] that any change will be made in the present arrangement."

Naturally this only rubbed salt in the wound, but Rombo perforce let the matter drop since he had no control over the powers of the

American naval governor, nor could singly alter dispositions in his zone.

This incident throws into relief the complex arrangements in the American zone; it illustrates the type of sortie, actual and rumored, by which Italy attempted to penetrate into the region, and how the naval governor met such a putsch by firmness and exercise of moral influence. It typifies the harmony which existed between the Yugoslav military personnel and the American admiral, and underscores their reluctance to act alone against Italy by showing that they worked through the naval governor. It provides a case study in the use of propaganda by Niblack, and portrays the functions of the Adriatic Committee as the instrument of inter-allied naval coöperation and its employment as a court of appeal. Finally, it records one instance in the execution of the American mission to "assist local governments", in this case by frustrating a contemplated Italian expansion into central Dalmatia.

The degree of control exercised by the American admiral in his zone varied with circumstances but he always exerted a wide influence. He was not responsible for the colossal job of relief after the armistice, for that remained within the province of Herbert Hoover's organization. Admiral Bullard did, however, assist Colonel Atwood, whom Hoover had detailed as his representative in Serbia, to expedite the flow of foodstuffs to Adriatic ports under an American credit extended to that government. Docking facilities, stevedores, and warehouses were arranged for by Bullard's staff to handle these food shipments.[139] This humanitarian program did not

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[139] For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 683 and 713.

endear itself to the Italian navy which yearned for its full pound of flesh. Early in December, 1918, Italians halted two laden foodships at Cattaro that were bound for the relief of Spalato, and escorted the vessels to an Italian port.[140] It is true that the Supreme Council did not lift the Adriatic blockade until March 8, 1919,[141] and that therefore Italy could appeal to the letter of the law, but her action was manifestly contradictory to the policy of the United States and Britain, and was intended to exert economic pressure upon the Yugoslavs in Dalmatia. Neither Bullard nor the State Department protested the matter to Italy.

On the other hand, certain acts of the American naval governor demonstrate the virtually boundless limits of his authority. When the Yugoslav government in Belgrade sought to recruit troops in the American zone, Admiral Andrews prevented it by "personal representation to [the] local government."[142] On two different occasions Belgrade attempted to introduce Jugoslav law into the zone; both times Andrews resisted by indicating that, being an occupied territory, the region must remain under the Austrian law of its former sovereign.[143] Constantly the naval governor played the

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140 Aide memoire, Serbian Legation to Department of State, December 5, 1918. For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, II, 321.

141 Minutes, Council of Ten, March 8, 1919. Naval Records, File QW.

142 Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, July 3, 1920. Naval Archives, File 29231-5:1.

143 Ibid.

rôle of mediator and arbitrator in adjusting questions between the provisional government and Italian authorities. He presented the statements and opinions of one side to the other, or, both parties willing, he decided on an issue. Numerous examples of this form of control are on record.[44] On his own initiative Admiral Andrews discontinued on April 26, 1919 the interallied patrol established by the Adriatic Committee, a unilateral alteration of conditions in the American zone. He "forced the Serbs [Jugoslavs] to take the military control on shore,"[45] but at the same time instituted a small American naval patrol drawn from United States ships present to circulate in Spalato during daylight hours.[46] In this way Andrews eliminated the European allies from sharing any vestige of the authority vested in him so far as police power ashore was concerned, ejected particularly the Italians whom he considered troublemakers, and together with the Jugoslavs policed the area with Americans. This arrangement continued until the occupation ended in 1921.

The presence of Italian naval units in the harbor, however, continued to breed disorder even after their crews had been excluded from the patrols. On March 11. 1919 Italian naval personnel became involved in a minor riot,[47] and again on May 15, that same year a

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[44] Naval Archives, File 29231.

[45] Admiral Andrews to Force Commander, Spalato to London, July 25, 1920. Naval Records, File VA.

[46] Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library, to A.C.D., March 22, 1943.

[47] U.S.S. Olympia, Logbook, March 11, 1919.

disturbance was precipitated when Italian officers failed to stand at attention for the Serbian national anthem.[148] Elsewhere the same sort of friction between Jugoslavs and Italians also took place; for example, after an attempted Italian encroachment upon Laibach, the frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia was closed on February 21, 1919. Nowhere along the Dalmatian coast did the Italians endeavor to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Even Signor Branchi, who associated himself with the more moderate renunciatori party, could exclaim:

> "The Jugoslavs do not exist; they have never existed. They are merely Croats, and we know by bitter experience that... they are more or less savages controlled by the priests..." 149

Spalato was full of thousands of refugees from the Italian zone to the north where the aggressive Italian naval governor Admiral Millo ruled with an iron hand. Jugoslavs were beaten, their ration cards seized, and other disagreeable cruelties inflicted on them. Millo suppressed all personal liberties, and dissolved the Jugoslav press and societies; he liquidated thirty out of thirty-three municipal councils, and dismissed more than half the local magistrates. Teachers, doctors, priests, and political leaders were harassed, deported in batches, and replaced by Italians. In order to erect a facade behind which to carry out this ruthless policy of denationalization, the Italians issued false reports of smallpox outbreaks, epidemics of skin disease, and the like.[150] It

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148 U.S.S. Olympia, Logbook, May 15, 1919.

149 Diary of Gino Speranza, Italy 1915-1919, p. 229; edited by Florence C. Speranza, New York, 1941.

150 Material on Italian activities in northern Dalmatia during the occupation has been collated from the following sources. Admiral Andrews to Benson, Venice to Paris, May 10, 1919. (Naval Records, File U-UB). H. Temperley (ed.), Peace Conference, IV, 304 and note, Report of Italian Senator Salvemini, November 24, 1920. D.H. Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (21 vols., New York, 1928), IX, 12-13, Doc.844, Report of Professor H. Temperley on Dalmatia, April 22, 1919. It will be noted that the sources are American, Italian, and British respectively; each agree on Italian terrorization.

becomes obvious therefore, why friction should develop between Jugoslavs and Italians in the American zone when just a few miles away such a brutal program was being conducted by Admiral Millo. After Nitti succeeded Orlando as prime minister on June 19, 1919 terrorization of Jugoslavs abated, but large numbers continued to stream into central Dalmatia where the presence of the American naval governor guaranteed decent treatment.[51]

Admiral Andrews wasted no sympathy on Italian methods. In a despatch to Admiral Benson he flatly stated:

> "The more I see and hear the more I know the Italian demands are without justice, and their actions based only on cruelty and lack of consideration. They are totally unreasonable. I have held the scales <u>even</u> [sic] here, and have dispensed justice so that both sides are grateful."[52]

He opined that the Italian naval command had with forethought selected officers most aggressive and reckless in temperament to deal with Dalmatian affairs, and he characterized Admiral Rombo, chairman of the Adriatic Committee, as "one of the most annoying and contemptible persons [he had] ever met."[53] What Andrews did not comprehend was that any protestations of gratitude he received from Italian naval officers in acknowledgment for having "dispensed justice" were but temporary and skin-deep. The alleged historian, Camillo Manfroni, spokesman for the Italian navy and more moderate than most, in 1923 alluded to the Dalmatian

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[51] Admiral Andrews to Force Commander for the Secretary of the Navy, Spalato to Washington via London, February 17, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-228.

[52] Admiral Andrews to Benson, Spalato to Paris, May 19, 1919. Naval Records, File U-UB.

[53] Admiral Andrews to Benson, Venice to Paris, May 10, 1919. Naval Records, File U-UB.

occupation applying to the American naval governors such epithets as ignorant, insulting, and disputatious.[154] It is not surprising that the admirals should have incurred such hostility, for in carrying out the political features of the American mission they were compelled, the situation in the eastern Adriatic being what it was, to adopt an anti-Italian attitude.

An increasing spirit of Jugoslav resistance to Italian oppression became noticeable in the forepart of 1920. The nation's youth was eager to begin comatadji warfare, and observers expressed the opinion that the Jugoslavs possessed the necessary power to drive Italy from her zone in Dalmatia.[155] Nevertheless, older heads among the Jugoslavs realized how strong was their position before the world, and that to launch a drive against the Italians would result in prejudicing that favorable international sentiment. Had hostilities on a large scale erupted it is very probable that Admiral Andrews and his detachment would have been withdrawn from Dalmatia. In this connection it is significant that Secretary of the Navy Daniels, responding to a Senate resolution calling for information on Dalmatia, stated that Andrews had "no real function in the Adriatic other than to safeguard" the Austrian warships,[156] an

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[154] C. Manfroni, Storia della marina Italiana durante la guerra mondiale, Bologna, 1923, passim, but see especially page 383. For really rabid work on the "puro eroismo" of the Italian navy consult A. Balliano and G. Soavi, L'Italia sul mare nella grande guerra, Torino, 1934; and A. Ginocchietti, La guerra sul mare, Rome, 1930.

[155] Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, June 27, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-230:5.

[156] Secretary of the Navy Daniels to President Wilson, October 7, 1919. Woodrow Wilson Collection, File VIII, Box 6.

official position incompatible with the actual fact of the admiral's control in his zone. This occurred in October, 1919, when the big debate on the Treaty of Versailles was promoting isolationism in the United States. By the middle of 1920 isolationism had so far progressed that undue complications in the Adriatic almost inevitably would have resulted in recall of the American detachment.

Nothing like that happened, but the aggravating presence of Italian men-of-war at Spalato and the growing restlessness of Jugoslavs throughout Dalmatia, a feeling which communicated itself to the American zone, created conditions that finally exploded in a widespread clash. On July 11, 1920, the Italian cruiser Puglia lay moored to a breakwater in Spalato harbor. Two Italian petty officers pulled down a Jugoslav flag flying nearby. They were contested by some natives, and before long the contagion had spread with partisans of both sides hastening to join the fray. In the ensuing gun fight a few men were killed or wounded, but no American nationals were involved.[157] This riot frightened and angered Italian authorities. Admiral Millo issued a decree which he caused to be posted in the Italian zone among other things elevating breach of peace to a crime, and tightening up on passport regulations. Deportations immediately increased in volume, swelling the Jugoslav population in the American zone.[158]

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[157] Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, July 10, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-230:6.

[158] Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, July 19, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-230:6.

There is no evidence to show that the American naval patrol concerned itself with pacifying this clash, but Admiral Andrews did undertake to investigate the incident, and his findings laid the blame upon the Italians. Admiral Millo despatched Rear Admiral Resio to Spalato for a consultation with Andrews. Captain Menini of the Puglia and Resio made much of a perverted half-truth that Italian naval personnel could not go ashore without molestation by hostile Jugoslavs. Andrews maintained that if Italy withdrew her warships from Spalato peace would be restored in his zone. This the Italians refused to do, for it would "look like being driven away."[159] Admiral Andrews had no power to order Italian warships from Spalato since the occupation was under inter-allied auspices, but it lay within his province to deny Italian liberty parties the privilege of going ashore since he was charged with the preservation of order in the zone. He never did take this step, presumably to avoid a further deterioration in Italo-American relations on the Dalmatian littoral, and consequently paid the penalty in being forced to deal with intermittent disturbances.

Another incident had earlier occurred in the American zone which must be sketched in here because it illustrates how the naval governor by a show of force dealt with an Italian sortie. Gabriele d'Annunzio, poetaster and irresponsible chauvinist, banded together a motley rabble of filibusters, and on September 12, 1919, seized Fiume, the regular Italian divisions in occupation there conveniently retreating before his few rifles. Using a similar

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159 Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, July 26, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-230:6.

technique, his partisans attempted to capture other towns desired by Italian imperialists. Several truckloads of irregulars officered by a captain emerged from the Italian zone in Dalmatia on September 23, and descended upon Trau where, after a brief skirmish, they disarmed the small Jugoslav garrison.[160] The Belgrade government believed this was the beginning of a concerted attack on Dalmatia, and accordingly protested vigorously to the Peace Conference, but before the ponderous wheels of diplomacy could turn the affair had subsided. Because Trau was situated in the American zone, the sortie became a problem for the naval governor. Appealed to by the provisional government of Dalmatia and by the Serbian general in command of Jugoslav troops, the naval governor sent Captain Boyd together with landing parties from the Olympia and Cowell "to give notice that they [Italian filibusters] would not be allowed to take the city of Trau."[161] Boyd presented the Italians with a two-hour ultimatum, and they withdrew. So great was the moral influence of the Americans that a show of force sufficed to end the illegal occupation.

Afraid that D'Annunzio's followers would not rest content, particularly after he had bombastically declared war on Jugoslavia, (September 29, 1919), the Belgrade government in October invoked the United States to order more warships to the Adriatic for the purpose of protecting Jugoslav interests and stabilizing conditions.

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[160] Secretary of the Navy Daniels to President Wilson, October 7, 1919. Woodrow Wilson Collection, File VIII, Box 6.

[161] Admiral Niblack, Memorandum on the Adriatic.

This request was denied, and Admiral Andrews received no reinforcements.[162] With regard to the Trau sortie it is a curious fact that Admiral Millo asked the American naval governor to turn the raiders back, and when it had been accomplished, conveyed his thanks. It is curious because in so doing Millo did not follow the policy of his government. Ostensibly to put pressure on D'Annunzio Italy declared a blockade around Fiume, but it was flimsiest paper, a farce, and intended as such. D'Annunzio's irregulars were even permitted to garrison the armistice line alongside battalions of the Italian army. In other words the Italian government tolerated, if it did not connive at the Fiume putsch. Now Italy did not yield her claims on Dalmatia until December, 1919,[163] hence it is difficult without unwarranted speculation to account for Millo's action in this instance.

The preceding pages have described the nature of American administration in central Dalmatia, and emphasized the type of problem encountered by the naval governor in carrying forward the political features of his mission. We must now turn to an examination of the concluding phases of the American occupation.

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[162] Admiral H. Knapp to Naval Operations, London to Washington, undated, but October 1919. Naval Archives, File 27844-1126.

[163] H. Temperley (ed.), Peace Conference, IV, 311 ff.

## CONCLUSION OF THE OCCUPATION

At Paris during 1919 the Peace Conference intermittently discussed the disposal of all surrendered enemy warships held under allied surveillance, and tried to work out a guiding principle. The budding Anglo-American naval rivalry, and the scuttling of German men-of-war at Scapa Flow in June, injected a note of bitterness into the conversations. It was on December 9, 1919, that the Conference of Ambassadors finally decided that the interned German and Austrian naval units should be distributed among the allies according to a tonnage ratio which. incidentally, scarcely took into account the economic sacrifice made by the United States in the late war.[164] These vessels were to be broken up or sunk, except for a few units that France and Italy were permitted to incorporate into their fleets. The Conference established an Interallied Committee for the Destruction of Enemy Warships to make allocations of specific ships and guarantee their dismantling by the recipient power. To France the Interallied Committee allotted the ex-Austrian pre-dreadnoughts Zyrini and Radetzky, and to Italy the torpedo boats, 12 and 52. It will be remembered that these ships were in American custody at Spalato.

Shortly after the allocations had been worked out on paper the French approached the Italians with a proposition to

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[164] Piqued by this, and having no urgent desire for the warships anyway, the United States ultimately refused its allotted share. The few units, notably the Ostfriesland, which were conveyed to the United States for inspection, testing, and bombing were acquired under another agreement.

exchange their ships, Zrinyi and Radetzky, for the Prinz Eugen, an ex-Austrian dreadnought granted to Italy. After some delay caused by Italian reluctance, an agreement was effected in July 1920 approving the transfer on the basis of a French promise to negotiate with the United States for a quick delivery of the Zrinyi and Radetzky to Italy. Therefore, even while the Italo-French conversations were in progress, Italy displayed a keen interest in the two pre-dreadnoughts anchored in Castelli Bay. No later than February,1920,Italian authorities requested Admiral Andrews to deliver the ships, but, referring the matter to the force commander in London who got in touch with the American ambassador in Paris, Andrews found the Italian appeal denied on the grounds that "it was an attempt to remove our reason for being in the Adriatic, and thus get the American ships out." Having little faith in Italy's good behavior in the Adriatic the Americans turned down the application.

In March,1920, when Admiral Andrews was in Rome, the Italian minister of marine reopened the question. On this occasion Andrews temporized by replying that the ships would probably be delivered when the Treaty of St. Germaine had been ratified by the three powers requisite before it came into force. Again Andrews forwarded Italy's request to the force commander, Admiral Knapp. At the same time Italy pushed the matter through regular diplomatic channels; the American ambassadors to Paris and Rome cabled to the State Department the wishes of the Italian government, and the

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165 Naval Archives, File 28785-208:1.

166 Naval Archives, File 28785-208:1.

Italian ambassador to Washington personally made similar representations. But the State Department was reluctant. It desired primarily to condition transfer of the warships upon the simultaneous evacuation of central Dalmatia by American and Italian naval forces, that is, to liquidate the American mission successfully by manoeuvering all Italian ships out of Spalato.

Admiral Andrews emphatically endorsed this attitude in July 1920, and even went beyond by recommending that American units be withdrawn from Spalato "if the Italian naval personnel remained there and continued their propaganda and provocative tactics . . ." since it might appear that the United States was supporting Italian policy.[167] Authorization for unilateral evacuation did not come through; Italo-American negotiations in Washington lagged. Carrying out their part of the transfer bargain referred to above, the French now injected themselves into the question. On instructions from Paris the French naval attaché in Rome asked the American attaché to have the Zrinyi, Radetzky, and the two torpedo boats turned over to Italy. Perhaps unaware that this step was linked to a larger political problem, the American naval attaché on August 6, 1920, simply directed a memorandum to Andrews advising him to get in touch with his seniors and then deliver the men-of-war to Italy.

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[167] Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, Spalato to Washington, July 25, 1920. Naval Archives, File 29231-8.

[168] Naval Archives, File 28785-208:1.

Obviously Admiral Andrews could not take such action without instructions from the force commander, so he referred the memorandum to Admiral Knapp. He, in turn, applied to Washington with the result that the languishing diplomatic negotiations revived. On September 12, 1920, the Italian government definitively declined to evacuate its ships from Spalato in return for the delivery of the ex-Austrian men-of-war.[164] Having no other alternative, since it could not postpone the matter indefinitely, the State Department accepted the Italian position. So it happened that in late October Admiral Andrews received an authorization to turn over the ships, all details of the operation being left to his discretion. The Italians feared if they themselves removed the vessels it would be so distasteful to the Jugoslavs that the spectacle might well precipitate a riot ashore. Rear Admiral Resio therefore submitted these views to Admiral Andrews, and asked that American units tow the warships outside the harbor. Upon his consent the Olympia and two destroyers on November 7, 1920, towed the ex-Austrian battleships out to sea in the direction of Sebenico where they were formally made over to the Italian navy. This operation concluded the naval aspects of the American mission in the Adriatic begun two years before almost to a day.

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Italian Ambassador to Mr. Colby, September 12, 1920. Naval Archives, File 28766-161:25.

Intelligence Report, November 9, 1920; Naval Records, File C-10-a. Also Naval Archives, File 28785-208:3, 4, and 6. All valuable parts of the two torpedo boats which had been wrecked by a storm earlier in the year were stowed aboard the battleships when the Italians received them in November, 1920.

If Italy, as appears likely, hoped to induce the United States to withdraw its warships from Spalato immediately following the disappearance of the Zyrini and Radetzky only disappointment awaited, because American units remained for another eleven months. Italy having refused to evacuate its men-of-war from Spalato when the ex-Austrian pre-dreadnoughts were delivered to Italian representatives, the State Department had the navy maintain American vessels on station. It was a gesture, but an important one. True enough, Italy had officially relinquished claims to Dalmatia in a memorandum addressed to the allies, (December 1919), but vis-à-vis Jugoslavia she pressed the claims as a bargaining point to obtain Fiume. This was not reassuring. On the other hand Italy recalled her troops from Cattaro and Antivari in June, 1920, where they had been stationed as part of an interallied force of occupation since the early days of the armistice.[11] However, the State Department apparently wished to see Italy withdraw not only her ships from Spalato, but also her troops from the Italian zone before concluding the American mission in the Adriatic. The objective, therefore, was political in nature.

Several events occurred about this time which strengthened Jugoslavia, and gave assurance that she would not fall an easy victim to Italian aggression. In August, 1920, the Czechs signed

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[11] Admiral Andrews to Naval Operations, October 18, 1920. Naval Archives, File 29231-3. Cf. H. Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, 309. France handed over the administration of the Cattaro region to the Jugoslavs in October 1920, and evacuated Cattaro finally on March 4, 1921. This liberated the eastern Adriatic littoral south of Slano from allied control. On French evacuation see Memorandum of Conference of Ambassadors to the Jugoslav Delegation, September 15, 1920. Naval Archives, File 6471-230:9.

a convention of alliance with Jugoslavia. This was followed by the Treaty of Rapallo on November 12, in which Italy renounced her claims to Dalmatia, and consented to see Fiume established as an independent city. When, in June of the next year, Jugoslavia and Rumania initialed an alliance, the Jugoslavs were in a position to take care of themselves.

Equally reassuring to the State Department was Italy's announcement in the late winter of 1920-21 that she would evacuate the Italian zone of occupation in four stages beginning April 1 with the area north of Spalato. This first movement was carried out on schedule, but subsequent withdrawals were delayed partly owing to inertia, and partly to the difficulty of reconstructing the local governments which Admiral Millo had so thoroughly uprooted. It was not until the winter of 1921 that Italian forces finally left Dalmatia. The important thing from the American standpoint was that Italy had committed herself to retire from the Dalmatian littoral.

Before this had been accomplished, Admiral Andrews was back in the United States. A final meeting of the Adriatic Committee on January 31, 1921, wound up the business outstanding, and on April 2 Andrews received instructions to discontinue the Adriatic detachment. That month, on the 26, he steamed out of Spalato aboard the Olympia, and after exchanging a national salute with the shore battery,

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Naval Archives, File 6869-731.

Ibid., File 6471-230: 20 and 22.

Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library, to A.C.D., March 22, 1943.

shifted his flag outside the harbor to the U.S.S. Sturtevant and proceeded to Venice. Two days later he hauled down his flag as commander of the United States naval detachment in the Adriatic.[115] That he had understood and competently executed the American political mission in the Adriatic is testified by a letter which he received while preparing his departure. It was sent by the Jugoslav mayor of Sebenico, a city in the Italian zone, and thanked him as a representative of the United States for having protected the Dalmatians from the Italians for the past two years.[116]

American destroyers remained at Spalato, however, after Andrews left the station. Command of the temporary naval base devolved automatically upon the senior officer present, but there was little to do. Italo-Jugoslav friction had not entirely disappeared, but Italy was in the process of liquidating her Dalmatian enterprise. Orders eventually arrived to close up the base, and -- strange fate indeed -- it was accomplished by the U.S.S. Reuben James under the command of R.F. Zogbaum, senior officer in the Adriatic. Leaving among other items two propellers, a tug, and several tons of oil to the Jugoslavs, the destroyer sailed for home, thereby becoming the warship that concluded American World War naval operations in the Adriatic theater. It was September 29, 1921 when the Reuben James stood out of Spalato.

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Memorandum, Office of Naval Records and Library, to A.C.D., March 22, 1943.

Admiral Andrews to Admiral A.P. Niblack, no date but end of April 1921. Naval Archives, File 29231-11.

As an indication of what thirty-five months of American naval control in central Dalmatia meant to the Jugoslavs one need only refer to the parting comment made to Zogbaum by Dr. Metlicic, governor of Dalmatia. "What," anxiously queried the governor, "shall we do now that we have no one to keep the Italians from around our necks?"[17]

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[17] R.F. Zogbaum to Naval Operations, October 7, 1921. Naval Archives, 28856-671.

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